USCG

During our ongoing audit of DHS law enforcement virtual training, we learned that the Coast Guard uses functional firearms to conduct DVD-based simulation training.  We identified this issue in Coast Guard’s Commandant Instruction 3574.5C, 18 September 2014, Coast Guard Judgmental Use of Force Evaluation and observed a demonstration of this training at one Coast Guard location.  According to testimony or policy from four other DHS components that employ or train law enforcement personnel, the use of functional firearms during video-based simulation training is prohibited within their respective components.  By using functional firearms capable of firing ammunition, even if emptied of ammunition, in DVD-based simulation training, Coast Guard increased the risk of unintentional injury or death.  Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation and took immediate corrective actions to discontinue the use of functional firearms during DVD-based simulation training.  The recommendation is resolved and closed.

DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities.  This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability.  We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.      

We identified 16 allegations of race-based harassment involving cadets between 2013 and 2018 that the Coast Guard Academy (the Academy) was aware of and had sufficient information to investigate and address through internal hate and harassment procedures.  The OIG identified issues in how the Academy addressed 11 of them.  First, in six incidents, the Academy did not thoroughly investigate the allegations, and/or did not discipline cadets when investigations documented violations of cadet regulations or Coast Guard policy.  In two of these instances, cadets committed similar misconduct again.  The Academy also did not fully include civil rights staff as required in six instances (including two of the instances noted previously).  Therefore, civil rights staff could not properly track these incidents to proactively identify trends and offer the Academy assistance.  In addition, in one incident involving a potential hate allegation, the Academy did not follow the Coast Guard process for hate incidents.  Finally, our review determined that race-based harassment is underreported at the Academy for various reasons, including concerns about negative consequences for reporting allegations.  Underreporting is especially concerning because our questionnaire results and interviews indicate harassing behaviors continue at the Academy.  We made five recommendations that will enhance the Academy’s ability to address harassment and hate allegations, including ensuring the Academy consistently investigates allegations, requiring the reasons for disciplinary decisions be documented after race- or ethnicity-based harassment investigations, informing civil rights staff of all misconduct that could reasonably relate to race or ethnicity; and improving training related to preventing and addressing race-based or ethnicity-based harassment or hate incidents.  The Coast Guard concurred with all recommendations

DHS developed a strategy to apply 29 lessons learned from prior system updates to the current Financial Systems Modernization (FSM) TRIO program. Since DHS’ actions provides a positive outlook on the future progress of the FSM TRIO project we made no recommendations for improvement.  The report’s limited objective and scope does not provide a complete assessment DHS’ efforts to incorporate lessons learned into their recently reinvigorated FSM efforts. 

The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company –DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) Detailed Accounting Submission. Coast Guard management prepared the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures in accordance with requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to Williams Adley’s attention that caused it to believe that the Coast Guard’s FY 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the Circular. Williams Adley did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

We intended to verify whether the U.S. Coast Guard is properly reporting service members who are prohibited from possessing a firearm (“prohibited individuals”) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, in comparing relevant databases with data into the National Instant Background Check System (NICS), We identified a number of issues that led us to question the reliability of the Coast Guard’s data.  As a result, OIG cannot identify the full scope of prohibited individuals or verify that the Coast Guard properly reported prohibited individuals to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and to Congress.  Despite our concerns about the quality of Coast Guard’s data, OIG identified 210 service members who committed offenses that placed them in one of the categories of prohibited individuals.  Of these 210, Coast Guard did not enter 16 service members (8 percent) into NCIS.  This underreporting occurred because Coast Guard policy did not require attorneys to forward information about all individuals referred for trial by general court martial for reporting to the FBI.  Additionally, Coast Guard’s reporting to the FBI is centralized, and does not allow investigators in field offices to have direct access to NICS.  We made eight recommendations that will enhance Coast Guard’s reporting of prohibited individuals to the FBI.  The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations.

DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law.  This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort.  As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment.  This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities.  Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents.  Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities.  During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list.  This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life.  Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures.  This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards.  The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.

The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires the Office of Inspector General to conduct an annual risk assessment and periodic audits on agency charge card programs. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security implemented internal controls to prevent illegal, improper, and erroneous purchases and payments. During fiscal year 2016, DHS reported spending approximately $1.2 billion in purchase, travel, and fleet card transactions. Although the Department has established internal controls for its charge card programs, the components we reviewed did not always follow DHS’ procedures. Our testing results of purchase, travel, and fleet card transactions revealed internal control weaknesses. Specifically, we found major internal control weaknesses that persisted at the United States Coast Guard and some control weaknesses within CBP’s Fleet Card Program.