USSS
United States Secret Service
- Report NumberOIG-24-42Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2024
DHS Office of Inspector General Announces Reviews of Secret Service Process for Securing Trump Campaign Event on July 13, 2024, Secret Service Counter Sniper Preparedness, and Secret Service Planning and Implementation Activities for Protective Operations
CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy Policies or Develop Sufficient Policies Before Procuring and Using Commercial Telemetry Data - (REDACTED)
Report NumberOIG-23-61Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2023Secret Service and ICE Did Not Always Adhere to Statute and Policies Governing Use of Cell-Site Simulators - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED)
Report NumberOIG-23-17Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2023DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities
Executive SummaryUnder 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon. However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020. Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland. This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements. We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property. DHS concurred with both recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-21-31Issue DateDocument FileKeywordsFiscal Year2021Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)
Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)
DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA
Executive SummaryDHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA). Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims. Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims. We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role. Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent. We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures. DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.
Report NumberOIG-20-66Issue DateDocument FileKeywordsFiscal Year2020United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort
Executive SummaryThe U.S. Secret Service incurred operational and temporary duty costs for rental cars, hotel rooms, meals and incidentals, overtime pay, commercial airfare, golf cart rentals, and other logistical support. Certain details of the cost information related to the Secret Service’s protective operations presented in the report are designated as Law Enforcement Sensitive. We did not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President because the Secret Service would have incurred these costs regardless of whether the President traveled. Also excluded are costs associated with assistance provided by the Department of Defense, such as the use of military aircraft to transport personnel and equipment, because the Secret Service is not required to reimburse these costs. We did not identify any fraud indicators or unauthorized costs. We made no recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-20-18Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2020Whistleblower Retaliation Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged Reprisal Against a Secret Service Special Agent