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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-17-80-D Cancellation of OIG Audit – FEMA’s Initial Response to the 2016 Catastrophic Flooding in Louisiana 2017
OIG-18-20 We evaluated the Office of Health Affairs’ (OHA) privacy safeguards for protecting the personally identifiable information (PII) it collects and maintains. OHA has not implemented an effective organizational framework for safeguarding PII in accordance with Federal requirements. OHA appointed a Privacy Officer, but this official lacks adequate authority and resources to carry out the various required privacy management responsibilities. This official also has not received OHA senior leadership support to issue the policies and procedures needed for effective organization-wide privacy management. Further, there was no central tracking to ensure that all employees completed annual privacy training and to accurately report this information to the Department and Congress as required.

>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program 		2018
OIG-18-21 FEMA is currently responding to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, one of the largest disasters in U.S. history, with current damage estimates reported to exceed $100 billion. Due to the massive scale of damage, FEMA and Texas, as a FEMA grantee, will face many challenges in the recovery phase of the disaster. As FEMA moves into the recovery phase for Hurricane Harvey, it will begin to obligate hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars from the Disaster Relief Fund for administrative costs and for Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation grants to eligible state, tribal, and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations. Texas, as FEMA’s grantee, will be responsible for oversight and monitoring of the disaster grants to Texas subrecipients.

>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior DHS-OIG Reports Related to FEMA's Response to Texas Disasters and Texas' Management of FEMA Grant Funds 		2018
OIG-18-22 Representative Raúl M. Grijalva requested that we review U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) decision to award GEO Care, LLC a contract to establish a Family Case Management Program (FCMP). We sought to determine whether ICE awarded the FCMP contract in accordance with laws, regulations, and guidance. We also conducted a limited review of post-award contract modifications. FCMP is an alternative to detention that uses case managers to ensure participants comply with their release conditions, such as attending court hearings, while allowing them to remain in their community as they move through immigration proceedings. We determined that ICE properly awarded FCMP contracts.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Award of the Family Case Management Program Contract 		2018
OIG-18-24 DHS reported using its Other Transaction Authority to work with non-traditional contractors, DHS did not always follow statutory requirements when entering, modifying, and overseeing its agreements. Inadequate internal policies contributed to DHS falling short of meeting all statutory requirements for using OTAs. In addition, DHS acquisition policy staff reported that competing priorities prevented timely reporting to Congress. As a result, DHS may have taken on more risks and costs than necessary and impeded Congress’ ability to oversee DHS’ use of OTAs.

>Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority 		2018
OIG-18-23 USCIS deployed this capability in April 2016 to improve processing of approximately 84,000 naturalization applications received each month. However, as before, the ELIS capabilities deployed did not include critical functionality necessary for end-to­-end Form N-400 processing. ELIS repeatedly experienced outages and did not always perform as intended. Also, USCIS did not ensure field personnel were adequately trained to use the new system capabilities prior to deployment. Given its focus on meeting established system release dates, USCIS did not fully address our prior report recommendations to improve user support, stakeholder engagement, performance measurement, and testing to ensure ELIS met user needs and improved operations.

>USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery 		2018
OIG-18-25 The Omaha Tribe’s serious financial management weaknesses combined with inadequate and missing documentation resulted in unreliable financial records. As a result, we have little confidence that the transactions recorded in the accounting system actually occurred or that the tribe completed its FEMA-authorized projects. Therefore, we question $13.9 million as unsupported. Due to the unreliable financial information, we calculated the amount unsupported as the entire $16.9 million FEMA provided for both grants, less $2.8 million in unused Federal funding that FEMA should put to better use; $165,000 in unclaimed insurance coverage; and approximately $74,749 that we were able to verify as supported and eligible.

>The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska and Iowa Mismanaged $14 Million in FEMA Disaster Grants 		2018
OIG-18-19 Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017 (Redacted) 2018
OIG-18-18 CBP issued the summons to Twitter regarding the @ALT_USCIS account for the purpose of identifying the owner of the account. CBP took the position that it needed this information in order to “insure compliance with the laws of the United States administered by the [Service]” - investigate possible criminal violations by CBP officials, including murder, theft, and corruption.

>Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509 		2018
OIG-18-17 The Hospital must improve its policies, procedures, and business practices to account for and expend FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. Specifically, it did not properly document and adequately account for project costs; comply with its overtime policy; and comply with Federal requirements for insurance. Additionally, there were major differences in the damage estimates FEMA and the Hospital calculated.

>Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its $6.7 Million FEMA Grant 		2018
OIG-18-16 Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 20187
OIG-18-15 Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight 2018
OIG-18-14 Management Alert - Concerns with Potential Duplicate or Ineligible FEMA Public Assistance Funding for Facilities Damaged by Back-to-Back Disasters 2018
OIG-18-13 FEMA and CBP Oversight of Operation Stonegarden Program Needs Improvement 2018
OIG-18-12 We prepared this special report to address challenges FEMA, Texas, Florida, U.S. territories in the Caribbean, and California may face managing insurance under the Public Assistance program in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the October 2017 California wildfires. This report describes lessons learned from findings and recommendations contained in our DHS OIG grant audit reports issued from fiscal years 2013–2017. During fiscal years 2013–2017, we issued 37 Disaster Assistance grant audit reports that disclosed challenges with FEMA’s Public Assistance insurance process. The major recurring challenges we identified included (1) Duplicate benefits in which subrecipients claimed FEMA reimbursement for costs that were covered by insurance; (2) Insufficient insurance in which subrecipients did not obtain and maintain sufficient insurance coverage required as a condition for receiving Federal disaster assistance; and (3) Misapplied or misallocated insurance proceeds in which subrecipients received insurance proceeds, and misapplied or did not allocate those proceeds to FEMA projects.

>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Previous Audit Reports on Insurance under the Public Assistance Program 		2018
OIG-18-11 Department leadership must commit itself to ensuring DHS operates more as a single entity. rather than a collection of components. The lack of progress in reinforcing a unity of effort translates to a missed opportunity for greater effectiveness. Second, Department leadership must establish and enforce a strong internal control environment typical of a more mature organization. The current environment of relatively weak internal controls affects all aspects of the Department’s mission, from border protection to immigration enforcement and from protection against terrorist attacks and natural disasters to cybersecurity. We have seen little evidence of proactive effort by leadership to view the organization holistically, to forcefully communicate the need for cooperation among components, and to establish programs or policies that ensure unity, even though such effort is a necessary precondition to unified action.

 

>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 		2018
OIG-18-10 The Department faces challenges to effectively sharing cyber threat information across Federal and private sector entities. Without acquiring a cross-domain information processing solution and automated tools, DHS cannot analyze and share threat information timely. Further, without enhanced outreach, DHS cannot increase participation and improve coordination of information sharing across Federal and private organizations.

 

>Biennial Report on DHS’ Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 		2018
OIG-18-09 The County does not have legal responsibility for the disaster-related repairs on township roadway projects. Therefore, the County is not eligible to receive $6,151,893 in Federal funding identified as township projects because it is not legally responsible for the repairs to the damaged facilities (roadways).

>Management Alert - FEMA Should Recover $6.2 Million in Public Assistance Funds for Disaster Repairs That Are Not the Legal Responsibility of Richland County, North Dakota 		2018
OIG-18-07 ICE, CBP, and USCIS continue to experience challenges with emerging immigration enforcement and administration activities. Although DHS has established unity of effort initiatives to break silos and centralize decision making related to immigration, problems remain. We identified challenges related to mission allocation and expenditure comparisons, the affirmative asylum application process, and the Department’s struggle to understand immigration outcomes and decisions. DHS will continue to allow vulnerabilities that may affect national security and public safety to persist.

 

>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration 		2018
OIG-18-07
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    • >DHS Needs a More Unified Approach         		2018
    OIG-18-08 CalRecycle also has sufficient policies, procedures, and business practices in place to account for disaster costs on a project-by-project basis in accordance with most Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. CalRecycle did not follow these policies, procedures, and practices when accounting for and expending $198.9 million in project costs. Therefore, we questioned these costs unless CalRecycle can correct the deficiencies we identify. CalRecycle did not adequately document costs, account for costs on a residential lot-by-lot basis, effectively monitor contractors to ensure they performed to contract terms and conditions, or clearly separate costs for eligible and ineligible work.

     

    >FEMA and California Need to Assist CalRecycle, a California State Agency, to Improve Its Accounting of $230 Million in Disaster Costs         		2018
    OIG-18-06 FEMA did not manage disaster relief grants and funds adequately and did not hold grant recipients accountable for properly managing disaster relief funds. We continue to identify persistent problems such as improper contract costs, and ineligible and unsupported expenditures as examples of this continued failure. Over the 7-year period, FYs 2009 to 2015, we found $1.64 billion, or 15 percent, in questioned costs out of the $10.9 billion that we audited, which we recommended FEMA disallow as ineligible and unsupported costs. In FY 2016, we found $155.6 million2, or 23 percent, in questioned costs out of the $686 million that we audited, confirming that FEMA is not making progress managing disaster relief funds adequately. We continue to identify persistent problems throughout FEMA’s grant process, we are concerned that billions of tax payer dollars remain at risk.

     

    >Summary and Key Findings of Fiscal Year 2016 FEMA Disaster Grant and Program Audits         		2018
    OIG-18-05 DHS personnel do not always safeguard sensitive assets that, if lost, would result in critical mission impact or loss of life. Between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, the Department of Homeland Security personnel lost a total of 2,142 highly sensitive assets — 228 firearms; 1,889 badges; and 25 secure immigration stamps. Although this represents a slight improvement from our last audit, more than half of the lost items we reviewed (65 of 115) revealed that component personnel did not follow policy or used poor judgment when safeguarding these assets. In these cases, components did not always hold personnel accountable nor did they receive remedial training for failing to safeguard these sensitive assets.

    >DHS' Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Assets         		2018
    OIG-18-04 We identified limitations with FAMS contributions to aviation security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We are making five recommendations that when implemented, should improve FAMS

     

    >FAMS’ Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security is Questionable (Unclassified Summary)         		2018
    OIG-18-03 USCIS site visits provide minimal assurance that H-1B participants are compliant and not engaged in fraudulent activity. These visits assess whether petitioners and beneficiaries comply with applicable immigration laws and regulations. USCIS can approve more than 330,000 H-1B petitions each year, which could include extensions and amendments. As of April 2017, USCIS reported more than 680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. However, during FYs 2014–16, USCIS conducted an average of 7,200 ASVVP site visits annually. For the limited number of visits conducted, USCIS does not always ensure the IOs are thorough and comprehensive in their approach. Further limiting the site visits’ effectiveness, USCIS does not ensure the agency always takes proper and timely action when IOs identify potential fraud or noncompliance. USCIS also uses targeted site visits to respond to indicators of fraud; however, the agency does not completely track the costs and analyze the results of these visits.

     

    >USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Verify H-1B Visa Participants         		2018
    OIG-18-02 In 2013 and 2014, we conducted an audit of the District of Columbia’s (DC) management of the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) for grants awarded from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. In September 22, 2014, we issued an audit report entitled, District of Columbia’s Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012 (OIG-14-147), which included 11 recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of DC’s management of the Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency’s (HSEMA) State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funds. We determined that DC HSEMA met the intent of our prior recommendations and demonstrated improvements in its SHSP and UASI subrecipient monitoring and oversight. We also confirmed DC HSEMA submitted required THIRA reports to FEMA. Overall, FEMA and DC HSEMA’s implementation of our prior recommendations achieved the intended results of strengthening grant program management, performance, and oversight

    >Verification Review of District of Columbia's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012         		2018
    OIG-18-01 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) followed applicable Federal grant requirements.  It is FEMA’s responsibility to hold Mississippi accountable for proper grant administration.  MEMA did not provide proper oversight of a $29.9 million Hazard Mitigation grant, or follow Federal Regulations and FEMA guidelines when accounting for grant funds.  As a result, FEMA has no assurance that MEMA properly accounted for and expended Federal funds.

    >Hazard Mitigation Grant Funds Awarded to MEMA for the Mississippi Coastal Retrofit Program         		2018
    OIG-17-113-D We determined that while the Commission has a system in place to account for funds on a project-by-project basis and generally expended Public Assistance grant funds according to FEMA guidelines, the Commission needs additional assistance in developing long-term solutions for repetitive damages to county roads and managing its $5.4 million FEMA grant. We found that the Commission did not receive adequate guidance from FEMA and Alabama concerning Hazard Mitigation funding for long-term solutions to repetitive damages to roads; thus, potentially costing FEMA millions of dollars in the future; and project formulation, causing improperly written project scopes.  Additionally, the Commission did not have proper procurement procedures to ensure that small businesses, minority-owned firms, and women’s business enterprises have an opportunity to bid on Federal contracts; and adequate procedures to ensure proper documentation is collected to support $24,000 in costs. The report contains five recommendations to the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, to provide the Commission with additional guidance to properly manage its $5.4 million and save millions in the future.  FEMA agreed with all recommendations.

    >The Covington County Commission Needs Additional Assistance in Managing a $5.4 Million FEMA Grant     		2017
    OIG-17-117-D We identified that the Diocese generally accounted for FEMA funds on a project-by-project basis as required by Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  However, it did not follow Federal procurement standards in awarding two contracts totaling $897,955. The Diocese and its parishes did not provide supporting documentation for procurements or their local procurement processes.  This occurred primarily because the Diocese was not familiar with certain Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  As FEMA’s grantee, New York should have done more to ensure the Diocese was aware of and complied with Federal procurement standards and documentation requirements.  FEMA should emphasize New York’s role in proper grant administration.

    >Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York         		2017
    OIG-17-118-D We determined that the County accounted for and expended the majority of FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  However, the County claimed $246,294 of ineligible and unsupported costs for two large projects.  County officials said these issues occurred because FEMA officials provided inconsistent guidance regarding the types of direct administrative costs that were eligible; and internal clerical errors for overstated material costs.  We recommended FEMA disallow $246,294 of ineligible and unsupported costs and provide clearer guidance for documenting eligible direct administrative costs.

    >FEMA Should Disallow $246,294 of $3.0 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Lincoln County, Missouri         		2017
    OIG-17-120-D The Audit Tips provides an overview of OIG responsibilities; applicable disaster assistance Federal statutes, regulations, and guidelines; the audit process and frequent audit findings; and key points to remember when administering FEMA grants.  Using this report should assist disaster assistance applicants to (1) document and account for disaster-related costs; (2) minimize the loss of FEMA disaster assistance funds; (3) maximize financial recovery; and (4) prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of disaster funds.  We have updated the report to include information on FEMA’s second edition of the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide that supersedes many of the Public Assistance publications and individual policy documents

    >Audit Tips for Managing Disaster-Related Project Costs         		2017
    OIG-17-119 We determined that the seven facilities we inspected were generally following U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guidance for documenting decisions on segregating detainees with mental health conditions and promptly reporting segregation placement information for detainees with mental health conditions to ICE field offices.  However, the field offices we reviewed did not record and promptly report all instances of segregation to ICE headquarters, nor did their system properly reflect all required reviews of ongoing segregation cases.  Also, ICE does not regularly compare segregation data in the electronic management system with information at detention facilities to assess the accuracy and reliability of data in the system.  Unless ICE field offices comply with requirements to report and record these reviews, ICE headquarters cannot be sure required reviews are taking place and may not have all the information needed to assess the use of segregation, which could put detainees and facility staff at risk of harm.  We made three recommendations to ICE to improve oversight and accountability for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions.

    >ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions         		2017
    OIG-17-115-MA We conducted unannounced inspections of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) immigration holding facilities to determine if conditions are adequate, the quality of care provided is reasonable, and standards outlined in CBP’s National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search are being met.  During these inspections, we identified physical security issues that pose a potential threat to Border Patrol agents, assets, and operations at Border Patrol stations.  We also identified security issues related to cameras and access at other Border Patrol stations.  As a result, we are recommending that CBP promptly address the physical security issues, ensure cameras are operable, and facility access is secure.

    >Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector (Redacted)         		2017
    OIG-17-121-MA We are providing this report to emphasize the potential housing challenges and risks that FEMA needs to address during Hurricane Harvey’s recovery efforts based on our observations and discussions with FEMA officials at the Austin, Texas Joint Field Office.  FEMA is currently responding to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, some of the most catastrophic disasters in recent United States history.  Damages from Hurricane Harvey are estimated to exceed $100 billion.  On September 22, 2017, the State of Texas General Land Office entered into an Intergovernmental Service Agreement to provide assistance to FEMA in the delivery of Direct Housing Assistance (DHA) to Hurricane Harvey survivors on a temporary basis.  FEMA estimates these costs will reach approximately $1 billion.  The agreement does not clearly identify basic controls to ensure DHA funds are spent according to Federal regulations. For instance, the agreement does not include approval authorities and physical inspections, or separation of duties and independent certifications.  We are concerned that without adequate controls in place the Federal funds may be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.  Therefore, it is imperative that FEMA ensure Texas’ proposed project management plan clearly identifies the internal controls needed to ensure that Federal funds will be properly spent.  Our report also provides observations on the current and past issues with FEMA’s use of direct housing assistance programs.

    >Management Alert - Observations and Concerns with FEMA's Housing Assistance Program for Hurricane Harvey Efforts in Texas         		2017
    OIG-17-116-VR We determined that due to changes DHS made to the process, political appointees do not influence Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processors to delay or withhold the release of FOIA information.  Unlike the former process, the new process does not provide opportunities for political appointees in headquarters to inappropriately interfere with releases of significant FOIA information, and we did not identify any instances in which headquarters officials used the process to engage in those activities.  However, because DHS has not issued final guidance for the process, it is vulnerable to misuse in the future.  We recommended that the Chief FOIA Officer/Chief Privacy Officer issue final guidance on the 1-Day Awareness Notification Process.  The guidance should state 1) the purpose of the process is to inform senior officials of the imminent release of information that may raise public interest and 2) FOIA staff determine whether information should be released or withheld under FOIA’s exceptions and exemptions.

     

    >DHS Review of Responses to Significant Freedom of Information Act Requests (Verification Review of OIG-11-67)         		2017
    OIG-17-114 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country.  The slow performance of a critical system used for pre-screening travelers reduced Office of Field Operations officers’ ability to identify any passengers who may pose concerns, including national security threats.  Further, incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports was hampered by system outages that created passenger delays and public safety risks.  IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations border security activities between ports of entry.  Poor systems performance and network instability resulted in processing backlogs and agents’ inability to meet deadlines for submitting potential criminal alien prosecution cases.  Also, network outages hindered air and marine surveillance operations, reducing the situational awareness needed to detect inadmissible aliens and cargo approaching U.S. borders.  CBP has not yet addressed these long-standing IT systems and infrastructure challenges, due in part to ongoing budget constraints.  We recommended that CBP take steps to address passenger screening and border security IT systems and infrastructure challenges.  We made seven recommendations and CBP concurred with all seven of our recommendations.

    >CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations         		2017
    OIG-17-110 We determined that FEMA is unable to assess flood hazard miles to meet its program goal and is not ensuring mapping partner quality reviews are completed in accordance with applicable guidance.  FEMA needs to improve its management and oversight of flood mapping projects to achieve or reassess its program goals and ensure the production of accurate and timely flood maps.  We made four recommendations that would help FEMA strengthen its management and oversight of flood mapping projects to achieve program goals.  FEMA concurred with all four recommendations.

    >FEMA Needs to Improve Management of its Flood Mapping Program         		2017
    OIG-17-112 We conducted covert tests to determine the effectiveness of TSA's checkpoint screening equipment and screener performance in identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport security checkpoints. We identified vulnerabilities with TSA's screener performance, screening equipment, and associated procedures. Details related to our testing results presented in the report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information. We are making eight recommendations that when implemented, should improve TSA's screening checkpoint operational effectiveness.

    >Covert Testing of TSA’s Screening Checkpoint Effectiveness         		2017
    OIG-17-111 We determined that 9,389 aliens identified as having multiple identities had received an immigration benefit.  When taking into account the most current immigration benefit these aliens received, we determined that naturalization, permanent residence, work authorization, and temporary protected status represent the greatest number of benefits, accounting for 8,447 or 90 percent of the 9,389 cases.  Benefits for the remaining 10 percent of cases include applications for asylum and appeals to immigration court decisions.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has drafted a policy memorandum, Guidance for Prioritizing IDENT Derogatory Information Related to Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records, outlining how it will review cases of individuals with multiple identities whose fingerprints were uploaded into the Automated Biometric Identification System through Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records.  We did not make any recommendations.

    >Individuals with Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits         		2017
    OIG-17-109 We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, we reviewed the Department’s security program, including its policies, procedures, and system security controls for the enterprise-wide intelligence system. This report was issued to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG).

    >Review of DHS' Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2017 (U)         		2017
    OIG-17-108-D We determined that FEMA’s policies are not sufficient enough to prohibit unaccredited, unlicensed, unregistered, and non-state approved non-profit schools from receiving Public Assistance funds.  We made one recommendation for the FEMA Assistant Administrator for the Recovery Directorate to strengthen its policies and guidelines pertaining to non-profit schools eligibility for Public Assistance.  FEMA agreed with our finding and recommendation, and will take corrective action to resolve the recommendation by February 28, 2018; therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and open.

    >FEMA Should Strengthen Its Policies and Guidelines for Determining Public Assistance Eligibility of PNP Schools         		2017
    OIG-17-107 We determined that although a complainant alleged there were systemic security challenges in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), there were few documented security incidents over the past 5 years, all of which OIA addressed with corrective actions.  Further, OIA has improved the effectiveness of its Field Intelligence Division and the Field Intelligence Officers by hiring qualified, experienced intelligence professionals and implementing clear policies and procedures, but it could enhance officer training.  OIA is also addressing weaknesses in coordination among its watches and perceived delays in intelligence reporting.  We made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of OIA operations; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) concurred with both recommendations.

    >TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis Has Improved Its Field Operations         		2017
    OIG-17-105-D We determined that the County’s accounting policies, procedures, and business practices appear adequate to account for FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  However, the County could benefit from Florida, as FEMA’s grant recipient, providing additional technical assistance and monitoring of its pending projects.

    >St. Johns County, Florida, Could Benefit from Additional Technical Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure St. Johns County, Florida, Could Benefit from Additional Technical Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Compliance with FEMA Grant Requirements         		2017
    OIG-17-106-D We determined that Downe Township did not always follow Federal procurement standards in awarding contracts for disaster work.  We recommended that FEMA disallow $832,040 of $2.5 million in grant funds awarded to the Township.  The Township did not have support for $445,385 of the questioned costs.  We also recommended that the Administrator, FEMA Region II, deobligate unused project costs, and withhold $2.3 million in funds requested for additional project work until New Jersey provides assurance that the Township complies with all Federal procurement standards for FEMA funded work.  FEMA Region II concurred with all of our recommendations.

    >Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Downe Township, New Jersey         		2017
    OIG-17-103-MA We determined that two DHS Components – CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) created their own internal authorizations for executive protection details and staffed them without clear legal authority. We made two recommendations to the DHS secretary to direct CBP and ICE to (1) discontinue security details pending a legal review by the DHS General Counsel and (2) develop directive regarding the scope and circumstances  when a security detail is permitted for DHS component heads including the requirements for departmental level authorization; pending the results of the legal review.

    >Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns (OIG-17-103-MA)     		2017
    OIG-17-104 TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-53), required us to review the Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS’) policies and procedures for identifying misuse of Government resources, as well as the administration of FAMS’ code of conduct or integrity policies with respect to instances of misconduct. We incorporated this requirement into our ongoing department-wide audit of conduct and discipline, which seeks to determine whether DHS and its components have sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. We determined that FAMS has sufficient policies and procedures to establish expectations for appropriate conduct, identify misuse of government resources, and address misconduct allegations. The report contains no recommendations.

    >The Federal Air Marshal Service Has Sufficient Policies and Procedures for Addressing Misconduct         		2017
    OIG-17-102-D We determined that the City followed Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines when accounting for FEMA funds; however, FEMA mistakenly obligated $587,538 of ineligible funding because of a mathematical error.  We made two recommendations to the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, to disallow $587,538 as ineligible costs.  FEMA agreed with our finding and recommendations, and has taken corrective action to resolve both recommendations.  Therefore, we consider these recommendations resolved and closed with no further action required from FEMA.

    >Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Pensacola, Florida         		2017
    OIG-17-101 We determined that DHS had only approved implementation plans for 4 of 23 strategic objectives of the Enterprise Data Strategy, and planned to finalize the remaining plans in late FY 2017.  While we found that DHS had taken some effective actions to coordinate component investments in data sharing and management, component officials identified other ways that DHS could improve by coordinating Enterprise-wide tools and data integration efforts.  We recommended that DHS take actions to finalize implementation plans for the remaining 19 strategic objectives by the end of FY 2017, and work with components to identify and provide the training for Enterprise-wide data analysis and management tools.  We made two recommendations and Intelligence and Analysis and the Office of the Chief Information Officer concurred with both of our recommendations. 

    >Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals         		2017
    OIG-17-100 We observed a strong “unity of effort” and commitment among DHS leaders in working together to promote and support the JTFs.  Although the JTFs are a step forward for DHS, they face challenges, including a need for dedicated funding and outcome-based performance measures.  Without dedicated funding, the JTFs rely on components that may have competing or conflicting priorities.  Without performance metrics, the JTFs cannot show the value they add to homeland security operations.  During our fieldwork, Congress passed the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, prompting us to modify our report objective.  This abbreviated report provides our views of successes and some challenges the JTFs face in achieving their mission.  We made no recommendations.

    >DHS' Joint Task Forces         		2017
    OIG-17-99-MA We found that CBP administered polygraph examinations to unsuitable applicants who provided disqualifying information during the pre-test interview.  This occurred because CBP’s process is not sufficient to prevent unsuitable applicants from continuing the polygraph examination.  We made two recommendations to CBP to improve its screening by establishing an in-person pre-security interview process, requiring examiners to use the on-call adjudication process, and discontinue testing of unsuitable applicants.  CBP concurred with both recommendations and agreed that conducting the in-person pre-security interview prior to the polygraph examination is a best practice.  CBP has implemented one of the recommendations and has initiated a pilot program for a new polygraph format.

    >Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants (OIG-17-99-MA)         		2017

    *NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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