Hurricane Harvey

FEMA’s Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with the Texas General Land Office (TxGLO) was appropriate to ensure direct housing assistance program compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  However, FEMA initiated the IGSA without first developing the processes and controls TxGLO needed to administer the program.  As a result, FEMA and the State had to develop and finalize implementation guidelines after signing the IGSA, delaying TxGLO’s disaster response.  In addition, FEMA disaster personnel had to prepare the necessary guidance, toolkits, and training resources while simultaneously responding to Hurricane Harvey.  Also, FEMA used workarounds and TxGLO set up a separate system, creating additional operational challenges and inefficiencies.  We made three recommendations to improve future state administered direct housing assistance efforts.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

During the course of the audit, we determined that FEMA provided hotel rooms to about 90,000 households (nearly 227,000 survivors) after the 2017 California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.  However, FEMA did not oversee and manage the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program to ensure it operated efficiently and effectively to meet all disaster survivors’ needs.  We made two recommendations that when implemented, will improve FEMA’s oversight and pre-disaster planning of transitional sheltering.  FEMA concurred with both recommendations and the recommendations are resolved and open.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Missouri, and Joplin Schools did not properly manage and oversee this disaster award.  Specifically, FEMA and Missouri did not provide proper grant management and oversight of Joplin’s subgrant activities.  Joplin Schools disregarded Missouri’s authority as the grantee and did not always comply with Federal requirements and FEMA policies as required.  This occurred because Joplin Schools heavily relied on the advice of its grant management contractor.  As a result of the grant management and oversight issues, Joplin Schools did not follow Federal procurement standards when it awarded $187.3 million in non-exigent disaster-related contracts, including $609,676 in ineligible contractor direct administrative costs.  We provided five recommendations to help improve FEMA and Missouri’s grant oversight and management process.  We also included four recommendations for FEMA to disallow or not fund $187.3 million in ineligible contract costs.  FEMA determined approximately $56 million, the net obligated amount, was eligible for reimbursement.  FEMA concurred with all nine recommendations and completed actions to close recommendations 1 to 4 and 8.  Recommendations 5 to 7 are resolved and open with a target completion date of June 1, 2020. Recommendation 9 is considered unresolved and open

Harris County, Texas needs additional technical assistance and monitoring to ensure grants management comply with Federal procurement regulations.  The County’s procurement policies, procedures, and business practices were not adequate to expend disaster grant funds in accordance with Federal procurement regulations and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines.  We recommended FEMA disallow $2.7 million in ineligible costs and require Texas to work with the County to incorporate Federal procurement regulations when using Federal funds, and review procurement activities before the County awards future contracts.  We made three recommendations that will help improve the procurement capability of Harris County, Texas.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not balance its Manufactured Housing Unit (MHU) program costs with disaster-related housing needs.  In response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, FEMA overestimated the number of MHUs it needed by nearly 2,600, which amounted to purchase, transportation, and storage costs of at least $152 million.  The agency also overestimated the number of tank and pump systems (TPS) it needed to operate the fire sprinklers, by nearly 2,400, which amounted to purchase and transportation costs of approximately $29 million.  Following Hurricane Harvey, FEMA focused on providing prompt assistance and did not emphasize financial accountability and recordkeeping.  Had FEMA better managed and overseen the MHU program, it could have put an estimated $182 million to better use to assist survivors from Hurricane Harvey or other disasters.  We made four recommendations that will help FEMA better manage its MHU program.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations. 

FEMA is currently responding to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, one of the largest disasters in U.S. history, with current damage estimates reported to exceed $100 billion. Due to the massive scale of damage, FEMA and Texas, as a FEMA grantee, will face many challenges in the recovery phase of the disaster. As FEMA moves into the recovery phase for Hurricane Harvey, it will begin to obligate hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars from the Disaster Relief Fund for administrative costs and for Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation grants to eligible state, tribal, and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations. Texas, as FEMA’s grantee, will be responsible for oversight and monitoring of the disaster grants to Texas subrecipients.

We are providing this report to emphasize the potential housing challenges and risks that FEMA needs to address during Hurricane Harvey’s recovery efforts based on our observations and discussions with FEMA officials at the Austin, Texas Joint Field Office.  FEMA is currently responding to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, some of the most catastrophic disasters in recent United States history.  Damages from Hurricane Harvey are estimated to exceed $100 billion.  On September 22, 2017, the State of Texas General Land Office entered into an Intergovernmental Service Agreement to provide assistance to FEMA in the delivery of Direct Housing Assistance (DHA) to Hurricane Harvey survivors on a temporary basis.  FEMA estimates these costs will reach approximately $1 billion.  The agreement does not clearly identify basic controls to ensure DHA funds are spent according to Federal regulations. For instance, the agreement does not include approval authorities and physical inspections, or separation of duties and independent certifications.  We are concerned that without adequate controls in place the Federal funds may be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.  Therefore, it is imperative that FEMA ensure Texas’ proposed project management plan clearly identifies the internal controls needed to ensure that Federal funds will be properly spent.  Our report also provides observations on the current and past issues with FEMA’s use of direct housing assistance programs.