Skip to main content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Government Website

Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Safely connect using HTTPS

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock () or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-19-61 FEMA Did Not Properly Review the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Request for $306 Million in Public Assistance Funds 2019
OIG-19-62 DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce Planning 2019
OIG-19-60 DHS’ information security program was effective for fiscal year 2018 because the Department earned the targeted maturity rating, “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in four of five functions, as compared to last year’s lower overall rating, “Consistently Implemented” (Level 3). We attributed DHS’ progress to improvements in information security risk, configuration management practices, continuous monitoring, and more effective security training. By addressing the remaining deficiencies, DHS can further improve its security program ensuring its systems adequately protect the critical and sensitive data they store and process.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2018 		2019
OIG-19-59 We determined that despite requirements of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) did not effectively coordinate and integrate department-wide research and development (R&D) activities.  In August 2015, S&T established Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) as the central mechanism to identify, track, and coordinate department-wide priority R&D efforts.  However, S&T did not follow its IPT process as intended.  Specifically, not all components submitted all information on capability gaps to the IPTs; S&T did not effectively gather, track, and manage data on the Department’s R&D gaps and activities; and S&T did not adequately monitor the IPT process to ensure it was effective.  As a result, S&T may not be able to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security and Congress with an accurate profile of the Department’s R&D activities or justify funding needs for a wide range of missions, including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers.  We made three recommendations to improve S&T’s coordination of R&D activities across DHS.  S&T concurred with our recommendations.

>S&T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS 		2019
OIG-19-58 FEMA's Longstanding IT Deficiencies Hindered 2017 Response and Recovery Operations 2019
OIG-19-57 A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations 2019
OIG-19-56 The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) methods for classifying its Office of Inspection (OOI) criminal investigators as law enforcement officers were adequate and valid, but the data TSA used were not adequate or valid. TSA’s criminal investigators spend at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal investigative duties to be classified as law enforcement officers. The FY 2017 timesheet data TSA used to validate that its criminal investigators met the 50 percent requirement were not adequate and valid as the data were not always timely submitted and approved. This occurred because OOI officials lacked oversight and accountability for the timesheet submission, review, and approval processes. Further, criminal investigators and their supervisors did not always complete and approve certification forms as required to verify eligibility for premium pay. In some instances, incorrect timesheet calculations inflated the annual average of unscheduled duty hours criminal investigators worked to be eligible for premium pay. OOI management did not develop and implement guidance to review these key calculations annually. Without better oversight and valid timesheet data, TSA cannot ensure it is accurately classifying criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA also may be wasting agency funds on criminal investigators ineligible to receive premium pay. We made four recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA improve data used to classify its OOI criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA concurred with all of our recommendations.

>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement 		2019
OIG-19-54 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not properly oversee the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (Louisiana or State) to ensure it complied with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  Louisiana and the Office of Community Development (OCD), in turn, did not always properly account for and expend Federal grant funds.  Specifically, Louisiana did not provide adequate documentation to support costs, as required by Federal regulations, and FEMA is not requiring the State to provide mandatory documentation to close out the $706.6 million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) grant.  Louisiana also has not provided FEMA with required documentation showing that homeowners paid $79.7 million in promissory notes for state-funded mitigation work on their homes.  Finally, Louisiana drew down funds exceeding project obligations by $50.4 million due to a lack of FEMA controls.  These issues arose primarily because FEMA did not ensure Louisiana exercised proper oversight of the HMGP grant and the State did not comply with Federal regulations.  As a result, Federal funds are at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.  We provided five recommendations to FEMA to postpone project closeout until Louisiana provides adequate documentation that supports $706.6 million in costs and that FEMA ensures compliance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  FEMA’s responses were sufficient to close all but one recommendation, which we consider open and unresolved.  

>Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a $706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes 		2019
OIG-19-55 FEMA has instituted several effective mechanisms to demonstrate the importance of fraud prevention in its disaster assistance programs, but it needs to do more.  In line with our 2011 audit report recommendations, FEMA now uses standard system queries and additional business rules to flag potentially fraudulent disaster assistance applications.  However, FEMA must take additional, proactive steps to create and sustain a culture of fraud prevention and awareness.  This includes adequately staffing the Fraud and Internal Investigations Division, implementing an effective process to monitor and discourage staff noncompliance with required fraud training requirements, and establishing a clear and consistent process for reporting suspected fraud.  We made five recommendations for FEMA to demonstrate its commitment to fraud prevention in carrying out its disaster assistance programs.  FEMA concurred with all of our recommendations and has begun implementing corrective actions.

>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 		2019
OIG-19-53 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a critical role in the Nation’s efforts to interdict dangerous substances and prohibited items at U.S. ports of entry and keep these materials from harming the American public. An important part of CBP’s mission is preventing foreign countries from importing illegal drugs such as opioids into the U.S. CBP is experiencing a rise in seizures of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that upon exposure can kill in minutes.  CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) Fines Penalties and Forfeitures Division stores, manages, and disposes seized property, including illicit drugs such as fentanyl.  During our ongoing audit of CBP’s storage of seized drugs at permanent drug vaults we visited, we determined that CBP does not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids.  Specifically, CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure.  This occurred because CBP lacks an official policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure.  In addition, CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure.  As a result, CBP staff is at increased risk of injury or death in case of exposure.  We made one recommendation to help CBP provide its components with guidance, knowledge, and tools to handle and reverse overdoses from fentanyl and other opioids.

>Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure 		2019
OIG-19-52 FEMA's Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC 2019
OIG-19-50 Inadequate Oversight of Low Value DHS Contracts 2019
OIG-19-51 Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley 2019
OIG-19-49 CBP’s controls over the Global Entry Program do not always prevent ineligible and potentially high-risk Global Entry members from obtaining expedited entry into the United States. This occurred because CBP officers did not always comply with policies when reviewing Global Entry applications nor do CBP’s policies sufficiently help officers

determine an applicant’s level of risk. Additionally, during the airport arrival process, CBP officers granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP officers also did not properly respond to a breach of the Daily Security Code. These weaknesses were due to officers not following policy, as well as CBP’s insufficient verification procedures. Unless CBP officers authenticate kiosk receipts, someone could use a fake receipt to enter the United States. Finally, CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. In particular, CBP did not conduct the required number of internal audits and did not use its Self-Inspection Program effectively. CBP’s lack of adherence to its compliance program’s policies and procedures creates vulnerabilities in Global Entry by allowing potentially ineligible members to continue to participate.

>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation 		2019
OIG-19-48 DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline 2019
OIG-19-47 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities 2019
OIG-19-44 Audit of DHS' Issuance and Management of Other Transaction Agreements Involving Consortium Activities 2019
OIG-19-46 According to CBP statistics, the number of southwest border migrant apprehensions during the first seven months of FY 2019 has in general already surpassed that of the total apprehensions for each of the previous four fiscal years. At the sector level, El Paso has experienced the sharpest increase in apprehensions when comparing the first seven months of FY 2019 to the same period in FY 2018. The purpose  is to notify you of urgent issues that require immediate attention and action. Specifically, we are recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (PDT).

>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center 		2019
OIG-19-45 Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on FEMA's 50 Percent Repair-or-Replace Rule Decisions 2019
OIG-19-43 The Department of Homeland Security did not comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because the Department did not meet two of the six requirements. Specifically, the Department omitted the percent of recaptured amounts from the Other Information section in its Agency Financial Report and did not meet its annual reduction target established for one of eight programs deemed susceptible to significant improper payments.The Department also did not comply with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, because DHS did not make available to the public its Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2019
OIG-19-42 DHS expanded the Insider Threat Program from monitoring user activity on its classified networks to monitoring cleared and non-cleared employees’ activity on unclassified networks. We initiated a project to determine Insider Threat Program progress in monitoring, detecting, and responding to malicious insider threats on unclassified DHS systems and networks. Before continuing its planned expansion of the Insider Threat Program, DHS needs to address several deficiencies that may hinder program effectiveness and efficiency. Although the expanded program was approved in January 2017, the Office of the Chief Security Officer has yet to revise, obtain approval for, and reissue required documentation.

>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program 		2019
OIG-19-41 Special Report: Review Regarding DHS OIG's Retraction of Thirteen Reports Evaluating FEMA's Initial Response to Disasters 2019
OIG-19-39 This report presents the results of KPMG LLP’s (KPMG) work conducted to address the performance audit objectives relative to the Audit of Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending. KPMG performed the work during the period of September 18, 2017 to August 30, 2018, and our scope period for testing was October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017. KPMG LLP (KPMG) found that DHS management has policies and procedures over conference spending and reporting, improvements are needed. KMPG made seven recommendations to improve conference spending reporting.

>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending 		2019
OIG-19-40 Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions 2019
OIG-19-38 FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC 2019
OIG-19-37 This interim report is part of an ongoing audit to determine the extent FEMA is meeting disaster survivors’ transitional shelter needs after the California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. We determined that FEMA does not require disaster survivors to notify the agency when they vacate hotels participating in the TSA program, thus allowing the hotels to continue to bill FEMA for unoccupied rooms. Because FEMA is unaware when disaster survivors vacate the hotels, the agency does not know the magnitude of unnecessary hotel charges. Consequently, FEMA could not account for associated TSA payments it may have paid since August 2017, related to the 2017 hurricane season and California wildfires.

>Additional Controls Needed to Better Manage FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program 		2019
OIG-19-36 Williams, Adley and Company - DC, LLP completed an audit of Missouri’s management of State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants awarded during fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015. Williams Adley concluded that Missouri’s State Administrative Agency generally complied with applicable Federal laws and regulations. Although Williams Adley did not identify any duplicate benefits received by the state, it did identify instances in which the state did not fully comply with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) FYs 2012–2015 Notice of Funding Opportunity guidance.

>Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015 		2019
OIG-19-35 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) needs to continue to improve its retention, hiring, and training of Transportation Security Officers (TSO). Specifically, TSA needs to better address its retention challenges because it currently does not share and leverage results of TSO exit surveys and does not always convey job expectations to new-hires. TSA does not fully evaluate applicants for capability as well as compatibility when hiring new TSOs. Thus, the agency may be making uninformed hiring decisions due to inadequate applicant information and a lack of formally documented guidance on ranking potential new-hires

>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers 		2019
OIG-19-34-UNSUM We determined that DHS' information security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems is effective this year as the Department achieved “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in three of five cybersecurity functions, based on current reporting instructions for intelligence systems. However, we identified deficiencies in DHS’ overall patch management process and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s weakness remediation and security awareness training activities.

 

We made one recommendation to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and two recommendations to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to address the deficiencies identified. DHS concurred with all three recommendations.

>(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018 		2019
OIG-19-33 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company –DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) Detailed Accounting Submission. Coast Guard management prepared the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures in accordance with requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to Williams Adley’s attention that caused it to believe that the Coast Guard’s FY 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the Circular. Williams Adley did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2019
OIG-19-32 Through the TSA program, FEMA provides transitional sheltering in hotels to disaster survivors displaced by emergencies or major disasters. TSA reduces the number of survivors in congregate emergency shelters by providing hotel lodging. During our ongoing audit of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, we determined that FEMA violated the Privacy Act of 19741 and Department of Homeland Security policy2 by releasing to the PII and SPII of 2.3 million survivors of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the California wildfires in 2017.3

>Management Alert - FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (REDACTED) 		2019
OIG-19-31 We could not fully assess whether Oregon’s State Administrative Agency (OEM) expenditures for State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) funding awarded from FY 2013 through FY 2015 enhanced its preparedness and security because we found some issues. These issues occurred because OEM did not obtain written consent when withholding more than 20 percent of funds, coordinate with subrecipients after award receipt, have approved indirect cost rate agreements, adhere to its subrecipient monitoring procedures, have a tracking system, or provide guidance to subrecipients. FEMA concurred with all 10 recommendations and plans to take corrective action.

>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015 		2019
OIG-19-28 The Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. Our case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within the prescribed 90-day timeframe revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation are external and beyond ICE’s control. The two predominant factors delaying repatriation are legal appeals and obtaining travel documents. Internally, ICE’s challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process.

>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens 		2019
OIG-19-26 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) FY 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. 

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-30 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY). ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Williams Adley was unable to assess the accuracy of the number of products reported in Metric 2, “Number of counter-narcotics intelligence requests satisfied,” as part of the PSR.

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-27 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) fiscal year (FY) 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report.

>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-29 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. CBP’s management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the drug control methodology used to estimate the percentages of obligations allocated between interdiction and intelligence. These percentages are used to derive the dollar-value of obligations reported as Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Drug Control Function in the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations presented in CBP’s Detailed Accounting Submission.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2019
OIG-19-25 Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 2019
OIG-19-23 Within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol agents are responsible for patrolling our international land borders and coastal waters surrounding Florida and Puerto Rico. We conducted this audit to determine to what extent Border Patrol agents meet workload requirements related to investigative and law enforcement activities. Border Patrol needs to manage its workforce more efficiently, effectively, and economically. CBP and Border Patrol must expedite the development and implementation of a workforce staffing model for Border Patrol as required by Congress. Without a complete workforce staffing model, Border Patrol senior managers are unable to definitively determine the operational needs for, or best placement of, the 5,000 additional agents DHS was directed to hire per the January 2017 Executive Order.

>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents 		2019
OIG-19-24 Prompted by the suspicious cyber activities on election systems in 2016, Secretary Jeh Johnson designated the election infrastructure as a subsector to one of the Nation’s existing critical sectors. Our audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Department’s efforts to coordinate with states on securing the Nation’s election infrastructure. DHS has taken some steps to mitigate risks to the Nation’s election infrastructure; however, improved planning, more staff, and clearer guidance could better facilitate the Department’s coordination with state and local officials. Specifically, despite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed the plans and strategies critical to identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities, or established metrics to measure progress in securing the election infrastructure. Senior leadership turnover and insufficient guidance and administrative staff have hindered DHS’ ability to accomplish such planning.

>Progress Made, But Additional Efforts are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure 		2019
OIG-19-22 We intended to verify whether the U.S. Coast Guard is properly reporting service members who are prohibited from possessing a firearm (“prohibited individuals”) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, in comparing relevant databases with data into the National Instant Background Check System (NICS), We identified a number of issues that led us to question the reliability of the Coast Guard’s data.  As a result, OIG cannot identify the full scope of prohibited individuals or verify that the Coast Guard properly reported prohibited individuals to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and to Congress.  Despite our concerns about the quality of Coast Guard’s data, OIG identified 210 service members who committed offenses that placed them in one of the categories of prohibited individuals.  Of these 210, Coast Guard did not enter 16 service members (8 percent) into NCIS.  This underreporting occurred because Coast Guard policy did not require attorneys to forward information about all individuals referred for trial by general court martial for reporting to the FBI.  Additionally, Coast Guard’s reporting to the FBI is centralized, and does not allow investigators in field offices to have direct access to NICS.  We made eight recommendations that will enhance Coast Guard’s reporting of prohibited individuals to the FBI.  The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations.

>United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 		2019
OIG-19-20 This inspection is part of an ongoing review of ICE detention facilities. While conducting an unannounced visit to the Essex County Correctional Facility using ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards, we identified serious violations. As part of this assessment, ICE must review and ensure compliance with those standards addressing unreported security incidents, food safety, and facility conditions that include ceiling leaks, unsanitary shower stalls, bedding, and outdoor recreation areas.

>Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey 		2019
OIG-19-21 The objective was to determine whether TSA implemented proper procedures to safeguard the secure areas of our Nation’s airports and whether airports, aircraft operators, and contractors were complying with TSA’s security requirements to control access to these areas.

 

We identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and associated access control procedures. We made six recommendations related to standard operating procedures, deployment of new technology, identification of industry best practices, and training.

>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas 		2019
OIG-19-19 DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs 2019
OIG-19-18 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In FY 2017, these 106 facilities held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors operating these 106 facilities. Despite documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose penalties when those standards are not maintained.

>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards 		2019
OIG-19-17 As a follow-up to our 2017 report on TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS) domestic flight operations, we conducted this audit to determine the extent to which FAMS can interdict an improvised explosive device during flight. We identified vulnerabilities with FAMS’ contribution to international flight security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We made two recommendations.

>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable 		2019
OIG-19-16 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278. Specifically, DHS delayed commissioning a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Card Program in enhancing security and reducing security risks for facilities and vessels. The public law required the assessment to begin no later than 60 days after its enactment. However, DHS did not award a work order for the assessment for more than a year after the deadline.  TSA only partially complied with requirements mandated by the public law. Of the six required actions, TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four. We have concerns with aspects of TSA’s responses to all of the required actions.

>DHS' and TSA's Compliance with Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment 		2019
OIG-19-15 National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Chief of Staff requested a review to determine whether Federal Protective Service (FPS) inspectors’ positions were classified correctly for purposes of earning overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors’ excessive use of overtime does raise significant concerns. Specifically, 11 of the 19 inspectors reviewed frequently worked multiple 17- to 21-hour shifts with no days off in between. This kind of extensive overtime allowed seven inspectors to earn more than the most senior executives in the Federal Government, with three earning more than the Vice President of the United States. Furthermore, FPS’ increasing use of overtime contributed to a projected budget shortfall for fiscal year 2018, potentially putting the FPS mission at risk. The inspectors were able to accumulate the extensive overtime because of poor internal controls, such as management not monitoring the use of overtime.

>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively 		2019
OIG-19-13 In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a $297 million contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The contract includes 1 base year, with 4 option years, to hire 7,500 fully qualified applicants, including Customs and Border Protection Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. In its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture has already taken longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a hastily approved contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations. CBP must hold the contractor accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government.

>Management Alert - CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract 		2019
OIG-19-14 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigative offices accurately maintained equipment records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. Offices were also accurate in accounting for all firearms. Investigative staff were diligent in complying with the DHS Management Directive relating to the referral of allegations. However, we noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence inventory requirements, and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. We also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms and problems with the timeliness of submitting investigative reports. Finally, we found that supervisors did not always review cases on a quarterly basis.

>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division 		2019

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

Return to top of page