Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number	Title	Issue Date Sort ascending	Fiscal Year
OIG-17-23-VR	We determined that all corrective actions have been implemented for recommendations 1, 3 and 4, which were designed to increase the effectiveness of SAVE verification. In response to OIG recommendation 2, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) built and implemented an interface with the Department of Justice’s Immigration Review Information Exchange System in August 2016 to obtain up-to-date information on the status of deportable aliens. While the interface is operational, USCIS and the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) still need to approve an Interface Control Agreement between the two systems before we can close the recommendation. >Verification Review of USCIS' Progress in Implementing OIG Recommendations for SAVE to Accurately Determine Immigration Status of Individuals Ordered Deported	01/18/2017	2017
OIG-17-21-D	We determined that for the projects we reviewed, the City effectively accounted for and expended FEMA Public Assistance grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. City officials accounted for disaster expenditures on a project-by-project basis, procured contracts for disaster work appropriately, and maintained adequate documentation to support the costs. We made no recommendations. >Perth Amboy, New Jersey, Effectively Managed FEMA Grant Funds Awarded for Hurricane Sandy Damages	01/12/2017	2017
OIG-17-22	We determined that DHS has not done enough to minimize the risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers. Specifically, the Department does not: (1) have an office responsible for managing and overseeing component use of force activities; (2) ensure the collection and validation of component data needed to assess use of force activities, minimize risks, and take corrective actions; (3) ensure use of force policies have been updated to reflect current operations and lessons learned; or (4) establish consistent requirements for less-lethal recurrent training and ensure training was completed as required. Additionally, each component varies on their use of force activities. Without improvements in the management and oversight of use of force activities, the Department may increase its risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers. DHS concurred with our two recommendations, which, if implemented, will help the Department actively oversee and assist with component use of force activities, update policies, and improve training. >DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)	01/12/2017	2017
OIG-17-24	Despite the progress made, Components were not consistently following DHS’ policies and procedures to maintain current or complete information on remediating security weaknesses timely. Components operated 79 unclassified systems with expired authorities to operate. Further, Components had not consolidated all internet traffic behind the Department’s trusted internet connections and continued to use unsupported operating systems that may expose DHS data to unnecessary risks. Our review identified deficiencies related to configuration management and continuous monitoring. We made four recommendations to the Chief Information Security Officer. The Department concurred with all four recommendations. >Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2016	01/12/2017	2017
OIG-17-19-D	We determined that the Cooperative has an effective accounting system in place to ensure it accounts for disaster-related costs on a project-by-project basis and can properly support those expenditures. As of June 2016, Cooperative officials had completed all disaster repairs using their own resources and contractors. However, Cooperative officials said they do not intend to claim $4.1 million in contracting costs because they believe their contracting methodology did not fully comply with Federal requirements when hiring disaster contractors. Therefore, we did not assess the Cooperative’s procurement policies and procedures, nor review its contract costs. Because the audit did not identify any issues requiring further action from FEMA, we consider this audit closed. >Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, Oklahoma, Has Adequate Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage its FEMA Grant	01/10/2017	2017
OIG-17-20-D	We determined that the Authority did not account for FEMA funds on a project-by-project basis as Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines require. We also identified $577,959 (Federal share $433,469) of project costs that FEMA should disallow. We recommended that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region II disallow the $577,959 of questioned costs. >FEMA Should Disallow $577,959 of $2.9 Million Awarded to Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority for Hurricane Irene Damages	01/10/2017	2017
OIG-17-18-D	We determined the Town did not always account for and expend FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. Therefore, FEMA should disallow $2.0 million of $3.59 million in grant funds awarded to the Town. We made four recommendations to the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region I, to disallow ineligible or unsupported costs and improve the State’s grant management activities. >FEMA Should Disallow $2.0 Million of $3.59 Million Awarded to Stratford, Connecticut	01/09/2017	2017
OIG-17-06-D	For the projects we reviewed, we identified $1,771,894 (Federal share $1,328,921) of costs that FEMA should disallow. We recommended that Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, disallow $1,771,894 of ineligible costs and direct the Florida Division of Emergency Management to monitor the County’s performance for compliance with Federal grant requirements on open projects. >FEMA Should Recover $1.8 Million of $5.5 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Columbia County, Florida, for Tropical Storm Debby Damages	01/05/2017	2017
OIG-17-17-D	We determined that the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) generally accounted for disaster costs on a project-by-project basis and adequately supported costs it claimed. However, OPPD overstated the fringe benefit rate it applied to its labor costs on three large projects. We recommended that FEMA disallow $67,570 in ineligible costs and instruct Nebraska to ensure that OPPD calculates and applies its fringe benefit rate according to Federal cost principles and FEMA guidelines for all future disasters. FEMA concurred with all three of our recommendations. >Omaha Public Power District in Nebraska Generally Accounted for and Expended FEMA Grant Funds Properly	01/04/2017	2017
OIG-17-16-VR	We determined that the Colorado State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services’ additional technical assistance and continuous monitoring of Larimer County’s procurement and project-related activities are effective. We also verified that the County can document and account for its disaster-related costs on a project-by-project basis and that its policies and procedures are adequate to account for FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. Because the verification review did not identify any issues requiring further actions from FEMA, the report contains no recommendations and we consider this verification review closed. >Verification Review of Larimer County, Colorado, OIG Audit Report (OIG-15-34-D)	01/04/2017	2017
OIG-17-14	We determined that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) resolved most of our recommendations from previous airport reports. However, there are several open security control recommendations related to TSA’s Security Technology Integrated Program and one open and unresolved recommendation concerning closed-circuit TVs at John F. Kennedy International Airport. We recommended that TSA prepare business impact analyses that comply with best practices and also establish a plan to conduct recurring reviews of the operational, technical, and management controls for securing TSA information technology systems at U.S. airports nationwide. TSA concurred with both recommendations. >Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports (Redacted)	12/30/2016	2017
OIG-17-15	We determined that in most instances, Texas distributed and spent the awards in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; however, the State lacked adequate controls over more than $1 million in grant funds we reviewed. This occurred because the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State did not ensure adequate management and oversight of Homeland Security Grant Program funds. We made three recommendations, which when implemented, should enhance Texas’ effectiveness in the overall use of the grant funds to improve preparedness and response capabilities. Better management and oversight should also reduce the risk associated with the State’s management of grant funds. FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. >Texas Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2012-14	12/07/2016	2017
OIG-17-13-D	We determined that of the 55 grant audit reports we issued in fiscal year 2015, 43 reports contained 154 recommendations resulting in potential monetary benefits of $1.734 billion. This amount included $457.46 million in questioned costs that we recommended FEMA disallow as ineligible or unsupported and $1.28 billion in cost avoidance, unused obligated funding, and unused funds at risk that we recommended FEMA put to better use. The eight program audits did not relate to specific grants. In three program audits, we deployed staff to major disasters to assess FEMA’s initial response to disasters. Another program audit related to technical assistance we provided during a disaster deployment. The remaining four program audits covered other FEMA programs or operations, contained six recommendations for improving FEMA programs or operations, and identified $1.6 million in potential monetary benefits. >Summary and Key Findings of Fiscal Year 2015 FEMA Disaster Grant and Program Audits	11/29/2016	2017
OIG-17-11	We determined that over the previous 3 years, USCIS produced at least 19,000 cards that included incorrect information or were issued in duplicate. Most card issuance errors were due to design and functionality problems in the Electronic Immigration System (ELIS), which is being implemented to automate benefits processing. Although USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards, these efforts also were not fully successful and lacked consistency and a sense of urgency. We recommended that USCIS improve ELIS functionality and develop internal controls to avoid inappropriate Green Card issuance, standardize card recovery and tracking efforts, prevent unrecoverable card use, and enable remote identity verification and more secure card delivery methods. We made seven recommendations. >Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance	11/21/2016	2017
OIG-17-12	KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with DHS OIG, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ FY 2016consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. KPMG expressed an unmodified (clean) opinion on the Department’s FY 2016 financial statements. However, KPMG identified six significant deficiencies in internal control; three of which are considered material weaknesses. Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting. KPMG also reported instances in which DHS did not comply with four laws and regulations. The Department concurred with all of the recommendations in the report. >Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	11/14/2016	2017
OIG-17-10	We determined that the U.S. Secret Service has clearly taken the Protective Mission Panel’s (PMP) recommendations seriously, which it has demonstrated by making a number of significant changes. Specifically, it has improved communication within the workforce, better articulated its budget needs, increased hiring, and committed to more training. However, fully implementing many of the PMP’s recommendations will require long-term financial planning, further staff increases, consistent re-evaluation of the initiated actions’ effectiveness, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department of Homeland Security leadership. We have made five recommendations. >The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel	11/10/2016	2017
OIG-17-09	We determined that the Department’s oversight of its drug interdiction efforts did not align with the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy. . This occurred because DHS lacks formal oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure its drug interdiction performance activities met both ONDCP and legislative requirements. As a result, DHS could not ensure its drug interdiction efforts met required national drug control outcomes nor accurately assess the impact of the approximately $4.2 billion it spends annually on drug control activities. We made two recommendations that, if implemented, will improve DHS’ drug interdiction efforts. DHS concurred with both recommendations. >DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement	11/08/2016	2017
OIG-17-07-D	We determined that Pennsylvania did not comply with Federal regulations. Since 2005 Pennsylvania has returned to compliance. However, it has not remitted earnings on drawdowns held as investments. We recommended that FEMA collect $2,430,541 from Pennsylvania in investment earnings on disaster assistance funds. FEMA Region III concurred with the two recommendations in the report. >FEMA Should Recover $2.4 Million in Investment Gains Pennsylvania Improperly Earned on Federal Disaster Funds	11/08/2016	2017
OIG-17-08	This report summarizes what we consider the most serious management and performance challenges to both the Department as a whole, as well as individual components challenges. We remain concerned about the systemic nature of these challenges, some of which span multiple Administrations and changes in Department leadership. We also assess the Department’s progress in addressing those challenges. This year, we are reporting the Department’s major challenges in the following areas: Unity of Effort, Employee Morale and Engagement, Acquisition Management, Grants Management, Cybersecurity, Management Fundamentals. We did not make any new recommendations in this report. >Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security	11/07/2016	2017
OIG-17-05	We determined that CBP, ICE and USSS have been able to maintain staffing levels close to the authorized number of law enforcement personnel, but they continue to have significant delays in hiring. The additional steps in the hiring process add to the time it takes to hire law enforcement officers, but the components also do not have the staff or comprehensive automated systems needed to hire personnel as efficiently as possible. Although they have taken steps to reduce the time it takes to hire law enforcement personnel, it is too early to measure the long-term effects of the Department’s and the components’ recent actions. We made five recommendations to make the law enforcement hiring process more efficient. >DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel	10/31/2016	2017
OIG-17-04	We determined that airports do not always properly account for access media badges after they have been issued, and that the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) current inspection practice of relying on information reported by airports about access media badges limits its oversight of controls over badge accountability. We made three recommendations to improve TSA’s oversight of airport access media badge controls. >TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges (Redacted)	10/14/2016	2017
OIG-17-03	We determined that the maritime missions and responsibilities of the agencies are not duplicative and their efforts bolster the overall effectiveness of DHS maritime border security. Given the large area of responsibility, different activities, and limited resources, eliminating the maritime law enforcement responsibilities of either agency — or combining them — could be harmful to border security. However, Air and Marine Operations and the Coast Guard could improve coordination in some areas. DHS concurred with our two recommendations to improve oversight, and coordination of maritime operations. >AMO and Coast Guard Maritime Missions Are Not Duplicative, But Could Improve with Better Coordination	10/14/2016	2017
OIG-17-02	We determined that overall; the Department cannot be assured that its preparedness plans can be executed effectively during a pandemic event. As a result, the eight components we reviewed may not be fully prepared to continue mission essential functions during a pandemic event. The Department concurred with all seven recommendations and has initiated corrective actions >DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and Execution	10/12/2016	2017
OIG-17-01	We determined that the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) did not have adequate protections in place on systems to which Master Central Index (MCI) information was migrated. These problems occurred because USSS has not consistently made IT management a priority. The USSS Chief Information Officer (CIO) lacked authority for all IT resources and was not effectively positioned to provide necessary oversight, inadequate attention was given to updating USSS IT policies, and high turnover and vacancies within the Office of the CIO meant a lack of leadership to ensure IT systems were properly managed. In addition, USSS personnel were not adequately trained to successfully perform their duties. We made 10 recommendations to USSS and 1 recommendation to the DHS Privacy Office to reduce the risk of future unauthorized access and disclosure of sensitive information. The USSS and the DHS Privacy Officer concurred with these recommendations. >USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data	10/07/2016	2017
OIG-16-143-D	The City of Louisville (City), Mississippi, received a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant award of $61.7 million for damages resulting from an April 2014 disaster. We had concerns about how effectively the City complied with the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Pilot Program (PAAP program) authorized by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013. >FEMA Should Recover $25.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Louisville, Mississippi, for an April 2014 Disaster	09/29/2016	2016
OIG-16-142	Title IV, Section 406 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 requires Inspectors General to assess agency National Security Systems (NSS) and other systems that provide access to personally identifiable information (PII). We reviewed information security policies and practices for logical access and data protection at the Department of Homeland Security in four key areas, asrequired by the Act. >Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015	09/27/2016	2016
OIG-16-139-D	Time is of the essence in establishing a Joint Field Office (JFO) as the nexus of disaster response and recovery efforts. FEMA needs to implement consistent JFO selection guidance so its disaster response is effective, efficient and economical. This audit was conducted as a follow up to our prior report on the JFO Selection in New Jersey and as part of our 2015 disaster deployment efforts in Texas and South Carolina. >FEMA Should Implement Consistent Joint Field Office Guidance	09/27/2016	2016
OIG-16-141	The Reducing Over- Classification Act requires Federal Government Inspectors General of departments that make original classification determinations to conduct no less than two evaluations of their agencies’ classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the two recommendations from our first evaluation. In this second evaluation, we assessed DHS’ progress in its classification management program after implementing the recommendations. What We >DHS Has Not Trained Classified Network Users on the Classification Management Tool	09/26/2016	2016
OIG-16-140-D	The Town of North Hempstead, New York, (Town) received a $36.6 million Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant award for damages from Hurricane Sandy, which occurred in October 2012. We audited four projects totaling $20.9 million for debris removal and emergency protective services. >FEMA Should Recover $9.9 Million of $36.6 Million Awarded to the Town of North Hempstead, New York, for Hurricane Sandy Damages	09/26/2016	2016
OIG-16-137-D	At the time of our audit, FEMA estimated that the City of Eureka, Missouri (City), had sustained approximately $1.5 million in damages from flooding in December 2015. We conducted the audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the City may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal procurement requirements. >City of Eureka, Missouri, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its $1.5 Million FEMA Grant	09/23/2016	2016
OIG-16-138	In 2012, we reported on DHS’ challenges in implementing an effective information technology (IT) management program. FITARA was enacted in 2014 to institutionalize IT reform across the Federal Government. We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS has implemented FITARA to improve department-wide IT management and oversight. >DHS’ Progress in Implementing the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act	09/23/2016	2016
OIG-16-136-D	Calaveras County, California (County), received a $10.8 million grant for damages from the September 2015 Butte Fire. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the County may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance. >Calaveras County, California, Needs Additional State and FEMA Assistance in Managing Its $10.8 Million FEMA Grant (	09/22/2016	2016
OIG-16-135-D	Hope Academy (Hope) in D’Iberville, Mississippi, received a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance award of $3.5 million for damages Hurricane Katrina caused in August 2005. Both FEMA and the Office of Inspector General had concerns about the eligibility of Hope as an applicant for assistance and about Hope’s purchase of land for permanent relocation of damaged properties. >FEMA Should Recover $3.4 Million of the $3.5 Million Awarded to Hope Academy for Hurricane Katrina Damages	09/19/2016	2016
OIG-16-134	We sought to determine whether the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has an intelligence-driven, risk-based security strategy that informs security and resource decisions across all transportation modes. >Transportation Security Administration Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy	09/09/2016	2016
OIG-16-131	We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. We assessed DHS programs for continuous monitoring management, configuration management, identity and access management, incident response and reporting, risk management, security training, plans of actions and milestones, remote access management, contingency planning, and contractor systems. This report will be issued to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in accordance with reporting instructions dated May 10, 2016. >Review of DHS’ Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2016	09/09/2016	2016
OIG-16-133-D	The Ouachita Parish Police Jury, Louisiana (Ouachita Parish), sustained potential damages of approximately $3.7 million from severe storms and flooding in March 2016. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the parish may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements. >Louisiana Should Provide the Ouachita Parish Police Jury Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds	09/09/2016	2016
OIG-16-132-D	The April 17, 2013 fertilizer plant explosion devastated the City of West, Texas, killing 15 and leveling homes in a 5-block radius. The West School Administration (School District) received $63.4 million in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant funds from the Texas Division of Emergency Management, a FEMA grantee, for emergency and permanent recovery work. >FEMA Miscalculated the 50 Percent Rule when Deciding to Replace School Buildings after the West, Texas Explosion	09/09/2016	2016
OIG-16-130	When aliens apply for U.S. citizenship, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) obtains information about their immigration history through fingerprint records. Our objective was to determine whether USCIS uses these records effectively during the naturalization process. >Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S.Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records	09/08/2016	2016
OIG-16-127-D	We conducted this audit to gain a better understanding of the problem and identify ways FEMA can improve Reservist performance. >FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident Workforce	09/02/2016	2016
OIG-16-126-D	FEMA grants billions of dollars each year to recipients that contract for services to help communities respond to and recover from disasters. We performed this audit to assess the extent to which FEMA has allowed contract costs we questioned for noncompliance with Federal procurement requirements. We also assessed whether FEMA has granted an exception to procurement requirements for a class of grants, rather than on a case-by-case basis. >FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance Grantees’ and Subgrantees’ Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules	09/02/2016	2016
OIG-16-129	The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires the Office of Inspector General to conduct an annual risk assessment on agency charge card programs. We conducted this risk assessment to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security implemented sufficient internal controls to prevent illegal, improper, and erroneous purchases and payments. >Fiscal Year 2015 Risk Assessment of the DHS Bank Card Program Indicates Moderate Risk	09/02/2016	2016
OIG-16-125-D	The Long Beach City School District, New York (District) received a $35.5 million Public Assistance grant award from the New York Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (New York), a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grantee, for damages from Hurricane Sandy that occurred in October 2012. >Long Beach City School District in New York Generally Accounted For and Expended FEMA Public Assistance Funds Properly	09/02/2016	2016
OIG-16-128	We conducted this audit to determine whether TSA’s background check processes ensure only eligible individuals receive credentials and remain in the program. >TWIC Background Checks are Not as Reliable as They Could Be	09/01/2016	2016
OIG-16-124-D	The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) received a $7.6 million Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant award from the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency (Nebraska), a FEMA grantee, for damages it sustained from severe storms, tornadoes, straight line winds, and flooding in May 2014. Our audit objective was to determine whether NPPD accounted for and expended FEMA funds according to Federal requirements. What We >Nebraska Public Power District Properly Managed FEMA Grant Funds Awarded for May 2014 Storms	09/01/2016	2016
OIG-16-123	In response to a request from Senator Tom Coburn, we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Professional Responsibility’s (OPR) actions to determine whether its collection, storage, and sharing of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) violated the Privacy Act of 1974 or Department policies. We also sought to determine whether CBP OPR’s policies and training for protecting sensitive PII are adequate. >CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices	08/29/2016	2016
OIG-16-122-D	The severe winter storms, straight-line winds, flooding,landslides, and mudslides during December 6–23, 2015, caused severe damageto the City of Portland, Oregon (City). City officials estimate that disaster-related costs may exceed $11 million. We conducted this audit early in the PublicAssistance process to identify areas where the Citymay need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. >Portland, Oregon, Has Adequate Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant Funding	08/19/2016	2016
OIG-16-121-D	Washington County, Florida, (County) received an award of $13.9 million from the Florida Division of Emergency Management Agency (Florida), a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grantee, for damages resulting from a July 2013 flood. We audited 14 projects totaling $3.6 million. Our audit objective was to determine whether the County accounted for and expended FEMA funds according to Federal requirements. >Washington County, Florida, Effectively Managed FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded for a July 2013 Flood	08/19/2016	2016
OIG-16-120-D	FEMA estimated that the County had sustained approximately $1.97 million in damages from severe storms and flooding in late 2015. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the County may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. >Phelps County, Missouri, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its $1.97 Million FEMA Grant	08/17/2016	2016
OIG-16-119-D	The City of Louisville (City), Mississippi, received a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance award of $51.7 million for damages resulting from April 2014 storms. We reviewed Project 104 totaling $47.3 million for compliance with the Public Assistance AlternativeProcedures Pilot (PAAP) Program authorized by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013. >FEMA Improperly Awarded $47.3 Million to the City of Louisville, Mississippi	08/16/2016	2016
OIG-16-118-D	Wisner-Pilger Public Schools (Wisner-Pilger) received a $7.9 million Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant award for damages from severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and flooding in June 2014. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where Wisner-Pilger may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance. >Wisner-Pilger Public Schools, Nebraska, Took Corrective Actions to Comply with Federal Grant Award Requirements	08/16/2016	2016

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