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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-24-36 USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims 2024
OIG-24-11 Summary of Selected DHS Components that Did Not Consistently Restrict Access to Systems and Information 2024
OIG-23-40 USCIS Has Generally Met Statutory Requirements to Adjudicate Asylum Applications from Paroled Afghan Evacuees 2023
OIG-22-65 USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information 2022
OIG-22-10 USCIS' U Visa Program is Not Managed Effectively and is Susceptible to Fraud (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-12 Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS' Benefits Delivery during the COVID-19 Pandemic 2022
OIG-21-56 We identified deficiencies in E-Verify’s processes for confirming identity during employment verification.  E-Verify’s photo matching process is not fully automated, but rather, relies on employers to confirm individuals’ identities by manually reviewing photos.  We attribute these deficiencies to USCIS not developing or evaluating the plans and internal controls needed to improve its processes and detect, track, and investigate system errors.  Until USCIS addresses E-Verify’s deficiencies, it cannot ensure the system provides accurate employment eligibility results.  We made 10 recommendations to improve E-Verify’s accuracy, internal controls, and workload capabilities.  USCIS concurred with all 10 recommendations.

>USCIS Needs to Improve Its Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification Process 		2021
OIG-21-16 This report offers DHS OIG’s initial observations on the PACR and HARP programs based on our March 2020 visit to the El Paso, Texas area and analysis of data and information provided by CBP and USCIS headquarters.  We determined that CBP rapidly implemented the pilot programs and expanded them without a full evaluation of the pilots’ effectiveness.  Additionally, we determined there are potential challenges with the PACR and HARP programs related to how aliens are held and provided access to counsel and representation, and how CBP and USCIS assign staff to program duties and track aliens in the various agency systems.  We made six recommendations to improve PACR and HARP program implementation.  DHS did not concur with five of the six recommendations, stating that lawsuits and the COVID-19 pandemic had, in effect, ended the programs.  We reviewed evidence provided by CBP and concluded the lawsuits themselves did not terminate the PACR and HARP pilot programs.  Therefore, the recommendations remain open and unresolved.  If the programs resume, we plan to resume actual or virtual site visits and issue a report detailing DHS’ full implementation of the PACR and HARP pilot programs.

>DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs 		2021
OIG-19-40 Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions 2019
OIG-18-78 USCIS has inadequate controls for verifying that foreign nationals seeking lawful permanent residence status meet health-related standards for admissibility. First, USCIS is not properly vetting the physicians it designates as civil surgeons. We determined that USCIS designated physicians with a history of patient abuse or a criminal record as civil surgeons. This is occurring because USCIS does not have adequate policies to ensure only suitable physicians are designated as civil surgeons. Second, when reviewing these foreign nationals’ required medical forms, ISOs are accepting incomplete and inaccurate forms because they are not adequately trained and because USCIS is not enforcing its existing policies. USCIS may be placing foreign nationals at risk of abuse by some civil surgeons. USCIS could also be exposing the U.S. population to contagious or dangerous health conditions from foreign nationals erroneously granted lawful permanent resident status.

>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement 		2018
OIG-18-61 We conducted a verification review to determine the adequacy, effectiveness, and timeliness of USCIS' corrective actions to address the seven report recommendations in Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance, OIG-17-11, November 16, 2016. At the time of our audit fieldwork in spring 2016, USCIS’ efforts to address the errors were inadequate. USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards; however, these efforts also were not fully successful. At the time of our audit fieldwork in spring 2016, USCIS’ efforts to address the errors were inadequate. USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards; however, these efforts also were not fully successful.

>Verification Review: Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance (OIG-17-11) 		2018
OIG-18-58 "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates applications for immigration benefits, including applications for permanent resident cards, also known as green cards. In response to congressional concerns, we examined green card application processing times, as well as why processing times vary among USCIS field offices. USCIS regularly posts information on its website about the time it takes field offices to adjudicate green card applications (processing time). Yet, the information is unclear and not helpful to USCIS’ customers because it does not reflect the actual amount of time it takes field offices, on average, to complete green card applications.

>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications 		2018
OIG-18-23 USCIS deployed this capability in April 2016 to improve processing of approximately 84,000 naturalization applications received each month. However, as before, the ELIS capabilities deployed did not include critical functionality necessary for end-to­-end Form N-400 processing. ELIS repeatedly experienced outages and did not always perform as intended. Also, USCIS did not ensure field personnel were adequately trained to use the new system capabilities prior to deployment. Given its focus on meeting established system release dates, USCIS did not fully address our prior report recommendations to improve user support, stakeholder engagement, performance measurement, and testing to ensure ELIS met user needs and improved operations.

>USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery 		2018
OIG-18-03 USCIS site visits provide minimal assurance that H-1B participants are compliant and not engaged in fraudulent activity. These visits assess whether petitioners and beneficiaries comply with applicable immigration laws and regulations. USCIS can approve more than 330,000 H-1B petitions each year, which could include extensions and amendments. As of April 2017, USCIS reported more than 680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. However, during FYs 2014–16, USCIS conducted an average of 7,200 ASVVP site visits annually. For the limited number of visits conducted, USCIS does not always ensure the IOs are thorough and comprehensive in their approach. Further limiting the site visits’ effectiveness, USCIS does not ensure the agency always takes proper and timely action when IOs identify potential fraud or noncompliance. USCIS also uses targeted site visits to respond to indicators of fraud; however, the agency does not completely track the costs and analyze the results of these visits.

 

>USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Verify H-1B Visa Participants 		2018
OIG-17-111 We determined that 9,389 aliens identified as having multiple identities had received an immigration benefit.  When taking into account the most current immigration benefit these aliens received, we determined that naturalization, permanent residence, work authorization, and temporary protected status represent the greatest number of benefits, accounting for 8,447 or 90 percent of the 9,389 cases.  Benefits for the remaining 10 percent of cases include applications for asylum and appeals to immigration court decisions.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has drafted a policy memorandum, Guidance for Prioritizing IDENT Derogatory Information Related to Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records, outlining how it will review cases of individuals with multiple identities whose fingerprints were uploaded into the Automated Biometric Identification System through Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records.  We did not make any recommendations.

>Individuals with Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits 		2017
OIG-17-84 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited USCIS’ financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including monitoring and recording employee completion of the annual ethics and integrity training; review and approval of H1-B and L fraud fee journal entries; recording of property, plant, and equipment; and inaccurate and unsupported data in some systems.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-76 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (USCIS) core financial and feeder systems.  The deficiencies collectively limited USCIS’ ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that USCIS, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s CIO and ACFO, make improvements to USCIS’ financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-42 We determined that USCIS charges employers a flat fee per H-2 petition, regardless of whether 1) the employer is petitioning for one temporary non-immigrant worker, or hundreds of workers, and 2) it takes just minutes or days and weeks for USCIS to process the petition.  USCIS also did not limit the number of workers that employers can request on one petition, thus creating disparities in the cost employers pay to bring foreign workers into the United States.  We also found that large petitions are prone to errors that can have national security implications.  According to USCIS, the flat fee is used because USCIS systems do not capture the time required to adjudicate petitions with various numbers of workers.  We made three recommendations to improve the fee structure and vetting process.

>H-2 Petition Fee Structure is Inequitable and Contributes to Processing Errors 		2017
OIG-17-26-MA We recommend that USCIS halt plans to revert to using the Electronic Immigration System (ELIS) to process immigrant naturalization applications until it successfully addresses identified system deficiencies.  We made two recommendations to this Management Alert.

>Management Alert - U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Use of the Electronic Immigration System for Naturalization Benefits Processing (OIG-17-26-MA) 		2017
OIG-17-23-VR We determined that all corrective actions have been implemented for recommendations 1, 3 and 4, which were designed to increase the effectiveness of SAVE verification.  In response to OIG recommendation 2, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) built and implemented an interface with the Department of Justice’s Immigration Review Information Exchange System in August 2016 to obtain up-to-date information on the status of deportable aliens. While the interface is operational, USCIS and the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) still need to approve an Interface Control Agreement between the two systems before we can close the recommendation.

>Verification Review of USCIS' Progress in Implementing OIG Recommendations for SAVE to Accurately Determine Immigration Status of Individuals Ordered Deported 		2017
OIG-17-11 We determined that over the previous 3 years, USCIS produced at least 19,000 cards that included incorrect information or were issued in duplicate.  Most card issuance errors were due to design and functionality problems in the Electronic Immigration System (ELIS), which is being implemented to automate benefits processing.  Although USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards, these efforts also were not fully successful and lacked consistency and a sense of urgency. We recommended that USCIS improve ELIS functionality and develop internal controls to avoid inappropriate Green Card issuance, standardize card recovery and tracking efforts, prevent unrecoverable card use, and enable remote identity verification and more secure card delivery methods. We made seven recommendations.

>Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance 		2017
OIG-16-130 When aliens apply for U.S. citizenship, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) obtains information about their immigration history through fingerprint records. Our objective was to determine whether USCIS uses these records effectively during the naturalization process.

>Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S.Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records 		2016
OIG-16-96-IQO We conducted this review as part of the planned periodic review of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component internal affairs offices by the DHS Office of Inspector General in keeping with the oversight responsibilities mandated by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

>Oversight Review of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Investigations Division 		2016
OIG-16-70 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-79 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-48 Since 2005, USCIS has worked to transform its paper-based processes into an integrated and automated immigration benefits processing environment. As we previously reported, past automation attempts have been hampered by ineffective planning, multiple changes in direction, and inconsistent stakeholder involvement. Current USCIS efforts to automate immigration benefits processing also could be improved. Although USCIS deployed the Electronic Immigration System (ELIS) in May 2012, to date only two of approximately 90 types of immigration benefits and services are available for online customer filing. The current ELIS approach also has not ensured stakeholder involvement, performance metrics, system testing, or user support needed for ELIS to be effective. As it struggles to address these issues, USCIS now estimates that it will take three more years—over four years longer than estimated—and an additional $1 billion to automate all benefit types as expected. Until USCIS fully implements ELIS with all the needed improvements, the agency will remain unable to achieve its workload processing, customer service, and national security goals.

>USCIS Automation of Immigration Benefits Processing Remains Ineffective 		2016
OIG-16-17 We conducted this audit to determine how human traffickers used legal means to bring potential victims to the United States. We also assessed whether improvements in data quality and exchange could help Department of Homeland Security (DHS) better identify human traffickers. Our match of ICE and USCIS data from 2005 to 2014 indicated that work and fiancé visas were the primary means by which 17 of 32 known traffickers brought victims into the United States. In addition, we determined that 274 subjects of ICE human trafficking investigations successfully petitioned USCIS to bring 425 family members and fiancés into the United States. Available data could not confirm whether or not these cases actually involved human trafficking. ICE and USCIS could improve data quality to facilitate the ability to identify instances of human trafficking.

>ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases 		2016
OIG-15-122 We did not find any evidence that the production and subsequent mailing of 3-year DACA-related EADs held in NPS from February 17 through February 19, 2015, was done in defiance of the Federal District Court’s injunction. We determined that a combination of factors led to the production, and mailing of about 2,000 of these 3-year EADs. USCIS Service Center Operations Directorate (SCOPS) management was not specific in its direction to USCIS Office of Information Technology (IT) staff. In addition, SCOPS management was mistaken in its assumptions about what IT staff was able to do or had done in halting production of the 3-year EADs. Finally, within IT, we concluded there was a lack of understanding about the consequences of actions taken related to release of the EADs that had been held. USCIS could not provide reliable data on the actual number of EADs held in NPS that were subsequently produced and mailed. USCIS also continues to discover EADs that were produced or issued after the injunction but not included in the 2,128 originally identified. Therefore, we cannot validate the number of 3-year EADs produced or issued after February 16, 2015.

>USCIS' Issuance of 3-year Employment Authorization Documents Following a Federal District Court Injunction 		2015
OIG-15-72 KPMG LLP reviewed the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains five observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-15-43 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls and business process application controls at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. KPMG, LLP determined that USCIS had made improvements in designing and consistently implementing controls related to reviewing audit logs and enforcing account security requirements. However, KPMG, LLP continued to identify access control deficiencies related to USCIS’s core financial system. Additionally, many key financial and feeder systems have not been substantially updated since being inherited from legacy agencies several years ago. Such control deficiencies have limited USCIS’s ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical financial and operational data.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Component of the FY 2014 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-14-112 Information technology plays a critical role in enabling U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to accomplish its mission. In 2009, we reported that insufficient information technology staffing and limited information technology budget authority impeded the Chief Information Officer. We conducted this follow-up audit to determine USCIS’ progress in establishing key information technology management capabilities to support mission needs. The USCIS Chief Information Officer has established key information technology management capabilities to support USCIS’ mission.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges 		2014
OIG-14-99 Radio frequency identification technology is a form of automatic identification and data capture teclogy that uses electric or magnetic fields at radio frequencies to transmit information. Our overall objective was to determine whether USCIS has effectively managed the implementation of radio frequency identification technology. We determined that USCIS has effectively managed the implementation of radio frequency identification technology by establishing an information technology infrastructure to secure personal information and implementing safeguards to minimize the risk of using radio frequency identification-enabled permanent resident cards. For example, USCIS has granted its card production system the authority to operate, evaluated privacy implications of using the system, and ensured that no personal data is transmitted by permanent resident cards. However, USCIS had not deployed timely security patches on the servers and workstations that support radio frequency identification processes, assessed annually the effectiveness of security controls implemented on the system that produces radio frequency identification cards, or ensured employees producing these cards receive the mandatory annual privacy awareness training.

>Radio Frequency Identification Security at USCIS Is Managed Effectively, But Can Be Strengthened 		2014
OIG-14-71 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
OIG-14-36 We audited USCIS’ foreign worker petition process to determine whether employers comply with the requirements of Public Law 111-230. Our objectives were to: 1) validate that the border security fees were paid when required, and 2) assess USCIS controls to verify that employers accurately disclosed information on the number and composition of their employees when petitioning for foreign workers

>USCIS Controls To Ensure Employers Sponsoring H-1B and L-1 Employees Pay Applicable Border Security Fee 		2014
OIG-14-19 In 1990, Congress created the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) Immigrant Investor Program, also known as the Employment-Based Fifth Preference Program. The program’s intent was to stimulate the United States (U.S.) economy through job creation and capital investment by foreign investors. Three years later, the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 created the regional center pilot program for pooling investor money in a defined industry and geographic area. Our audit objective was to determine whether the USCIS’ Employment-Based Fifth Preference regional center program is administered and managed effectively

>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Employment-Based Fifth Preference (EB-5) Regional Center Program 		2014
OIG-13-107 Senator Charles Grassley requested that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General examine the potential for fraud or abuse in the L-1 intracompany transferee visa program. The L-1 visa program facilitates the temporary transfer of foreign nationals with management, professional, and specialist skills to the United States. Through domestic and international fieldwork, we observed DHS personnel and Department of State consular officials process L-1 petitions and visas. We also interviewed 71 managers and staff in DHS and the Department of State. Although U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services regulations and headquarters memorandums provide guidance regarding the definition of specialized knowledge, they are insufficient to ensure consistent application of L-1 visa program requirements in processing visas and petitions.

>Implementation of L-1 Visa Regulations 		2013
OIG-13-97 We performed this audit to determine whether USCIS recorded information about adjudicated family-based petitions and applications suspected of being fraudulent according to agency policy requirements and in a manner that deterred immigration fraud. U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who petition to sponsor a qualifying family member, including a spouse, must file a PetitionfforfAlienfRelative (Form I-130) with USCIS.1 USCIS officers adjudicate I-130 petitions at field offices or service centers. Through the I-130 adjudication process, USCIS must validate that the petitioner is a U.S.citizen or lawful permanent resident.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Tracking and Monitoring of Potentially Fraudulent Petitions and Applications for Family-Based Immigration Benefits 		2013
OIG-13-81 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012, and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). We were also engaged to audit the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements. The objective of our audit engagement was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of the FY 2012 financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Citizenship and Immigration Services Component of the FY 2012 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2013
OIG-13-59 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>United States Coast Guard’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-13-57 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-13-11 We audited the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program to determine the accuracy of nformation used to validate an applicant’s immigration status when the applicant had been ordered deported. Our objectives were (1) to assess whether the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program uses accurate and up-to-date information to validate immigration status of deportable, removable, and excludable individuals, and (2) if Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements is not using accurate information, to determine the rate of error with respect to verification of these individuals’ status.

>Improvements Needed for SAVE To Accurately Determine Immigration Status of Individuals Ordered Deported (Revised) 		2013
OIG-12-125  

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program Issues 		2012
OIG-12-83 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Laptop Safeguards Need Improvements 2012
OIG-12-56  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Component of the FY 2011 DHS Financial Statement Audit 		2012
OIG-12-54  

>USCIS' Management Letter for FY 2011 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2012
OIG-12-24  

>The Effects of USCIS Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers 		2012
OIG-12-12 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Progress in Transformation 2012
OIG-11-105  

>The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Adjudication of Petitions for Nonimmigrant Workers (I-129 Petitions for H-1B and H-2B visas) 		2011
OIG-11-85  

> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Privacy Stewardship 		2011
OIG-11-74  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2010 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Financial Statement Audit 		2011

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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