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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-22-39 CBP and CWMD Need to Improve Monitoring and Maintenance of Radiation Portal Monitor Systems - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-41 DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-40 Violations of ICE Detention Standards at South Texas ICE Processing Center 2022
OIG-22-38 Yuma Sector Border Patrol Struggled to Meet TEDS Standards for Single Adult Men but Generally Met TEDS Standards for Other Populations 2022
OIG-22-36 Management Alert - FEMA's COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent with Previous Interpretation of Long-Standing Regulations for Eligible Funeral Expenses 2022
OIG-22-37 ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels 2022
OIG-22-35 FEMA Successfully Assisted HHS in Providing Shelter and Supplies to Unaccompanied Children from the Southwest Border 2022
OIG-22-34 CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise 2022
OIG-22-33 The Office for Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve Its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices 2022
OIG-22-32 FEMA Followed Its Declaration Request Policies, but Could Improve Its Records Management 2022
OIG-22-31 Management Alert - Immediate Removal of All Detainees from the Torrance County Detention Facility 2022
OIG-22-30 S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects 2022
OIG-22-29 I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-28 Management Alert - Reporting Suspected Fraud of Lost Wages Assistance 2022
OIG-22-27 CBP Officials Implemented Rapid DNA Testing to Verify Claimed Parent-Child Relationships 2022
OIG-22-26 CBP Border Patrol Stations and Ports of Entry in Southern California Generally Met TEDS Standards 2022
OIG-22-25 FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs 2022
OIG-22-23 Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report 2022
OIG-22-24 Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds 2022
OIG-22-19 Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report 2022
OIG-22-20 Review of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report 2022
OIG-22-21 Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report 2022
OIG-22-22 Rio Grande Valley Area Border Patrol Struggles with High Volumes of Detainees and Cases of Prolonged Detention but Has Taken Consistent Measures to Improve Conditions in Facilities 2022
OIG-22-17 Review of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds 2022
OIG-22-18 Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds 2022
OIG-22-16 Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds 2022
OIG-22-15 CISA Should Validate Priority Telecommunications Services Performance Data 2022
OIG-22-13 Trusted Traveler Revocations for Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-10 USCIS' U Visa Program is Not Managed Effectively and is Susceptible to Fraud (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-11 FEMA Continues to Phase Out Its Use of Alternative Contracting Methods to Administer the National Flood Insurance Program 2022
OIG-22-14 Medical Processes and Communication Protocols Need Improvement at Irwin County Detention Center 2022
OIG-22-12 Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS' Benefits Delivery during the COVID-19 Pandemic 2022
OIG-22-09 DHS' Implementation of OIG Recommendations Related to Drug Interdiction 2022
OIG-22-06 DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts 2022
OIG-22-08 KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ fiscal year 2021 consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on the financial statements, reporting that they present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2021.  However, KPMG identified material weaknesses in internal control in two areas and other significant deficiencies in four areas.  Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG also reported noncompliance with two laws and regulations.  KPMG made 19 recommendations to improve the Department’s internal control over financial reporting.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2022
OIG-22-07 FEMA Did Not Always Accurately Report COVID-19 Contract Actions in the Federal Procurement Data System 2022
OIG-22-05 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 2022
OIG-22-04 DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain 2022
OIG-22-03 Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities 2022
OIG-22-02 DHS could not provide any performance measures and provided only limited data to demonstrate the full extent or effectiveness of its efforts to enforce wildlife trafficking laws.  In addition, CBP personnel inconsistently recorded data on wildlife encounters, and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents did not always completely or accurately record actions and data related to wildlife trafficking.  CBP personnel also did not always demonstrate that they involved ICE HSI special agents when suspecting wildlife trafficking crimes.  Finally, DHS did not establish performance goals to measure the results of its efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.  We attributed these issues to DHS, CBP, and ICE not providing adequate oversight, including clear and comprehensive policies and procedures, of wildlife trafficking efforts.  As a result, DHS may be missing opportunities to curtail the spread of zoonotic viruses and disrupt transnational criminal organizations that use the same networks for other illicit trafficking, such as narcotics, humans, and weapons.  We made one recommendation to improve the Department’s efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.  The Department concurred with the recommendation and provided a plan to improve its efforts.

>DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking 		2022
OIG-22-01 ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities 2022
OIG-21-73 FLETC implemented robust protocols to respond to and mitigate COVID-19 at its Glynco training facility.  Before reopening in June 2020, FLETC developed a formal plan to resume in-person training.  Through this plan, along with other policies and procedures, FLETC established protocols in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance and medical expertise.  DHS students and component officials we spoke with confirmed that these protocols were in place and told us that, overall, they were effective.  However, they also raised concerns related to students socializing inappropriately, and not following some requirements such as mask-wearing.  In instances such as these, FLETC was largely reliant on students’ home agencies to take action to reinforce compliance among their students with safety protocols, or to take disciplinary action, if necessary.  As a result of its measures, FLETC’s rate of positive COVID-19 tests was lower than that of its surrounding county.  We also found, however, that FLETC did not always follow its own protocols for housing assignments related to COVID-19.  For example, some students who were not positive for COVID-19 or were not quarantined for exposure to COVID-19 were still housed in the isolation dormitory.  Some of the students we spoke with who were incorrectly assigned to the isolation dormitory told us that they did not feel safe.  We made one recommendation to the FLETC Director to improve COVID-19 student-housing protocols.  FLETC concurred with the recommendation. 

>FLETC's Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19 at its Glynco Training Center 		2021
OIG-21-71 FEMA does not always appropriately report and investigate employee allegations of sexual harassment and workplace sexual misconduct.  For FYs 2012 to 2018, we identified 305 allegations from FEMA employees potentially related to sexual harassment and sexual misconduct such as sexual assault, unwelcome sexual advances, and inappropriate sexual comments.  However, we were unable to determine whether FEMA properly handled 153 of these allegations, because it could not provide complete investigative and disciplinary files.  For allegations that had complete files available, at times we were unable to determine whether FEMA conducted an investigation.  Finally, we found FEMA did not document whether it investigated some sexual harassment EEO complaints as potential employee misconduct.  We attribute the inconsistent investigations and incomplete files to inadequate policies, processes, and training. These shortcomings may fuel employee perceptions that FEMA is not addressing sexual harassment and sexual misconduct and is not supportive of employees reporting that type of behavior.  We made five recommendations to improve FEMA’s handling of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations including establishing a comprehensive case management system; developing and implementing formal processes and procedures to appropriately address all harassment allegations; providing investigative training; and ensuring allegations are appropriately referred to DHS OIG.

>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct 		2021
OIG-21-72 In May 2020, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management formally documented the Department’s risk acceptance to allow the Coast Guard to meet FISMA requirements according to Department of Defense, rather than DHS’ reporting requirements.  The Deputy Under Secretary for Management’s decision adversely affected our ability to evaluate the Department’s enterprise-wide information program under this year’s OIG reporting metrics.  Nonetheless, when evaluating the overall effectiveness of DHS’ information security program for FY 2020 FISMA, our rating does not include the Coast Guard.  DHS’ information security program earned a maturity rating of “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in three of five functions.  DHS can further improve the effectiveness of its information security program by ensuring components execute all its policies and procedures.  We made four recommendations in our report, with one to the DHS Chief Information Officer, one to the S&T Chief Information Officer, one to the Secret Service Chief Information Officer, and one to the FEMA Chief Information Officer.  The Department concurred with all four recommendations.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2020 		2021
OIG-21-70 CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-21-63 Summary: OFO continues to experience challenges managing searches of electronic devices, similar to those identified in our first audit report, CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry, issued in December 2018.  Specifically, OFO did not properly document and conduct searches of electronic devices, fully assess the effectiveness of the electronic device search program, or adequately manage electronic device search equipment.  This occurred because, although it plans to do so, OFO has not yet fully implemented corrective actions for four of the five recommendations in our previous audit report, including establishing training for staff.  According to an OFO official, there have been delays in fully implementing the prior recommendations due to reviews of existing policy and a capabilities analysis report, and development of additional training.  In addition, OFO does not have adequate processes for auditing electronic device searches, does not track prosecutions and convictions resulting from referrals to other Federal agencies, and does not adequately monitor search equipment usage, functionality, and inventory.  Unless it corrects previously identified deficiencies and better manages searches and equipment, OFO will limit its ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.  We made five recommendations to improve CBP’s oversight of searches of electronic devices at ports of entry.  CBP concurred with all five recommendations.

>CBP Continues to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 		2021
OIG-21-67 During our ongoing audit of DHS law enforcement virtual training, we learned that the Coast Guard uses functional firearms to conduct DVD-based simulation training.  We identified this issue in Coast Guard’s Commandant Instruction 3574.5C, 18 September 2014, Coast Guard Judgmental Use of Force Evaluation and observed a demonstration of this training at one Coast Guard location.  According to testimony or policy from four other DHS components that employ or train law enforcement personnel, the use of functional firearms during video-based simulation training is prohibited within their respective components.  By using functional firearms capable of firing ammunition, even if emptied of ammunition, in DVD-based simulation training, Coast Guard increased the risk of unintentional injury or death.  Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation and took immediate corrective actions to discontinue the use of functional firearms during DVD-based simulation training.  The recommendation is resolved and closed.

>Management Alert - The United States Coast Guard Discontinued the Use of Functional Firearms in DVD Simulation Training 		2021
OIG-21-69 TSA acquired CT systems that did not address all needed capabilities.  These issues occurred because the Department of Homeland Security did not provide adequate oversight of TSA’s acquisition of CT systems.  DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds.  However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance.  In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters.  DHS also did not validate TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system.  As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs.  We made three recommendations to improve DHS’ oversight of TSA’s CT systems acquisition.  DHS concurred with all three recommendations.  

>DHS Did Not Effectively Oversee TSA's Acquisition of Computed Tomography Systems 		2021
OIG-21-68 TSA implemented 167 of the 251 (67 percent) requirements in both Acts, 55 of the 167 (33 percent) were not completed by the Acts’ established deadlines, and TSA did not complete the remaining 84 requirements.  TSA was unable to complete 33 of these requirements because the actions relied on external stakeholders acting first or depended on conditions outside of TSA's control. The shortfalls occurred because TSA did not: (1) designate a lead office to establish internal controls, conduct oversight, and provide quality assurance for implementing the legislatively mandated requirements; (2) develop formal policies and procedures to ensure consistency and accountability for implementing the requirements on time; or (3) plan or develop an effective system to maintain relevant supporting documentation for the Acts’ requirements to help ensure information accuracy, continuity, and record retrieval capability. Further, TSA had difficulty completing some mandates that required lengthy regulatory processes or coordination with and reliance on external Government and industry stakeholders.  Because TSA has not implemented all requirements, it may be missing opportunities to address vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems.  TSA provided a corrective action plan but did not concur with the recommendation.

>TSA Has Not Implemented All Requirements of the 9/11 Act and the TSA Modernization Act 		2021
OIG-21-66 DHS did not fully comply with the public law.  TSA and the Coast Guard prepared, and DHS submitted, a CAP to Congress in June 2020.  Although the CAP identified corrective actions for one area, it did not address four issues we consider significant.  We recommended that DHS, in consultation with TSA and Coast Guard, re-evaluate the assessment to determine if further corrective actions are needed or justify excluding significant issues from the CAP.  DHS did not concur with the recommendation, but we consider DHS’ actions partially responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and unresolved.

>DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment 		2021

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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