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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-24-42 The Secret Service's Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 - (REDACTED) 2024
OIG-23-61 CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy Policies or Develop Sufficient Policies Before Procuring and Using Commercial Telemetry Data - (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-23-17 Secret Service and ICE Did Not Always Adhere to Statute and Policies Governing Use of Cell-Site Simulators - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-21-31 Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities 		2021
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021
OIG-20-66 DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA 		2020
OIG-20-18 The U.S. Secret Service incurred operational and temporary duty costs for rental cars, hotel rooms, meals and incidentals, overtime pay, commercial airfare, golf cart rentals, and other logistical support.  Certain details of the cost information related to the Secret Service’s protective operations presented in the report are designated as Law Enforcement Sensitive.  We did not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President because the Secret Service would have incurred these costs regardless of whether the President traveled.  Also excluded are costs associated with assistance provided by the Department of Defense, such as the use of military aircraft to transport personnel and equipment, because the Secret Service is not required to reimburse these costs.  We did not identify any fraud indicators or unauthorized costs.  We made no recommendations. 

>United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort 		2020
OIG-17-87 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the United States Secret Service’s financial statements and internal control over financial.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including financial reporting; time and attendance approval; invoice entry and disbursements; and confidential financial disclosure reporting.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-72 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls, segregation of duties, and configuration management.  The deficiencies collectively limited USSS’ ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that USSS, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Information Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to USSS’ financial management systems and associated information.

 

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Secret Service Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-47 The Protective Mission Panel (PMP) made a number of recommendations in its December 2014 classified report.  The objective of this review was to determine whether the Secret Service has taken or plans to take action to implement the PMP’s classified recommendations, which primarily relate to security gaps and vulnerabilities at the White House Complex (WHC).  The Secret Service has clearly taken these recommendations seriously.  Using funding appropriated for PMP initiatives, the Secret Service began enhancing security and refreshing technology at the WHC.  Fully implementing many of the PMP’s classified recommendations will depend on staff increases, sustained funding, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department leadership to ensure actions continue even during times of increased protective mission demands and unexpected priorities.  We made no recommendations in this report.

>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Classified Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel 		2017
OIG-17-10 We determined that the U.S. Secret Service has clearly taken the Protective Mission Panel’s (PMP) recommendations seriously, which it has demonstrated by making a number of significant changes.  Specifically, it has improved communication within the workforce, better articulated its budget needs, increased hiring, and committed to more training.  However, fully implementing many of the PMP’s recommendations will require long-term financial planning, further staff increases, consistent re-evaluation of the initiated actions’ effectiveness, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department of Homeland Security leadership.  We have made five recommendations.

>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel 		2017
OIG-17-01 We determined that the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) did not have adequate protections in place on systems to which Master Central Index (MCI) information was migrated.  These problems occurred because USSS has not consistently made IT management a priority.  The USSS Chief Information Officer (CIO) lacked authority for all IT resources and was not effectively positioned to provide necessary oversight, inadequate attention was given to updating USSS IT policies, and high turnover and vacancies within the Office of the CIO meant a lack of leadership to ensure IT systems were properly managed.  In addition, USSS personnel were not adequately trained to successfully perform their duties. We made 10 recommendations to USSS and 1 recommendation to the DHS Privacy Office to reduce the risk of future unauthorized access and disclosure of sensitive information. The USSS and the DHS Privacy Officer concurred with these recommendations.

>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data 		2017
OIG-16-81 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. For

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-69 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Secret Service Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-64 We conducted this review of the Secret Service as part of an overall review of the Secret Service’s presidential protective function to determine whether in three incidents the Secret Service followed its own protective policies, what actions were taken to correct identified deficiencies, and whether these corrections are adequate.

>2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-16-20 Secret Service has a dual mission of protection and criminal investigations. To support its protective mission, officers carry radios, which are their first line of communication for events such as fence jumpers, suspicious packages, or protests. These radio systems are critical for day-to-day protective operations. Secret Service needs to upgrade the radio systems used around the White House complex, the Vice President’s Residence, and Foreign Diplomatic Embassies. If Secret Service continues to use these outdated radio communications systems, it may negatively impact their protective operations.

>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-16-16 The Secret Service responded immediately to a November 2011 incident in which shots fired from an assault rifle hit the White House and participated in the ensuing investigation. However, the Secret Service did not conduct a formal after action review or a detailed analysis of its protective operations or investigative response, so it is not clear whether protective policies were followed. After the incident, the Secret Service spent at least $17 million to improve infrastructure around the White House and increase patrols; however, without a formal after action review and detailed analysis, the Secret Service cannot be certain these changes were necessary, would have minimized the potential threat, or improved the response to the incident.

>The Secret Service Did Not Identify Best Practices and Lessons Learned from the 2011 White House Shooting Incident 		2016
OIG-15-61 In October 2014, we visited former President George H.W. Bush's Houston residence in response to a complaint alleging alarms were inoperable. During our visit, we identified issues with the alarm system at the residence. The system had been inoperable for at least 13 months. During this time, the Secret Service protective detail created a roving post to secure the residence and no security breach occurred. We found problems with identifying, reporting, and tracking alarm system malfunctions, and with repairing and replacing alarm systems. Because these issues may be affecting other residences, we are bringing them to the Secret Service’s attention.

>Management Advisory-Alarm System Maintenance at Residences Protected by the U.S. Secret Service (Redacted) 		2015
OIG-15-69 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG LLP assessed certain non-technical areas related to the protection of sensitive information technology and financial information and assets at United State Secret Service (USSS). KPMG LLP performed after-hours physical security walkthroughs and social engineering tests and identified instances where USSS personnel did not adequately comply with requirements for safeguarding sensitive material or assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. The inadequate protection of DHS information systems and data from those without a need to know or a need for access puts USSS’ sensitive electronic and physical data at adverse risk of loss, theft, or misuse.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Secret Service Component of the FY 2014 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-15-58 KPMG LLP reviewed the United States Secret Service’s (U.S. Secret Service) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains seven observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations. KPMG LLP noted deficiencies and the need for improvements in certain U.S. Secret Service processes. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2014, included in DHS’ fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report. These observations are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-15-21 The United States Secret Service’s acquisition management program office, established in 2011, has adequate oversight and management of its acquisition process, complies with DHS acquisition guidance, and has implemented some best practices. However, the Secret Service does not have its own guidance for acquisitions valued at less than $300 million and, at the time of our audit, the component did not have a designated Component Acquisition Executive.

>The United States Secret Service Has Adequate Oversight and Management of its Acquisitions (Revised) 		2015
OIG-14-74 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>United States Secret Service’s Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
OIG-14-20 In April 2012, United States Secret Service (USSS) employees were preparing for a Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. While off duty, several employees were suspected of soliciting prostitutes and consuming excessive amounts of alcohol. We assessed the adequacy of the agency’s efforts to identify, mitigate, and address instances of misconduct and inappropriate behavior. To satisfy our review objectives, we (1) interviewed more than 200 USSS supervisors, managers, and senior officials; (2) administered an electronic and in-person survey with a combined response rate of 41 percent; (3) reviewed USSS internal affairs cases; (4) analyzed discipline records; and (5) analyzed personnel security records.

>Adequacy of USSS Efforts to Identify, Mitigate, and Address Instances of Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior (Redacted) 		2014
OIG-13-65 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>United States Secret Service’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-13-24 In April 2012, United States Secret Service (USSS) employees were in Cartagena, Colombia, preparing for a Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas. during these preparations, several USSS employees were suspected of soliciting prostitutes. In response, USSS took the following steps: (1) managers in Cartagena responded to the alleged solicitation; (2) USSS’ internal affairs office investigated the alleged solicitation; and (3) USSS revised policies and supervision staffing for protective visits. We assessed USSS’ response to the alleged solicitation of prostitutes by its employees.

>Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia 		2013
OIG-11-94  

>DHS/U.S. Secret Service FY 2009 Antideficiency Act Violation 		2011
OIG-11-56  

>U.S. Secret Service's Information Technology Modernization Effort 		2011
OIG-11-54  

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011
OIG-10-04 United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security  2010
OIG-08-95 Review of DHS Security Controls for Portable Storage Devices 2008
OIG-05-38 Improved Security Required For U.S. Secret Service Networks (Redacted) 2005
OIG-05-37 Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical United States Secret Service Database (Redacted) 2005

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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