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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-25-04 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security (MMPC) 2025
OIG-24-05 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security (MMPC) 2024
OIG-23-01 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 2023
OIG-22-55 Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2021 2022
OIG-22-45 Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 2022
OIG-22-28 Management Alert - Reporting Suspected Fraud of Lost Wages Assistance 2022
OIG-22-20 Review of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report 2022
OIG-22-17 Review of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds 2022
OIG-22-06 DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts 2022
OIG-22-09 DHS' Implementation of OIG Recommendations Related to Drug Interdiction 2022
OIG-22-08 KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ fiscal year 2021 consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on the financial statements, reporting that they present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2021.  However, KPMG identified material weaknesses in internal control in two areas and other significant deficiencies in four areas.  Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG also reported noncompliance with two laws and regulations.  KPMG made 19 recommendations to improve the Department’s internal control over financial reporting.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2022
OIG-22-05 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 2022
OIG-22-04 DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain 2022
OIG-21-73 FLETC implemented robust protocols to respond to and mitigate COVID-19 at its Glynco training facility.  Before reopening in June 2020, FLETC developed a formal plan to resume in-person training.  Through this plan, along with other policies and procedures, FLETC established protocols in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance and medical expertise.  DHS students and component officials we spoke with confirmed that these protocols were in place and told us that, overall, they were effective.  However, they also raised concerns related to students socializing inappropriately, and not following some requirements such as mask-wearing.  In instances such as these, FLETC was largely reliant on students’ home agencies to take action to reinforce compliance among their students with safety protocols, or to take disciplinary action, if necessary.  As a result of its measures, FLETC’s rate of positive COVID-19 tests was lower than that of its surrounding county.  We also found, however, that FLETC did not always follow its own protocols for housing assignments related to COVID-19.  For example, some students who were not positive for COVID-19 or were not quarantined for exposure to COVID-19 were still housed in the isolation dormitory.  Some of the students we spoke with who were incorrectly assigned to the isolation dormitory told us that they did not feel safe.  We made one recommendation to the FLETC Director to improve COVID-19 student-housing protocols.  FLETC concurred with the recommendation. 

>FLETC's Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19 at its Glynco Training Center 		2021
OIG-21-72 In May 2020, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management formally documented the Department’s risk acceptance to allow the Coast Guard to meet FISMA requirements according to Department of Defense, rather than DHS’ reporting requirements.  The Deputy Under Secretary for Management’s decision adversely affected our ability to evaluate the Department’s enterprise-wide information program under this year’s OIG reporting metrics.  Nonetheless, when evaluating the overall effectiveness of DHS’ information security program for FY 2020 FISMA, our rating does not include the Coast Guard.  DHS’ information security program earned a maturity rating of “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in three of five functions.  DHS can further improve the effectiveness of its information security program by ensuring components execute all its policies and procedures.  We made four recommendations in our report, with one to the DHS Chief Information Officer, one to the S&T Chief Information Officer, one to the Secret Service Chief Information Officer, and one to the FEMA Chief Information Officer.  The Department concurred with all four recommendations.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2020 		2021
OIG-21-55 Since our FY 2020 evaluation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has continued to provide effective oversight of the department-wide intelligence system and has implemented programs to monitor ongoing security practices.  We determined that DHS' information security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems is effective this year as the Department achieved “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in three of five cybersecurity functions, based on current reporting instructions for intelligence systems.  However, we identified deficiencies in DHS’ protect and recover functions.  We made three recommendations to I&A to address the deficiencies identified, and I&A concurred with all three recommendations.

>Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2020 - Secret 		2021
OIG-21-51 In FY 2018, S&T did not always adhere to DHS and internal purchase card policies and procedures.  Of 421 purchase card transactions selected for review, we identified 394 transactions that did not have required supporting documentation, separation of key transaction duties, approvals and other required signatures, or compliance with other risk-based procedures.  According to S&T officials, these issues were due to shortfalls in program oversight and training, as well as outdated policy.  We identified $63,213 in questionable costs associated with purchase card transactions.  We made four recommendations to improve S&T’s adherence to DHS policies and procedures for its Bankcard Program.  S&T concurred with the four recommendations. 

>FY 2018 Audit of Science and Technology Bankcard Program Indicates Risks 		2021
OIG-21-38 We determined DHS had not yet strengthened its cybersecurity posture by implementing a Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program.  DHS spent more than $180 million between 2013 and 2020 to design and deploy a department-wide continuous monitoring solution but faced setbacks.  DHS initially planned to deploy its internal CDM solution by 2017 using a “One DHS” approach that restricted components to a standard set of common tools.  We attributed DHS’ limited progress to an unsuccessful initial implementation strategy, significant changes to its deployment approach, and continuing issues with component data collection and integration.  As of March 2020, DHS had developed a key element of the program, its internal CDM dashboard.  However, the dashboard contained less than half of the required asset management data.  As a result, the Department cannot leverage intended benefits of the dashboard to manage, prioritize, and respond to cyber risks in real time.  Finally, we identified vulnerabilities on CDM servers and databases.  This occurred because DHS did not clearly define patch management responsibilities and had not yet implemented required configuration settings.  Consequently, databases and servers could be vulnerable to cybersecurity attack, and the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data could be at risk.  We made three recommendations for DHS to update its program plan, address vulnerabilities, and define patch management responsibilities

>DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program 		2021
OIG-21-37 We determined that DHS needs to improve the collection and management of data across its multiple components to better serve and safeguard the public.  The data access, availability, accuracy, completeness, and relevance issues we identified presented numerous obstacles for DHS personnel who did not have essential information they needed for decision making or to effectively and efficiently carry out day-to-day mission operations.  Although DHS has improved its information security program and developed plans to improve quality and management of its data, follow through and continued improvement will be essential to address the internal control issues underlying the data deficiencies highlighted in the report.  We made no recommendations in the summary report.

>Persistent Data Issues Hinder DHS Mission, Programs, and Operations 		2021
OIG-21-35 We determined DHS law enforcement components did not consistently collect DNA from arrestees as required.  Of the five DHS law enforcement components we reviewed that are subject to these DNA collection requirements, only Secret Service consistently collected DNA from arrestees.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Protective Service inconsistently collected DNA, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected no DNA.  DHS did not adequately oversee its law enforcement components to ensure they properly implemented DNA collection.  Based on our analysis, we project the DHS law enforcement components we audited did not collect DNA for about 212,646, or 88 percent, of the 241,753 arrestees from fiscal years 2018 and 2019.  Without all DHS arrestees’ DNA samples in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s criminal database, law enforcement likely missed opportunities to receive investigative leads based on DNA matches.  Additionally, DHS did not benefit from a unity of effort, such as sharing and leveraging processes, data collection, and best practices across components.  We recommended DHS oversee and guide its law enforcement components to ensure they comply with collection requirements.  DHS concurred with all four of our recommend.

>DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees 		2021
OIG-21-33 We determined DHS did not comply with Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)  in fiscal year 2020 because it did not achieve and report an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for 2 of 12 programs reported in its FY 2020 Agency Financial Report.  DHS complied with Executive Order 13520 by properly compiling and making available to the public its FY 2020 Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment reports.  We made two recommendations to DHS to follow Office of Management and Budget requirements and ensure the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues its remediation process to reduce improper payments.  DHS concurred with both recommendations. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2021
OIG-21-22 We determined that DHS’ Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) BioWatch has information sharing challenges that reduce nationwide readiness to respond to biological terrorism threats.  We made four recommendations that, when implemented, will improve BioWatch. CWMD concurred with all four recommendations. 

>Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for BioWatch (REDACTED) 		2021
OIG-21-17 Based on our review of 45 judgmentally sampled awards (15 non-competitive grants and 30 other than full and open competition [OTFOC] contracts), we found DHS complied with applicable laws and regulations.  We made two recommendations to help improve DHS’ procedures and ensure future reporting submissions are accurate.  The Department concurred with the two recommendations.  

>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019 		2021
OIG-21-14 Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning 2021
OIG-21-08 Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 2021
OIG-21-07 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 2021
OIG-21-06 DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives 2021
OIG-21-01 DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure 2021
OIG-20-77 Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019 2020
OIG-20-74 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) increased the number of Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) participants as well as the volume of cyber threat indicators it has shared since the program’s inception in 2016.  However, CISA made limited progress in improving the overall quality of information it shares with AIS participants to effectively reduce cyber threats and protect against attacks.  The lack of progress can be attributed to the limited number of AIS participants sharing cyber indicators with CISA, delays in receiving cyber threat intelligence standards, and insufficient staff.  To be more effective, CISA should hire the staff it needs to provide outreach, guidance, and training.  We made four recommendations to CISA to enhance the program’s overall effectiveness and cyber threat information sharing.  CISA concurred with all four recommendations.  

>DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act in Calendar Years 2017 and 2018 		2020
OIG-20-73 DHS has not fulfilled most of the 13 responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act.  To comply with one responsibility, DHS has a Geospatial Information Officer and a dedicated Geospatial Management Office whose duties include overseeing the Act’s implementation and to coordinate with other agencies.  However, DHS has only partially met, or not met, the remaining 12 responsibilities in the Act.  DHS’ lack of progress in complying with the responsibilities outlined in the Act can be attributed to multiple external and internal factors.  External factors include the need for additional guidance from the Federal Geographic Data Committee and the Office of Management and Budget to properly interpret and implement certain responsibilities.  Internal factors include competing priorities that diverted resources away from fulfilling the Act’s 13 responsibilities.  We made three recommendations that focus on increasing the resources necessary to comply with DHS’ 13 responsibilities under the Act.  The Department concurred with all three recommendations.

>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 		2020
OIG-20-72 Oversight Review of the Office of the Chief Security Officer, Internal Security Division 2020
OIG-20-62 Since 2017, DHS has continued to make progress in meeting its Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) reporting requirements, but challenges remain.  To enable more effective tracking of Federal spending, DHS must continue to take action to accurately align its budgetary data with the President’s budget, reduce award misalignments across DATA Act files, improve the timeliness of financial assistance reporting, implement and use government-wide data standards, and address risks to data quality.  Without these actions, DHS will continue to experience challenges in meeting its goal of achieving the highest possible data quality for submission to USAspending.gov.  We made five recommendations to help strengthen DHS’ controls for ensuring complete, accurate, and timely spending data.  The Department concurred with all five recommendations. 

>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain 		2020
OIG-20-61 The DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) and most component CIOs had conducted strategic planning efforts to help prioritize legacy Information Technology (IT) systems and infrastructure to better accomplish mission goals.  However, due to a lack of standard guidance and funding, not all components have complied with or fully embraced Department-wide IT modernization initiatives to adopt cloud-based computing, and to consolidate data centers.  Meanwhile, DHS continues to rely on deficient and outdated IT systems to perform mission-critical operations.  Additionally, DHS has not yet leveraged the Modernizing Government Technology Act mandate to accelerate ongoing IT modernization efforts, as DHS and its components questioned whether the benefits of the Act outweighed the additional effort needed to use the resources provided under the Act.  Until DHS addresses these issues, it will continue to face significant challenges to accomplish mission operations efficiently and effectively.  We made three recommendations for the DHS OCIO to develop guidance for implementing cloud technology and migrating legacy IT systems to the cloud, coordinate with components to develop and finalize a data center migration approach, and establish a process to assign risk ratings for major legacy IT investments.  The Department concurred with all three recommendations.

>Progress and Challenges in Modernizing DHS' IT Systems and Infrastructure 		2020
OIG-20-56 DHS generally met deadlines for responding to simple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, it did not do so for most complex requests.  A significant increase in requests received, coupled with resource constraints, limited DHS’ ability to meet production timelines under FOIA, creating a litigation risk for the Department.  Additionally, DHS has not always fully documented its search efforts, making it difficult for the Department to defend the reasonableness of the searches undertaken.  With respect to responding to congressional requests, we determined DHS has established a timeliness goal of 15 business days or less; however, on average, it took DHS nearly twice as long to provide substantive responses to Congress, with some requests going unanswered for up to 450 business days.  Further, DHS redacted personal information in its responses to congressional committee chairs even when disclosure of the information was statutorily permissible.  This was a descriptive report and contained no recommendations.  In its response, DHS acknowledged FOIA backlogs remain a problem, despite increasing requests processed.  DHS stated its process responding to congressional requests varies greatly and that its redactions are appropriate.

>DHS' Process for Responding to FOIA and Congressional Requests 		2020
OIG-20-53 According to the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (SAFA), the program should provide oversight, lead policy initiatives, and coordinate with DHS components and Federal agencies.  However, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) has not yet carried out a program to meet SAFA’s requirements.  This occurred because CWMD believes it does not have clearly defined authority from the Secretary to carry out the requirements of the SAFA.  In addition, since its establishment in December 2017, CWMD has not prioritized SAFA requirements but instead has focused its resources on other mission areas.  As a result, CWMD has limited awareness of DHS’ ongoing efforts and cannot ensure it is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the Nation’s food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.  We made three recommendations to DHS’ CWMD to improve oversight, policy initiatives, and coordination of the Department’s efforts to protect the Nation’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems. 

>DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department's Efforts to Defend the Nation's Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism 		2020
OIG-20-47 Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2019 2020
OIG-20-43 DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities.  This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability.  We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.      

>DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems 		2020
Department of Homeland Security Section - Top Challenges Facing Federal Agencies: COVID-19 Emergency Relief and Response Efforts 2020
OIG-20-40 Two years since enactment, DHS and its components have mostly complied with SAVE Act requirements.  The SAVE Act requires the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO), as delegated by DHS, to collect and review components’ vehicle use data, including their analyses of the data and plans for achieving the right types and sizes of vehicles to meet mission needs.  Most components developed their plans as required.  However, only two of the 12 components we reviewed fully met requirements to analyze and document vehicle use and cost data to help them achieve the right type and size of fleet vehicles to meet their missions.  This occurred because DHS did not require components to include data analyses in their OCRSO-reviewed submissions, as mandated by the SAVE Act.  Had ORSCO thoroughly evaluated component submissions, it would have identified that components did not fully comply with SAVE Act requirements.  DHS concurred with all four recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the Department’s oversight over its vehicle fleets. 

>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management 		2020
OIG-20-37 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) does not effectively coordinate and share best practices to enhance security across the commercial facilities sector.  Specifically, CISA does not coordinate within DHS on security assessments to prevent potential overlap, does not always ensure completion of required After Action Reports to share best practices with the commercial facilities sector, and does not adequately inform all commercial facility owners and operators of available DHS resources.  This occurred because CISA does not have comprehensive policies and procedures to support its role as the commercial facilities’ Sector-Specific Agency (SSA).  Without such policies and procedures, CISA cannot effectively fulfill its SSA responsibilities and limits its ability to measure the Department’s progress toward accomplishing its sector-specific objectives.  CISA may also be missing opportunities to help commercial facility owners and operators identify threats and mitigate risks, leaving the commercial facilities sector vulnerable to terrorist attacks and physical threats that may cause serious damage and loss of life.  We made three recommendations to improve CISA’s coordination and outreach to safeguard the commercial facilities sector.  CISA concurred with all three recommendations.

>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats 		2020
OIG-20-31 DHS complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) in fiscal year 2019 by meeting all six of the IPERA requirements.  DHS also complied with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments.  Additionally, we reviewed DHS’ processes and procedures for estimating its annual improper payment rates.  Based on our review, we determined DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting.  We made one recommendation to DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division to properly follow the requirements in the DHS Improper Payment Reduction Guidebook. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2019 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2020
OIG-20-19 DHS’ funding and payments for PALMS violated Federal appropriations law.  Specifically, DHS violated the bona fide needs rule in using fiscal year (FY) 2011 component funds in FYs 2012 and 2013 for e-Training services and PALMS implementation respectively, when the funds were not legally available for those needs.  As a result of the bona fide needs rule and purpose statute violations, DHS may also have violated the Antideficiency Act in FYs 2013 – 2015 when the Department augmented appropriations for the Human Resources Information Technology program with component funds. We made nine recommendations to address violations of Federal appropriations law and to improve controls to prevent such potential violations in the future.

>PALMS Funding and Payments Did Not Comply with Federal Appropriations Law 		2020
OIG-20-09 DHS developed a strategy to apply 29 lessons learned from prior system updates to the current Financial Systems Modernization (FSM) TRIO program. Since DHS’ actions provides a positive outlook on the future progress of the FSM TRIO project we made no recommendations for improvement.  The report’s limited objective and scope does not provide a complete assessment DHS’ efforts to incorporate lessons learned into their recently reinvigorated FSM efforts. 

>DHS Confirmed It Has Applied Lessons Learned in the Latest Financial System Modernization Effort 		2020
OIG-20-05 From fiscal years 2015 through 2018, in the midst of a growing opioid epidemic, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Secret Service appropriately disciplined employees whose drug test results indicated illegal opioid use, based on their employee standards of conduct and tables of offenses and penalties.  Additionally, during the same time period, components have either implemented or are taking steps to evaluate whether employees using prescription opioids can effectively conduct their duties.  For example, components have established policies prohibiting the use of prescription opioids that may impact an employee’s ability to work, in addition to requiring employees to report such prescription opioid use.  They have also implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to evaluate the fitness for duty of employees using prescription opioids.  These policies establish consistent standards components can use to ensure they are allowing employees to use legally-prescribed opioids, while also ensuring their workforce is capable of effectively performing their duties.  We made two recommendations to improve components’ oversight of illegal and prescription opioid use by employees.  CBP and Secret Service concurred with the recommendations, which are both resolved and open.

>CBP, ICE, TSA, and Secret Service Have Taken Steps to Address Illegal and Prescription Opioid Use 		2020
OIG-20-03 KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with DHS OIG, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ FY 2019 consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG issued an unmodified (clean) opinion over the Department’s financial statements, reporting that they present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2019.  However, KPMG identified material weaknesses in internal control in two areas and other significant deficiencies in three areas.  Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG also reported two instances of noncompliance with laws and regulations.  DHS concurred with all of the recommendations.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2020
OIG-19-62 DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce Planning 2019
OIG-19-60 DHS’ information security program was effective for fiscal year 2018 because the Department earned the targeted maturity rating, “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in four of five functions, as compared to last year’s lower overall rating, “Consistently Implemented” (Level 3). We attributed DHS’ progress to improvements in information security risk, configuration management practices, continuous monitoring, and more effective security training. By addressing the remaining deficiencies, DHS can further improve its security program ensuring its systems adequately protect the critical and sensitive data they store and process.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2018 		2019
OIG-19-59 We determined that despite requirements of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) did not effectively coordinate and integrate department-wide research and development (R&D) activities.  In August 2015, S&T established Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) as the central mechanism to identify, track, and coordinate department-wide priority R&D efforts.  However, S&T did not follow its IPT process as intended.  Specifically, not all components submitted all information on capability gaps to the IPTs; S&T did not effectively gather, track, and manage data on the Department’s R&D gaps and activities; and S&T did not adequately monitor the IPT process to ensure it was effective.  As a result, S&T may not be able to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security and Congress with an accurate profile of the Department’s R&D activities or justify funding needs for a wide range of missions, including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers.  We made three recommendations to improve S&T’s coordination of R&D activities across DHS.  S&T concurred with our recommendations.

>S&T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS 		2019
OIG-19-50 Inadequate Oversight of Low Value DHS Contracts 2019

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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