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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-21-32 During our unannounced inspection of Pulaski County Jail, we identified violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees.  In addressing COVID-19, Pulaski did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing, which may have contributed to repeated COVID-19 transmissions at the facility.  Pulaski did not meet standards for classification, medical care, segregation, or detainee communication.  We found that the facility was not providing a color-coded visual identification system based on the criminal history of detainees, causing inadvertent comingling of a detainee with significant criminal history with detainees who had no criminal history.  The facility generally provided sufficient medical care, but did not provide emergency dental services and the medical unit did not have procedures in place for chronic care follow-up.  We also found that the facility was not consistently providing required oversight for detainees in segregation by conducting routine wellness checks.  Finally, we found deficiencies in staff communication practices with detainees.  Specifically, ICE did not specify times for staff to visit detainees and could not provide documentation that it completed facility visits with detainees during the pandemic.  We did find that Pulaski generally complied with the ICE detention standard for grievances.  We made five recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the Chicago ERO Field Office overseeing Pulaski addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  ICE concurred with all five recommendations. 

>Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Pulaski County Jail 		2021
OIG-21-31 Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities 		2021
OIG-21-30 Violations of Detention Standards Amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ 2021
OIG-21-29 DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge 2021
OIG-21-15 ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment,” OIG-21-15.  We determined the Worksite Enforcement (WSE) program compliance, civil enforcement, and outreach activities are not as effective as they could be to support U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) immigration enforcement strategy.  ICE officials did not consistently enforce ICE guidance, take timely and affirmative steps against unauthorized alien workers, and ensure the outreach program achieved measurable progress and was cost effective.  We made four recommendations with which ICE officials concurred.  Based on the information ICE provided, we consider the four recommendations resolved and open.

>ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment 		2021
OIG-21-12 ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility 2021
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021
OIG-21-03 We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment.  Although the Howard County Detention Center (HCDC) generally complied with ICE detention standards regarding communication, it did not meet the standards for detainee searches, food service, and record requirements for segregation and medical grievances.  We determined HCDC excessively strip searched ICE detainees when leaving their housing unit to attend activities within the facility, in violation of ICE detention standards and the facility’s own search policy.  In addition, HCDC failed to provide detainees with two hot meals per day, as required.  For those in segregation, HCDC did not document that detainees received three meals per day and daily medical visits.  Further, HCDC did not properly document the handling of detainee medical grievances.  We made two recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the Baltimore ERO Field Office overseeing HCDC addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  ICE concurred with both recommendations and is implementing a corrective action plan to address the concerns we identified.

>ICE Needs to Address Concerns About Detainee Care and Treatment at the Howard County Detention Center 		2021
OIG-20-80 DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces 		2020
OIG-20-66 DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA 		2020
OIG-20-65 We determined that children brought to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, waited extended periods, and in many cases overnight, to be reunited with their parents.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not prepared to promptly reunify all children who arrived at Port Isabel on the first day of attempted mass reunifications.  ICE and U.S. Health and Human Services had fundamentally different understandings about the timing and pace of reunifications, and ICE personnel at Port Isabel underestimated the resources necessary to promptly out-process the parents of arriving children.  As a result, some children waited in vehicles at Port Isabel, while others waited in unused detention cells, though all children were in climate-controlled environments and had continuous access to food, water, and restrooms.  As the mass reunifications continued, ICE personnel responded to processing and space issues, which generally resulted in shorter wait times for children who arrived at Port Isabel closer to the court’s July 26, 2018 deadline.  The report contains no recommendations.

>Children Waited for Extended Periods in Vehicles to Be Reunified with Their Parents at ICE's Port Isabel Detention Center in July 2018 		2020
OIG-20-59 determined ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is effectively contributing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing.  However, existing agreements and guidance on HSI’s participation in the JTTF and its terrorism financing investigations are outdated.  Additionally, we determined existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF.  We recommended DHS JTTF contributors evaluate and update agreements governing JTTF participation as needed.  HSI should renegotiate and update the 2003 agreement on terrorism financing, as well as update its related guidance accordingly.  We also recommended DHS coordinate with Department of Justice and Department of State, as well as within the DHS, to develop agreements to allow for the more direct sharing of critical investigative information.  We made five recommendations that aim to improve counterterrorism efforts and information sharing.  DHS concurred with two recommendations and non-concurred with three.

>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved (REDACTED) 		2020
OIG-20-54 U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not follow its written policy when conducting disciplinary reviews of Senior Executive Employees (SES) employees, which risks creating an appearance that SES employees receive more favorable treatment than non-SES employees.  We reviewed the disciplinary proceedings of the former SES official to evaluate whether ICE’s deviation from the written policy, or any other evidence, in that case indicated that the official received favorable treatment, as alleged.  We did not find evidence of actual favoritism or inappropriate influence in the official’s disciplinary or security clearance review processes.  We recommended that ICE finalize and issue its draft policy documenting the process for disciplining SES members.  We made one recommendation that will enhance transparency in ICE’s disciplinary program.  ICE concurred with our recommendation and took action to resolve and close it.

>Special Report - ICE Should Document Its Process for Adjudicating Disciplinary Matters Involving Senior Executive Service Employees 		2020
OIG-20-45 We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment.  Although the conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at each, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and review of documents revealed several common issues.  At three facilities, we found segregation practices infringing on detainee rights.  Detainees at all four facilities had difficulties resolving issues through the grievance and communication systems, including allegations of verbal abuse by staff.  Two facilities had issues with classifying detainees according to their risk levels, which could affect safety.  Lastly, we identified living conditions at three facilities that violate ICE standards.  We recommended the Acting Director of ICE ensure the Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices overseeing the detention facilities covered in the report address identified issues and ensure facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  We made one recommendation that will help ICE ensure compliance with detention standards. ICE concurred with the recommendation.

>Capping Report: Observations of Unannounced Inspections of ICE Facilities in 2019 		2020
OIG-20-42 We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff.  The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees.  These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure.  However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19.  Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations.  The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility.  Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread.  At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020.

>Early Experiences with COVID-19 at ICE Detention Facilities 		2020
OIG-20-13 Through its Criminal Alien Program (CAP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) can successfully identify aliens charged with or convicted of crimes.  However, because ICE relies on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies, it sometimes faces challenges apprehending aliens in uncooperative jurisdictions.  ICE’s inability to detain aliens identified through CAP contributes to increased risk those aliens will commit more crimes.  Furthermore, having to arrest “at-large” aliens may put officer, detainee, and public safety at risk and strains ICE’s staffing resources.  We made four recommendations to ICE focused on improving CAP.  ICE concurred with all four recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address the findings. 

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges 		2020
OIG-19-57 A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations 2019
OIG-19-47 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities 2019
OIG-19-28 The Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. Our case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within the prescribed 90-day timeframe revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation are external and beyond ICE’s control. The two predominant factors delaying repatriation are legal appeals and obtaining travel documents. Internally, ICE’s challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process.

>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens 		2019
OIG-19-30 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY). ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Williams Adley was unable to assess the accuracy of the number of products reported in Metric 2, “Number of counter-narcotics intelligence requests satisfied,” as part of the PSR.

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-25 Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 2019
OIG-19-20 This inspection is part of an ongoing review of ICE detention facilities. While conducting an unannounced visit to the Essex County Correctional Facility using ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards, we identified serious violations. As part of this assessment, ICE must review and ensure compliance with those standards addressing unreported security incidents, food safety, and facility conditions that include ceiling leaks, unsanitary shower stalls, bedding, and outdoor recreation areas.

>Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey 		2019
OIG-19-18 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In FY 2017, these 106 facilities held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors operating these 106 facilities. Despite documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose penalties when those standards are not maintained.

>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards 		2019
OIG-19-14 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigative offices accurately maintained equipment records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. Offices were also accurate in accounting for all firearms. Investigative staff were diligent in complying with the DHS Management Directive relating to the referral of allegations. However, we noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence inventory requirements, and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. We also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms and problems with the timeliness of submitting investigative reports. Finally, we found that supervisors did not always review cases on a quarterly basis.

>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division 		2019
OIG-19-07 On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2019
OIG-18-86 We identified a number of serious issues that violate U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards and pose significant health and safety risks at the facility.  Specifically, we are concerned about nooses in detainee cells, improper and overly restrictive segregation, and untimely and inadequate detainee medical care.  We recommended that ICE conduct a full review and inspection of the Adelanto ICE Processing Center and the GEO Group’s management of the center to immediately to ensure compliance with ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards.  Specifically, ICE must review and ensure compliance with: Personal Care Required; Segregation; and Medical Care.  We made one recommendation to improve conditions at the facility.

>Management Alert - Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California 		2018
OIG-18-77 We examined whether ICE is effectively overseeing and managing the 287(g) program as it expands. Under the 287(g) program, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) delegates authority to state and local law enforcement agencies to help ICE in its immigration enforcement mission in their jurisdictions. After the Executive Order was issued, the 287(g) program expanded quickly, it rose from 36 to 76.  ICE approved 40 additional applicants without planning for a corresponding increase in program management staffing, determining how to promptly deliver needed information technology (IT) equipment to participants, or ensuring participants are fully trained.  



Without effective oversight, it is difficult to monitor and measure performance to determine whether program participants are assisting ICE in its immigration enforcement mission. Further, without the necessary equipment and training, program participants may not be acting as a force multiplier to identify removable aliens. ICE may also not be able to fully expand the program and include new localities interested in participating.

>Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program 		2018
OIG-18-76 We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased.

>Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers 		2018
OIG-18-67 Neither type of inspection ICE uses to examine detention facilities ensures consistent compliance with detention standards or comprehensive correction of identified deficiencies. Specifically, because the Nakamoto inspection scope is too broad, ICE’s guidance on procedures is unclear, and Nakamoto’s inspection practices are not consistently thorough, its inspections do not fully examine actual conditions or identify all compliance deficiencies. In contrast, ODO uses effective methods and processes to thoroughly inspect facilities and identify deficiencies, but the inspections are too infrequent to ensure the facilities implement all corrections. Moreover, ICE does not adequately follow up on identified deficiencies or systematically hold facilities accountable for correcting deficiencies, which further diminishes the usefulness of both Nakamoto and ODO inspections.

>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements 		2018
OIG-18-53 U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill asked us to review ICE’s modification of its intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) with the City of Eloy in Arizona to procure family detention space in Dilley, Texas. We also reviewed other selected IGSAs to determine whether they complied with applicable laws and regulations. (ICE) is responsible for the detention of removable aliens. ICE commonly uses a type of agreement called an IGSA to reserve space at detention facilities owned or operated by state or local governments. In September 2014, ICE improperly modified an existing IGSA with the City of Eloy (Eloy) in Arizona to establish the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, more than 900 miles away. Although ICE could have contracted directly with the private company that operates the South Texas Family Residential Center, CCA, it instead created an unnecessary “middleman” by modifying its existing IGSA with Eloy. Eloy’s sole function under the modification is to act as the middleman between ICE and CCA; Eloy collects about $438,000 in annual fees for this service.

>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services 		2018
OIG-18-51 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010.  The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today.

>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement 		2018
OIG-18-45 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY).  The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is required to conduct a review of the report and provide a conclusion about the reliability of each assertion made in the report. Independent Accountants’ Report on the

U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) FY 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular).

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2018
OIG-18-46 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all

funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a multi-mission bureau, and obligations are reported pursuant to an approved drug methodology. ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Domestic Investigations, International Operations (IO) and Office of Intelligence uphold U.S. drug control policy delegated amid the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) initiatives, by fully supporting the overall ICE mandate to detect, disrupt, and dismantle smuggling organizations.

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2018
OIG-18-42 Management Alert - ICE's Training Model Needs Further Evaluation 2018
OIG-18-37 Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image.

>DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-18-36 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) faces challenges in implementing the Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol (KSTEP) screening process, which is used to identify aliens who may be known or suspected terrorists. Although ERO uses KSTEP to screen all aliens who are in ICE custody, ERO policy does not require continued screening of the approximately 2.37 million aliens when released and under ICE supervision. We sampled and tested 40 of 142 ERO case files of detained aliens identified as known or suspected terrorists during fiscal years 2013–15. All 40 files had at least one instance of noncompliance with KSTEP policy, generating greater concerns regarding the population of aliens screened and determined to have no connections to terrorism.

>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-18-32 In response to concerns raised by immigrant rights groups and complaints to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Hotline about conditions for detainees held in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody, we conducted unannounced inspections of five detention facilities to evaluate their compliance with ICE detention standards. We identified problems that undermine the protection of detainees’ rights, their humane treatment, and the provision of a safe and healthy environment. Although the climate and detention conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at all of them, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and our review of documents revealed several issues. Upon entering some facilities, detainees were housed incorrectly based on their criminal history. Further, in violation of standards, all detainees entering one facility were strip searched. Available language services were not always used to facilitate communication with detainees. Some facility staff reportedly deterred detainees from filing grievances and did not thoroughly document resolution of grievances. Staff did not always treat detainees respectfully and professionally, and some facilities may have misused segregation. Finally, we observed potentially unsafe and unhealthy detention conditions.

>Concerns About ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities 		2018
OIG-18-22 Representative Raúl M. Grijalva requested that we review U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) decision to award GEO Care, LLC a contract to establish a Family Case Management Program (FCMP). We sought to determine whether ICE awarded the FCMP contract in accordance with laws, regulations, and guidance. We also conducted a limited review of post-award contract modifications. FCMP is an alternative to detention that uses case managers to ensure participants comply with their release conditions, such as attending court hearings, while allowing them to remain in their community as they move through immigration proceedings. We determined that ICE properly awarded FCMP contracts.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Award of the Family Case Management Program Contract 		2018
OIG-17-119 We determined that the seven facilities we inspected were generally following U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guidance for documenting decisions on segregating detainees with mental health conditions and promptly reporting segregation placement information for detainees with mental health conditions to ICE field offices.  However, the field offices we reviewed did not record and promptly report all instances of segregation to ICE headquarters, nor did their system properly reflect all required reviews of ongoing segregation cases.  Also, ICE does not regularly compare segregation data in the electronic management system with information at detention facilities to assess the accuracy and reliability of data in the system.  Unless ICE field offices comply with requirements to report and record these reviews, ICE headquarters cannot be sure required reviews are taking place and may not have all the information needed to assess the use of segregation, which could put detainees and facility staff at risk of harm.  We made three recommendations to ICE to improve oversight and accountability for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions.

>ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions 		2017
OIG-17-103-MA We determined that two DHS Components – CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) created their own internal authorizations for executive protection details and staffed them without clear legal authority. We made two recommendations to the DHS secretary to direct CBP and ICE to (1) discontinue security details pending a legal review by the DHS General Counsel and (2) develop directive regarding the scope and circumstances  when a security detail is permitted for DHS component heads including the requirements for departmental level authorization; pending the results of the legal review.

>Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns (OIG-17-103-MA) 		2017
OIG-17-71 KPMG, LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses nine observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including intra-governmental payment and collection expense approval; accounts payable analysis, payroll cash reconciliation; performance reviews; and financial disclosure reporting.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-63 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls, configuration management, and segregation of duties for ICE’s core financial and feeder systems.  The deficiencies collectively limited ICE’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that ICE, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security Chief Information Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to ICE’ financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-65 As part of our ongoing oversight of detention conditions, we completed unannounced inspections of three U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) family detention facilities.  During these inspections, nothing came to our attention that warranted serious concerns about the health, safety, or welfare of the detained families.  Specifically, we did not observe any conditions or actions that represented an immediate, unaddressed risk or an egregious violation of ICE’s Family Residential Standards.  The facilities were clean, well-organized, and efficiently run.  At all three facilities, ICE was satisfactorily addressing the inherent challenges of providing medical care and language services and ensuring the safety of families in detention.  Staff said they had received training for handling allegations of sexual assault or abuse and child abuse, and all staff interviewed could identify the appropriate steps for handling such allegations, complaints, or grievances.  We also observed surveillance cameras and perimeter security at all three facilities.  Staff at all three facilities reported they store camera footage for at least three weeks; staff at one facility reported cameras cannot see certain spots in public areas; and facility perimeters may not prevent unauthorized intrusion.  We made no recommendations in this report.

>Results of Office of Inspector General FY 2016 Spot Inspections of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Detention Facilities 		2017
OIG-17-56 We determined that DHS’ information technology systems did not effectively support U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) visa tracking operations.  Specifically, ICE personnel responsible for investigating visa overstays had to piece together information from dozens of systems and databases, some of which were not integrated and did not electronically share information.  Additionally, ICE did not ensure that its field personnel received the training and guidance needed to properly use the systems currently available to conduct visa overstay tracking.  Further, DHS lacked a completed comprehensive biometric exit system at U.S. ports of departure to capture information on nonimmigrants departing the country.  As a result, DHS could not account for all visa overstays in a report to the Congress.  Manual checking across multiple systems used for visa tracking contributed to delays in investigating suspects who potentially posed public safety or homeland security risks.  We recommended the DHS Chief Information Officer continue to work with components to further eliminate duplication, improve information sharing, and properly align system access, especially for system modernization efforts, across DHS according to visa tracking mission requirements.  We made five recommendations.

>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is Hindered by Insufficient Technology 		2017
OIG-17-51 We determined that ICE does not effectively manage the deportation of aliens under its supervision.  ICE does not collect and analyze data about employee workloads to allocate staff judiciously and determine achievable caseloads.  ICE also has not clearly and widely communicated deportation priorities to Deportation Officers; has not issued up-to-date, comprehensive, and accessible procedures; and has not provided sufficient training.  ICE’s failure to effectively balance and adequately prepare its workforce also makes it harder to address other obstacles to deportation, which may require significant time and resources.  These management deficiencies and unresolved obstacles make it difficult for ICE to deport aliens expeditiously.  ICE concurred with our five recommendations and has taken steps to improve its management of deportation operations

>ICE Deportation Operations 		2017
OIG-17-40 We determined that U.S. Customs and Immigration Services’ and ICE’s social media screening pilots, on which DHS plans to base future department-wide use of social media screening, lack criteria for measuring performance to ensure they meet their objectives.  Although the pilots include some objectives, it is not clear DHS is measuring and evaluating the pilots’ results to determine how well they are performing against set criteria.  Absent measurement criteria, the pilots may provide limited information for planning and implementing an effective, department-wide future social media screening program.  We recommended developing and implementing a plan to evaluate the performance of social media screening pilots that includes well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives.

>DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success (Redacted) 		2017
OIG-17-43-MA A recent unannounced inspection of the Theo Lacy Facility, an ICE detention facility in Orange, California, raised serious concerns, some that pose health risks and others that violate ICE’s 2008 Performance-Based National Detention Standards and result in potentially unsafe conditions at the facility.  Overall, we had concerns about food handling, confinement conditions, and services.  We made three recommendations to ensure compliance with ICE detention standards and strengthen ICE’s oversight of TLF.

>Management Alert on Issues Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California (OIG-17-43-MA) 		2017
OIG-17-31 ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures to comply with the requirements of ONDCP’s Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013.  Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that ICE’s FY 2016 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular.  KPMG did not make any recommendations as a result of its review. 

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2017
OIG-17-30 ICE’s management prepared the Table of FY 2016 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of ONDCP’s Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013.  Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that the FY 2016 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular.  KPMG did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2016 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2017

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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