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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-21-70 CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-21-63 Summary: OFO continues to experience challenges managing searches of electronic devices, similar to those identified in our first audit report, CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry, issued in December 2018.  Specifically, OFO did not properly document and conduct searches of electronic devices, fully assess the effectiveness of the electronic device search program, or adequately manage electronic device search equipment.  This occurred because, although it plans to do so, OFO has not yet fully implemented corrective actions for four of the five recommendations in our previous audit report, including establishing training for staff.  According to an OFO official, there have been delays in fully implementing the prior recommendations due to reviews of existing policy and a capabilities analysis report, and development of additional training.  In addition, OFO does not have adequate processes for auditing electronic device searches, does not track prosecutions and convictions resulting from referrals to other Federal agencies, and does not adequately monitor search equipment usage, functionality, and inventory.  Unless it corrects previously identified deficiencies and better manages searches and equipment, OFO will limit its ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.  We made five recommendations to improve CBP’s oversight of searches of electronic devices at ports of entry.  CBP concurred with all five recommendations.

>CBP Continues to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 		2021
OIG-21-62 CBP officials had legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on American journalists, attorneys, and others suspected of organizing or being associated with the migrant caravan.  However, many CBP officials were unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts and, therefore, may have inadvertently placed lookouts on these Americans, which did not fully comport with the policy.  Additionally, CBP officials did not remove lookouts promptly once they were no longer necessary and, as a result, subjected some of these U.S. citizens to repeated and unnecessary secondary inspections.  During the same time period, a CBP official requested that Mexico deny entry to caravan associates, including 14 Americans.  Unlike CBP’s legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on these U.S. citizens, CBP had no genuine basis for requesting Mexico to deny entry to these individuals.  On several other occasions throughout Operation Secure Line, other CBP officials also improperly shared the names and sensitive information of U.S. citizens with Mexico.  We made six recommendations that will improve CBP’s controls on placing and removing lookouts and sharing Americans’ sensitive information with foreign countries.  CBP concurred with all six recommendations.

>CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan 		2021
OIG-21-60 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP custody and is not required to do so.  Instead, CBP relies on local public health systems to test symptomatic individuals.  According to CBP officials, as a frontline law enforcement agency, it does not have the necessary resources to conduct such testing.  For migrants that are transferred or released from CBP custody into the United States, CBP coordinates with DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and other Federal, state, and local partners for COVID-19 testing of migrants.  In addition, although DHS generally follows guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for COVID-19 preventative measures, the DHS’ multi-layered COVID-19 testing framework does not require CBP to conduct COVID-19 testing at CBP facilities.  Further, DHS’ Chief Medical Officer does not have the authority to direct or enforce COVID-19 testing procedures.  We recommended DHS reassess its COVID-19 response framework to identify areas for improvement to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 while balancing its primary mission of securing the border.  Additionally, we recommended DHS ensure the components continue to coordinate with the DHS Chief Medical Officer and provide available resources needed to operate safely and effectively during the COVID-19 pandemic and any future public health crisis.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ response to COVID-19 at the southwest border.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border 		2021
OIG-21-53 CBP did not effectively manage its aviation fleet acquisitions to meet operational mission needs.  Specifically, AMO acquired and deployed 16 multi-role enforcement aircraft (MEA) that did not contain the necessary air and land interdiction capabilities to perform its mission.  In addition, CBP AMO initiated the MEA and medium lift helicopter program without well-defined operational requirements and key performance parameters — critical items in the acquisition planning process.  This occurred because CBP did not provide oversight and guidance to ensure acquisition personnel followed key steps required by the DHS Acquisition Lifecycle Framework.  As a result, AMO expended approximately $330 million procuring multi-role enforcement aircraft that, at the time of acceptance, did not effectively respond to emergent air threats along the northern or southern borders, and experienced schedule delays deploying the medium lift helicopter.  Without effective oversight and guidance, AMO risks aviation acquisitions taking longer to deliver, at a greater cost, and without the needed capabilities.  We made four recommendations aimed at improving CBP’s acquisition management of aviation fleet to meet operational needs.  CBP concurred with three of the four recommendations. 

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs 		2021
OIG-21-48 CBP needs better oversight and policy to adequately safeguard migrants experiencing medical emergencies or illnesses along the southwest border.  According to CBP’s policies, once an individual is in custody, CBP agents and officers are required to conduct health interviews, and “regular and frequent” “welfare checks” to identify individuals who may be experiencing serious medical conditions.  However, CBP could not always demonstrate staff conducted required medical screenings or consistent welfare checks for all 98 individuals whose medical cases we reviewed.  This occurred because CBP did not provide sufficient oversight and clear policies and procedures, or ensure officers and agents were adequately trained to implement medical support policies.  As a result, CBP may not identify individuals experiencing medical emergencies or provide appropriate care in a timely manner.  CBP concurred with all three of our recommendations, which when implemented, should improve medical attention and procedures for migrants at the southwest border. 

>CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention 		2021
OIG-21-49 We found Border Patrol provided adequate medical assistance to the mother and her newborn, and complied with applicable policies. However, we found that Border Patrol’s data about pregnant detainees is limited and the agency lacks the necessary processes and guidance to reliably track childbirths that occur in custody. In addition, our review of a sample of childbirths in custody showed Border Patrol did not always take prompt action to expedite the release of U.S. citizen newborns, resulting in some being held in stations for multiple days and nights. Although some of these instances may have been unavoidable, Border Patrol needs reliable practices to expedite releases because holding U.S. citizen newborns at Border Patrol stations poses health, safety, and legal concerns. Lastly, we found that Border Patrol agents do not have guidelines on interpreting for Spanish-speaking detainees at hospitals. As a result, an agent assigned to hospital watch for the detainee provided interpretation that may not have comported with CBP’s language access guidance. We made four recommendations to improve CBP’s processes for tracking detainee childbirths, its practices for expediting release of U.S. citizen newborns, and its guidance to agents on providing interpretation for detainees. CBP concurred with all four recommendations

>Review of the February 16, 2020 Childbirth at the Chula Vista Border Patrol Station 		2021
OIG-21-47 CBP did not always protect MPC apps from cybersecurity threats.  This occurred because app version updates were not always scanned for vulnerabilities and CBP did not always identify vulnerabilities detected in scans.  CBP also did not complete seven required security and privacy compliance reviews of MPC apps because it did not establish a schedule for the reviews or track and centrally store review documentation.  In addition, CBP did not obtain the information needed for the reviews, had competing priorities, and did not ensure app developers created a process for a required internal audit.  Finally, CBP did not implement Department server configuration requirements for its MPC servers.  We made eight recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the security of CBP’s MPC program.  CBP concurred with all eight recommendations.

>CBP Has Placed Travelers' PII at Risk of Exploitation 		2021
OIG-21-45 DHS issued notices to appear (NTA), to MPP participants that were mostly accurate and in accordance with laws and regulations.  However, some NTAs were completed inaccurately.  Specifically, of our sample of 106 NTAs from February 2019 through April 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) served 20 that did not meet legal sufficiency standards or contained inaccurate information.  However, CBP agents and officers documented proactively issuing 105 of 106 NTAs in our sample in person before returning migrants to Mexico.  If CBP serves a legally insufficient NTA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cannot prosecute its removal case if a migrant fails to appear for the initial hearing.  Serving NTAs by mail to migrants in Mexico could result in migrants missing their hearings or the Government’s cases being dismissed or challenged.  We recommended that CBP’s Executive Director of the Office of Field Operations’ Admissibility and Passenger Programs and the Deputy Chief of Border Patrol’s Law Enforcement Operations Directorate develop procedures for quality control and supervisory review of NTAs for MPP enrollees to better ensure that officers and agents fill out the NTAs accurately and completely.  We made one recommendation to improve the accuracy and completeness of NTAs issued to MPP participants.  CBP non-concurred with the recommendation due to it being overcome by events when the program was terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security on June 1, 2021.  We administratively closed the recommendation.

>CBP Generally Provided Accurate Notices to Appear to Migrant Protection Protocols Enrollees, but Could Improve Procedures to Reduce Future Errors 		2021
OIG-21-34 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol headquarters officials were only aware of a few of the 83 CBP employees’ cases of social media misconduct.  CBP and Border Patrol senior officials only responded to one of those cases, upon direction from DHS.  In contrast, the senior Office of Field Operations (OFO) headquarters leader issued guidance to remind OFO employees of acceptable use of social media.  With regard to the posts media outlets published in July 2019, we found no evidence that senior CBP headquarters or field leaders were aware of them until they were made public by the media.  We also found some senior leaders questioned the legality or the application of CBP policies, which may undermine CBP’s ability to enforce the policies.  We made two recommendations to help reduce the incidence of social media misconduct.  First, we recommended the Commissioner ensures CBP uniformly applies social media misconduct policies, and establishes social media training for new recruits and annual refresher training for all employees.  CBP concurred with all recommendations.

>CBP Senior Leaders' Handling of Social Media Misconduct 		2021
OIG-21-31 Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities 		2021
OIG-21-18 CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-21-27 We determined that U.S Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) mail inspection processes and physical security at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport International Mail Facility (IMF) are ineffective, showing limited progress since our prior audit.  CBP inspected approximately [REDACTED] percent of the 1.3 million pieces of mail it received during our June 2019 site visit.  CBP also did not timely inspect and process mail from high-risk countries, creating unmanageable backlogs. These deficiencies were largely because of inadequate resources and guidance.  Consequently, more than [REDACTED] pieces of mail were sent out for delivery without physical inspection.  We made eight recommendations aimed at improving international mail processes at JFK International Airport.  CBP concurred with six, but non-concurred with two of the recommendations. 

>CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility (Redacted) 		2021
OIG-21-21 We determined that, in response to Executive Order 13767, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented new tools and technologies that have enhanced Border Patrol’s surveillance capabilities and efficiency along the southwest border.  We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s border technology, enhance situational awareness of the southwest border, and address potential IT security vulnerabilities.  CBP concurred with all three recommendations.

>CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain 		2021
OIG-21-19 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) training approach and execution do not fully support the canine teams’ mission to detect smuggling of illegal narcotics, agriculture products, and humans at and between ports of entry.  In total, we made four recommendations that, if implemented, should help CBP improve oversight of its Canine Program, formalize and implement a realignment plan for the training academy, provide proper training capabilities, and update and standardize program guidance.  CBP concurred with all our recommendations. 

>CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance (REDACTED) 		2021
OIG-21-16 This report offers DHS OIG’s initial observations on the PACR and HARP programs based on our March 2020 visit to the El Paso, Texas area and analysis of data and information provided by CBP and USCIS headquarters.  We determined that CBP rapidly implemented the pilot programs and expanded them without a full evaluation of the pilots’ effectiveness.  Additionally, we determined there are potential challenges with the PACR and HARP programs related to how aliens are held and provided access to counsel and representation, and how CBP and USCIS assign staff to program duties and track aliens in the various agency systems.  We made six recommendations to improve PACR and HARP program implementation.  DHS did not concur with five of the six recommendations, stating that lawsuits and the COVID-19 pandemic had, in effect, ended the programs.  We reviewed evidence provided by CBP and concluded the lawsuits themselves did not terminate the PACR and HARP pilot programs.  Therefore, the recommendations remain open and unresolved.  If the programs resume, we plan to resume actual or virtual site visits and issue a report detailing DHS’ full implementation of the PACR and HARP pilot programs.

>DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs 		2021
OIG-21-13 CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage 2021
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021
OIG-21-02 In 2018, senior DHS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) leaders issued public statements urging undocumented aliens seeking asylum to enter the United States legally at ports of entry, while also directing ports of entry to focus on other priority missions and institute practices to limit the number of undocumented aliens processed at ports of entry.  CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) personnel at 24 Southwest Border ports of entry implemented a practice known as queue management, where an officer manned a “limit line” position at or near the U.S.-Mexico border to control the number of undocumented aliens entering the port.  We identified that seven of these ports stopped processing virtually all undocumented aliens, including asylum seekers, by redirecting them to other ports located miles away.  This redirection contravenes CBP’s longstanding practice to process all aliens at a “Class A” port of entry or reclassify the port of entry.  Additionally, CBP officers at four ports returned undocumented aliens to Mexico despite a legal requirement to process asylum claims of aliens that are physically present in the United States.  We made three recommendations aimed at bringing CBP’s practices in line with Federal law and regulations and promoting efficient processing of undocumented aliens.  CBP concurred with two of the recommendations and did not concur with one.  CBP defended its decision to redirect undocumented aliens at seven ports citing the availability of operational capacity and resources and the need to maintain a discretionary balance between mission requirements at each port.

>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry 		2021
OIG-20-80 DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces 		2020
OIG-20-79 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) cannot ensure its Entry Reconciliation Program reporting is accurate or complies with requirements.  Specifically, CBP did not always validate importers’ self-reported final values of imports when it assessed duties and fees because it did not require importers to substantiate self-reported merchandise values with source documentation.  In addition, CBP did not always follow its policies when conducting reviews of reconciliation entries because its Standard Operating Procedures had been implemented differently across all ports of entry.  Finally, CBP missed opportunities to collect additional revenue when it did not assess monetary liquidated damages for importers that filed reconciliation entries late or not at all.  This occurred because CBP’s controls were insufficient to ensure the ports properly assess liquidated damages for importers who file reconciliations late or not at all.  CBP’s actions compromised the integrity of the Entry Reconciliation Program and, as such, may have put approximately $751 million of revenue, in the form of reconciliation refunds, at risk.  We made four recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of the program.  CBP concurred with three of our four recommendations. 

>CBP's Entry Reconciliation Program Puts Revenue at Risk 		2020
OIG-20-78 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) quickly deployed funding for consumables and medical services to address the needs of migrants in its custody along the southwest border, but did not adequately plan to ensure it used fiscal year 2019 funds effectively.  Specifically, U.S. Border Patrol’s process did not adequately ensure taxpayer funds were used to purchase items required to meet migrants’ basic needs as Congress intended.  Additionally, CBP relied on a single contracting officer’s representative, rather than onsite personnel, to oversee its medical contract because it did not include onsite monitoring when expanding the contract across multiple sectors.  We made four recommendations to CBP to improve its consumables reimbursement process and medical contract oversight.  CBP concurred with all four recommendations.  

>CBP Did Not Adequately Oversee FY 2019 Appropriated Humanitarian Funding 		2020
OIG-20-75 CBP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Strategy for Meeting Its LS-NII Needs 2020
OIG-20-71 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not adequately safeguard sensitive data on an unencrypted device used during its facial recognition technology pilot (known as the Vehicle Face System).  A subcontractor working on this effort, Perceptics, LLC, transferred copies of CBP’s biometric data, such as traveler images, to its own company network.  The subcontractor obtained access to this data without CBP’s authorization or knowledge, and compromised approximately 184,000 traveler images from CBP’s facial recognition pilot.  Later in 2019, the Department of Homeland Security experienced a major privacy incident, as the subcontractor’s network was subjected to a malicious cyber attack.  While CBP and DHS took immediate action to mitigate the data breach, we attribute this incident to the subcontractor violating numerous DHS security and privacy protocols for safeguarding sensitive data.  Consequently, this incident may damage the public’s trust in the Government’s ability to safeguard biometric data, and may result in travelers’ reluctance to permit DHS to capture and use their biometrics at U.S. ports of entry.  We made three recommendations to aid CBP in addressing the vulnerabilities that caused the 2019 data breach, and to better mitigate future incidents through greater oversight of third-party partners.  CBP concurred with all three recommendations.

>Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot 		2020
OIG-20-69 We surveyed staff at Border Patrol stations and OFO ports of entry from April 22, 2020 to May 1, 2020.  The 136 Border Patrol stations and 307 OFO ports of entry that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among travelers, detained individuals, and staff.  These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and having personal protective equipment for staff, as well as supplies available to those individuals with whom they come into contact.  However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing and the risk of exposure to COVID-19 due to the close-contact nature of their work.  Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations.  The facilities expressed concerns regarding staff availability, however, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 at the facility.  Overall, the majority of respondents reported that their facilities were prepared to address COVID-19.

>Early Experiences with COVID-19 at Border Patrol Stations and OFO Ports of Entry 		2020
OIG-20-70 Management Alert - CBP Needs to Award A Medical Services Contract Quickly to Ensure No Gap in Services 2020
OIG-20-67 During our unannounced inspections of five U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facilities in the Laredo and San Antonio areas of Texas in February 2020, three Border Patrol stations and two Office of Field Operation ports of entry we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) standards we evaluated. We verified accessibility to water, food, toilets, sinks, basic hygiene supplies, and bedding. We observed clean facilities and verified that temperatures and ventilation in holding rooms were appropriate. Of the five facilities we visited, only one could provide on-site showers to detainees, but during our visits, no detainees were approaching the detention time threshold where a shower would be required. Because Border Patrol leadership directed all Border Patrol stations to implement Phase 2 of the enhanced medical screening ahead of the prescribed schedule outlined in CBP Directive 2100-004, the Border Patrol stations we visited were conducting alien intake health assessments using CBP Form 2500. These Ports of Entry had implemented Phase 1, but were not yet required to conduct Phase 2 assessments at the time of our inspection. We did not make any recommendations in this report.

>Five Laredo and San Antonio Area CBP Facilities Generally Complied with the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search 		2020
OIG-20-66 DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA 		2020
OIG-20-64 We determined CBP’s use of tear gas on these dates, in response to physical threats, appeared to be within CBP’s use of force policy.  However, U.S. Border Patrol obtained an acoustic device and used it in an “alert tone” mode on November 25, 2018, which did not conform to CBP’s Use of Force policy because Border Patrol did not get advance authorization to have a device with this capability.  CBP’s Use of Force policy would have permitted use of the alert tone in a manner reasonable and necessary for self-defense or the defense of another person in threatening, emergent situations.  However, the policy does not authorize the carrying of any weapon for duty use that is not authorized, included on the Authorized Equipment List, or specifically approved by the LESC director.  Using the acoustic device in alert mode may increase the risk of temporary or permanent hearing loss to those exposed to the sound and thereby increase the Government’s liability.  CBP’s own internal investigation of the November 25, 2018 incident regarding the acoustic device was incomplete and inaccurate and did not provide all the information CBP needed to determine whether the CBP officer and Border Patrol agents involved had complied with the use of force policy.  In addition, not all Border Patrol agents had the required training and certification to carry less-lethal devices.  This occurred because Border Patrol lacked internal controls to ensure agents had fulfilled these requirements.  Border Patrol agents using less-lethal devices for which they are not certified could result in unintended serious injury or death, increasing the Government’s liability.  We made four recommendations to CBP to ensure compliance with its Use of Force policy and improve its investigative process.  CBP concurred with all four recommendations.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Compliance with Use of Force Policy for Incidents on November 25, 2018 and January 1, 2019 - Law Enforcement Sensitive 		2020
OIG-20-55 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not comprehensively plan and conduct its covert testing, use test results to address vulnerability, or widely share lessons learned.  CBP’s two covert testing groups do not use risk assessments or intelligence to plan and conduct covert tests at ports of entry and U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints, do not plan coordinated tests, and do not design system-wide tests.  This occurred because CBP has not provided adequate guidance on risk- and intelligence-based test planning, directed the groups to coordinate, given them the required authority, or established performance goals and measures for covert testing.  Following testing, CBP does not widely share covert test results, consistently make recommendations, or ensure corrective actions are taken.  Results are not widely shared because CBP has not defined roles and responsibilities for such sharing.  Covert testing groups do not make recommendations or ensure corrective actions are implemented due to insufficient authority and policies directing these actions.  Finally, CBP does not effectively manage covert testing groups to ensure data reliability, completeness, and compliance with security requirements due to leadership changes and limited staff.  Without comprehensive planning, incorporating lessons learned from test results, and program management accountability, CBP cannot ensure it addresses vulnerabilities, which may be exploited and threaten national security.  We recommended CBP develop policies and procedures for conducting covert testing and assign roles and responsibilities for oversight of covert testing groups.  We made seven recommendations that will strengthen its covert testing program.  CBP concurred with all seven recommendations.

>CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities - (REDACTED) 		2020
OIG-20-52 U.S. Customs and Border Protection has not demonstrated the acquisition capabilities needed to effectively execute the Analyze/Select Phase of the Wall Acquisition Program.  Specifically, CBP did not conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to assess and select the most effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions to obtain operational control of the southern border as directed, but instead relied on prior, outdated border solutions to identify materiel alternatives for meeting its mission requirement.  CBP did not use a sound, well-documented methodology to identify and prioritize investments in areas along the border that would best benefit from physical barriers.  Additionally, the Department did not complete the required plan to execute the strategy to obtain and maintain control of the southern border, as required by its Comprehensive Southern Border Security Study and Strategy.  Without an Analysis of Alternatives, a documented and reliable prioritization process, or a plan, the likelihood that CBP will be able to obtain and maintain complete operational control of the southern border with mission-effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions is diminished.  We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s ongoing investments for obtaining operational control of the southern border.  DHS concurred with recommendation 2 but did not concur with recommendations 1 and 3. 

>CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border 		2020
OIG-20-38 During 2019, there was a surge in Southwest Border crossings between ports of entry, resulting in 851,508 Border Patrol apprehensions and contributing to what senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials described as an “unprecedented border security and humanitarian crisis.”  Our unannounced inspections revealed that, under these challenging circumstances, CBP struggled to meet detention standards.  Specifically, several Border Patrol stations we visited exceeded their maximum capacity.  Although Border Patrol established temporary holding facilities to alleviate overcrowding, it struggled to limit detention to the 72 hours generally permitted, as options for transferring detainees out of CBP custody to long-term facilities were limited.  Also, even after deploying medical professionals to more efficiently provide access to medical care, overcrowding made it difficult for the Border Patrol to manage contagious illnesses.  Finally, in some locations, Border Patrol did not meet certain standards for detainee care, such as offering children access to telephone calls and safeguarding detainee property.  In contrast to Border Patrol, which could not control apprehensions, CBP’s ports of entry could limit detainee access, and generally met applicable detention standards.  Supplementing a May 2019 Management Alert recommendation, we made two additional recommendations regarding access of unaccompanied alien children to telephones and proper handling of detainee property.  CBP concurred with the recommendations.

>Capping Report: CBP Struggled to Provide Adequate Detention Conditions During 2019 Migrant Surge 		2020
OIG-20-35 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field operations (OFO) personnel at ports of entry had separated 60 asylum-seeking families between May 6 and July 9, 2018, despite CBP’s claim that it had separated only 7 such families.  More than half of those separations were based solely on the asylum-seeking parents’ prior non-violent immigration violations, which appeared to be inconsistent with official DHS public messaging.  After a June 27, 2018 court ruling, CBP issued specific guidance, and the ports separated fewer families in the prior months.  Despite the new guidance, we continue to have concerns about DHS’ ability to accurately identify and address all family separations due to data reliability issues.  In late June 2018, CBP modified its system for tracking aliens at the ports of entry to capture family separation data consistently, but it could not provide a reliable number of families separated before June 2018.  We made one recommendation that will help CBP’s data collection.  CBP concurred with our recommendation.

>CBP Separated More Asylum-Seeking Families at Ports of Entry Than Reported and For Reasons Other Than Those Outlined in Public Statements 		2020
OIG-20-34 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States.  This occurred because neither CBP nor TSA developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure air carriers resolved referrals timely or appropriately.  We made four recommendations to CBP and TSA to mitigate a number of vulnerabilities in the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program.  CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations. 

>CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States 		2020
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Immigration Laws at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel (OSC File No. DI-18-5034); OSC Final Letter to President; OSC Referral to DHS 2020
OIG-20-16 DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components.  We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities.  We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices.  DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.

>DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 		2020
OIG-20-07 Between 2011 and 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processed an average of $896 million in drawback claims annually; however, a lack of internal controls could affect the validity and accuracy of the drawback claims amount.  This occurred, in part, because CBP did not address internal control deficiencies over drawback claims.  The Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2018 Independent Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting identified reoccurring CBP internal control deficiencies over drawback claims.  CBP has outlined plans to correct these deficiencies by implementing an updated data processing system and revising legislative procedures.  Without correcting these repeated control deficiencies, CBP cannot determine drawback claims’ validity and accuracy.  These corrective actions are ongoing; therefore, we could not verify during our audit whether CBP remedied the identified internal control deficiencies. Our report contains no recommendations.  

>Lack of Internal Controls Could Affect the Validity of CBP’s Drawback Claims 		2020
OIG-20-06 DHS did not have the Information Technology (IT) system functionality needed to track separated migrant families during the execution of Zero Tolerance.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) adopted various ad hoc methods to record and track family separations, but this practice introduced widespread errors.  These conditions persisted because CBP did not address known IT deficiencies before the Zero Tolerance Policy was implemented in May 2018.  DHS also did not provide adequate guidance to personnel responsible for executing the policy.  Because of the IT deficiencies, we could not confirm the total number of families DHS separated during the Zero Tolerance period.  DHS estimated Border Patrol agents separated 3,014 children from their families while the policy was in place.  DHS also estimated it completed 2,155 reunifications, although this effort continued on for seven months beyond the July 2018 deadline for reunifying children with their parents.  However, we conducted a review of DHS data during the Zero Tolerance period and identified 136 children with potential family relationships that were not accurately recorded by CBP.  In a broader analysis of DHS data between the dates of October 1, 2017 to February 14, 2019, we identified an additional 1,233 children with potential family relationships not accurately recorded by CBP.  Without a reliable accounting of all family relationships, we could not validate the total number of separations, or the completion of reunifications.  Although DHS spent thousands of hours and more than $1 million in overtime costs, it did not achieve the original goal of deterring “Catch-and-Release” through the Zero Tolerance Policy.  Moreover, the surge in apprehended families during this time period resulted in children being held in CBP facilities beyond the 72-hour legal limit.  The Department concurred with all five report recommendations.

>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families 		2020
OIG-19-67 Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics 2019
OIG-19-53 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a critical role in the Nation’s efforts to interdict dangerous substances and prohibited items at U.S. ports of entry and keep these materials from harming the American public. An important part of CBP’s mission is preventing foreign countries from importing illegal drugs such as opioids into the U.S. CBP is experiencing a rise in seizures of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that upon exposure can kill in minutes.  CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) Fines Penalties and Forfeitures Division stores, manages, and disposes seized property, including illicit drugs such as fentanyl.  During our ongoing audit of CBP’s storage of seized drugs at permanent drug vaults we visited, we determined that CBP does not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids.  Specifically, CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure.  This occurred because CBP lacks an official policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure.  In addition, CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure.  As a result, CBP staff is at increased risk of injury or death in case of exposure.  We made one recommendation to help CBP provide its components with guidance, knowledge, and tools to handle and reverse overdoses from fentanyl and other opioids.

>Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure 		2019
OIG-19-51 Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley 2019
OIG-19-49 CBP’s controls over the Global Entry Program do not always prevent ineligible and potentially high-risk Global Entry members from obtaining expedited entry into the United States. This occurred because CBP officers did not always comply with policies when reviewing Global Entry applications nor do CBP’s policies sufficiently help officers

determine an applicant’s level of risk. Additionally, during the airport arrival process, CBP officers granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP officers also did not properly respond to a breach of the Daily Security Code. These weaknesses were due to officers not following policy, as well as CBP’s insufficient verification procedures. Unless CBP officers authenticate kiosk receipts, someone could use a fake receipt to enter the United States. Finally, CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. In particular, CBP did not conduct the required number of internal audits and did not use its Self-Inspection Program effectively. CBP’s lack of adherence to its compliance program’s policies and procedures creates vulnerabilities in Global Entry by allowing potentially ineligible members to continue to participate.

>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation 		2019
OIG-19-46 According to CBP statistics, the number of southwest border migrant apprehensions during the first seven months of FY 2019 has in general already surpassed that of the total apprehensions for each of the previous four fiscal years. At the sector level, El Paso has experienced the sharpest increase in apprehensions when comparing the first seven months of FY 2019 to the same period in FY 2018. The purpose  is to notify you of urgent issues that require immediate attention and action. Specifically, we are recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (PDT).

>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center 		2019
OIG-19-26 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) FY 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. 

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-29 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. CBP’s management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the drug control methodology used to estimate the percentages of obligations allocated between interdiction and intelligence. These percentages are used to derive the dollar-value of obligations reported as Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Drug Control Function in the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations presented in CBP’s Detailed Accounting Submission.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2019
OIG-19-13 In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a $297 million contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The contract includes 1 base year, with 4 option years, to hire 7,500 fully qualified applicants, including Customs and Border Protection Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. In its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture has already taken longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a hastily approved contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations. CBP must hold the contractor accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government.

>Management Alert - CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract 		2019
OIG-19-11 CBP has a statutory responsibility to collect revenue owed to the U.S. Government that arises from the importation of goods into the United States. Although in fiscal year 2017 CBP collected $40 billion in duties, taxes, and fees, more than $4.3 billion in its allowance for doubtful account for cumulative duties, taxes, and fees remained delinquent and uncollectible — some dating back almost 40 years This outstanding cumulative debt will continue to increase without completing the viability analysis worksheets to enable the timely pursuit or termination of delinquent debt, and the ability to monitor and properly track debt collection and write-offs.

>CBP Did Not Maximize its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers 		2019
OIG-19-10 The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information in communication, electronic, or digital devices at U.S. ports of entry. We determined that CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) did not always conduct the searches at U.S. ports of entry according to its SOPs. Specifically, because of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, and equipment management, combined with a lack of performance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.

>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry 		2019
OIG-19-07 On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2019

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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