



U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024

[A Message from the Inspector General](#)



I am pleased to submit our Semiannual Report (SAR) to Congress summarizing the work and accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General from April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024. The scope of the DHS mission and the breadth of its work have transformed dramatically since its inception in 2003. I have had the honor of leading DHS OIG since July 2019, and I am proud of the tremendous improvements we have made to our organization. Using our [Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Workplan](#) to drive performance and measure success since the fiscal year began, we continue to demonstrate progress in the quantity and quality of our work.

Our greatest resource continues to be our workforce and the relationships we have with Congress, the Department, and our stakeholders. I am extremely proud of, and grateful for, our more than 800 professional, career employees who lead with integrity and are dedicated to excellence.

During this SAR period, we issued 45 audit and inspection reports containing 140 recommendations to improve DHS programs and operations. In addition, we initiated 160 investigations, closed 163 investigations, and issued 133 investigative reports. Our investigative activities resulted in 64 arrests, 41 convictions, and more than \$7 million in recoveries, restitution, and fines. We have also reported on a wide range of other high-priority, high-risk areas, including:

- [Pandemic Response](#)
- [Strengthen U.S. Borders and Approaches](#)
- [Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats](#)
- [Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure](#)
- [Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience](#)
- [Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security](#)
- [Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department](#)

As DHS performs its vital mission, we are firmly committed to providing rigorous, independent, and objective oversight to promote excellence, integrity, and accountability in DHS programs and operations. As part of an annual publication required by the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, we identified four overarching challenges – transparency, accountability, efficiency, and sustainability – that reflect vulnerabilities affecting a broad spectrum of the Department's programs, operations, and responsibilities. These challenges are described more fully in our 2023 *Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security* report ([OIG-24-05](#), November 3, 2023). Thank you for supporting our work.

Sincerely,
**JOSEPH V
CUFFARI**
Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

Digitally signed by
JOSEPH V. CUFFARI
Date: 2024.10.30
15:33:58 -0700

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**Office of Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security
Profiles**

Office of Inspector General Department of Homeland Security Profiles

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Strategic Plan 2022 – 2026

The OIG Strategic Plan is the result of a collaborative and inclusive process that engages internal and external stakeholders. The Plan establishes our organizational goals and objectives, and highlights priority management challenges. The Plan also sets the foundation for the transformational change we want to achieve during the next several years by focusing on our mission priorities and setting forth the values and behaviors underpinning the culture needed for us to succeed. The following are excerpts from the Plan which can be accessed [here](#).

Mission:	To provide independent oversight and promote excellence, integrity, and accountability within DHS.
Vision:	Promote transformative change to improve DHS programs and operations to provide a safe and secure homeland.
Values:	Integrity – Quality – Innovation - Respect
	Strategic Goals
	Deliver Results That Promote the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Integrity of DHS Programs and Operations.
	Strengthen Relationships and Build Trust with External Stakeholders.
	Build and Sustain Enterprise-Wide Governance and Management to Support the Workforce and Optimize Efficiency and Effectiveness.
	Cultivate a Diverse, Highly Skilled, Flexible, and Engaged Workforce.

OIG Offices

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 officially established DHS, as well as an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, ensures DHS OIG's independence. This independence is fundamental to our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse as well as provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress about the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations. DHS OIG is headquartered in Washington, DC, and operates from approximately 30 locations across the country.

DHS OIG is comprised of the Executive Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audits, Office of Counsel, Office of Innovation, Office of Inspections and Evaluations, Office of Integrity, Office of Investigations, and Office of Management.

DHS Components and Offices

DHS offices and components consist of; Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD), Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), Management Directorate (MGMT), Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISOMB), Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), Office of the General Counsel (OGC), Office of Health Security (OHS), Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO), OIG, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Office of the Military Advisor, Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), Office of Homeland Security Situational Awareness (OSA), Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE), Office of Public Affairs (OPA), Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY), Privacy Office (PRIV), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), United States Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and United States Secret Service (USSS).



**Summary of
Office of Inspector General
Activities and Accomplishments**

Summary of Office of Inspector General Activities and Accomplishments

Audit and Inspection Statistics

During this reporting period, DHS OIG issued 45 audit and inspection reports and 140 recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department's programs and operations. We also closed 108 recommendations issued in this and prior periods.

Investigative Statistics

In accordance with the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, we have included information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.¹ During this reporting period, we initiated 160 investigations, closed 163 investigations, and effected 64 arrests, resulting in 59 Grand Jury indictments and 41 convictions. Our investigative efforts resulted in \$7,112,354.01 in recoveries, restitution, and fines. As of September 30, 2024, we had 836 open investigations, issued 133 investigative reports, referred 123 investigations (persons) for Federal prosecution of which 109 investigations (persons) were accepted for Federal prosecution and 66 investigations (persons) were declined for Federal prosecution. Additionally, 10 individuals were referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution and a total of 57 Indictments and criminal informations resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Complaint Activity from April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and criminal and non-criminal activities associated with waste, fraud, or abuse affecting the programs and operations of the Department. During this reporting period, we received 13,222 hotline complaints of which 11,226 were referred outside of DHS OIG and we closed 12,841 complaints. These figures do not include whistleblower complaints which are reported separately.

¹ All data is maintained in the Enforcement Data System (EDS), or DHS OIG's investigations case management system. Investigations accepted or declined for further action by prosecuting authorities may have been received in a prior reporting period. Investigative work often involves several law enforcement agencies working on the same case. OIGs may conduct investigations with other OIGs, other Federal law enforcement agencies, and state or local law enforcement entities. Investigative "receivables and recoveries" reflects orders associated with criminal and civil cases plus any voluntary repayments recovered during the fiscal year. In criminal cases, the dollar value reflects the restitution, criminal fines, and special assessments resulting from successful criminal prosecutions. The dollar value in civil cases reflects the number of damages, penalties, settlements, and forfeitures resulting from successful civil actions. Voluntary repayments include the amount paid by the subject of an investigation or the value of government property recovered before prosecutorial action is taken. These totals do not reflect the dollar amounts associated with recovered items, such as original historical documents and cultural artifacts, whose value cannot be readily determined.

Whistleblower Protection Division

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Division (WPD) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. WPD primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1034); *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information* (Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-19); *Security Clearances and Classified Information* (50 U.S.C. § 3341); and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees* (41 U.S.C. § 4712). Additionally, in certain instances, WPD conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended (5 U.S.C. Ch.4 §§ 401-424), and the *Whistleblower Protection Act* (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9)).

WPD Activity this SAR Period

Investigations

During the SAR period, WPD closed 10 whistleblower retaliation investigations, completed 9 investigations through the issuance of Reports of Investigations, and administratively closed 1 investigation. WPD also substantiated allegations of whistleblower retaliation in 2 of 9 investigations. WPD began this SAR period with 38 pending investigations, closed 10 investigations, and opened 10 new investigations. Overall, this resulted in 38 pending cases as of September 30, 2024.

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	Number
Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period	38
Investigations Opened During Period	10
Investigations Closed During Period	10
Investigations Pending at End of SAR Period	38

Complaint Intake

WPD entered this SAR period with 7 pending complaints awaiting resolution and received 417 complaints through the DHS OIG Hotline, resulting in 424 reviewed complaints during the SAR period. The 424 reviewed complaints was a record number for WPD and represents a roughly 20 percent increase in complaints reviewed during the SAR period ending on September 30, 2024. After reviewing the 424 complaints, WPD declined to open investigations for 408 complaints. Investigations were opened on 10 complaints, with a remaining 6 complaints currently pending decision.

WPD Intake Complaints	Number
Pending Complaints Entering this Period	7
Complaints Received by WPD During Period	417
Total Complaints Reviewed by WPD during Period	424
Complaints Declined During Intake Process ²	408
Complaints Converted to Investigation	10
Total Complaints Pending Decision at End of Period	6

Substantiated Reports of Whistleblower Retaliation this SAR Period

DHS OIG issued 2 investigative reports this SAR period that substantiated allegations of whistleblower retaliation.

W21-USCG-WPD-23386

In this case, DHS OIG substantiated allegations that members of the whistleblower's command retaliated against the whistleblower for protected activity and protected communications in violation of the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1034. The

² Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency or allege whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

whistleblower made a report of sexual assault on behalf of a victim and testified in the sexual assault investigation. The whistleblower alleged that these reports contributed to the issuance of negative administrative remarks (Negative Page 7) directed at the whistleblower. DHS OIG determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a causal connection existed between the protected communications and the Negative Page 7. The evidence established that USCG had weak support for the reasons behind the Negative Page 7 issued to the whistleblower. The evidence in the record also established significant animosity towards the whistleblower, which supported the motive to retaliate based on the whistleblower's report of sexual assault. Finally, the timing of the Negative Page 7 suggested a causal relationship with the whistleblower's protected activity. Ultimately, DHS OIG substantiated the whistleblower's allegation of retaliation for reporting the sexual assault, in violation of the MWPA. DHS OIG submitted the comprehensive Report of Investigation to the DHS Secretary, and the case is currently under review by USCG Office of Judge Advocate General in consultation with DHS OGC for appropriate action.

W20-USCG-WPD-05838

In this case, DHS OIG substantiated, in part, allegations that a former employee of a DHS contractor was subject to a reprisal under 41 U.S.C. § 4712. DHS OIG did not find clear and convincing evidence that two personnel actions were non-retaliatory. Specifically, that the company would have laid off Complainant, and terminated Complainant while rescinding severance, absent the Complainant's protected communication and the company's perception of Complainant as a whistleblower. Therefore, the allegations were substantiated in part. The former contract employee (the whistleblower) who performed work under a contract with the Federal Protective Service (FPS), alleged that the DHS contractor reprised against the whistleblower both for making a protected communication, and for being perceived as a whistleblower by the contractor. The evidence established that the whistleblower was perceived as regularly and routinely making reports to an FPS official, and that the contractor had a strong motive to retaliate against the whistleblower based on this perception. In addition, the file contained clear evidence of animosity towards the whistleblower based on this perceived whistleblowing. Finally, the contractor did not have strong reasoning to support the actions, providing inconsistent explanations for laying off and terminating the Complainant, ultimately leading to DHS OIG substantiating reprisal by the contractor under 41 U.S.C. § 4712. This report has been sent to the DHS Secretary for appropriate action during the next SAR period.

Pending Corrective Action from Prior SAR Periods

An update on corrective action taken by the Secretary arising from previously substantiated investigations from the last SAR period follows:

W19-FEMA-WPD-17244

In this case, 6 complainants alleged reprisal by their employer through a contract (or through subcontracts entered into by the prime contractor) with FEMA under which the complainants were contracted. The 6 contract employees alleged that they were released from the contract/subcontracts for reporting misconduct related to their work and were therefore subjected to reprisal in violation of 41 U.S.C. § 4712.

DHS OIG substantiated allegations by 2 of 6 Complainants that their early release from their contracts, was in part, in retaliation for their protected disclosures, in violation of 41 U.S.C. § 4712. DHS OIG forwarded this case to the DHS Secretary, and the case is currently under review by the DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC), in consultation with FEMA's Office of Chief Counsel for appropriate action.

W18-USCG-WPD-04609

DHS OIG substantiated allegations that members of the whistleblower's command retaliated against a former Chief for protected activity and protected communications, in violation of the MWPA, 10 U.S.C. § 1034. In this instance, the Complainant (whistleblower) reported the abusive sexual contact of his spouse by a member of his chain of command. The whistleblower claimed that his reporting contributed to several personnel actions taken against him by his chain of command, including significant changes to his duties and responsibilities, his removal from USCG facilities, lowered performance reviews, and charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. DHS OIG forwarded this case to the DHS Secretary, and the case is currently under review by USCG Office of Judge Advocate General in consultation with DHS OGC for appropriate action.

Whistleblower Protection Coordinator

Whistleblowers perform an important service by reporting what they reasonably believe to be evidence of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. DHS employees, contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and personal services contractors are protected by law from retaliation for making a protected disclosure. In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinator, who is in the OIG's Office of Counsel, provides the following services:

- Educates DHS employees, contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, personal service contractors, and employees eligible for access to classified information, on reporting fraud, waste, and abuse within DHS without fear of reprisal.
- Educates all DHS employees on avenues to report allegations of whistleblower reprisal and on the roles that the OIG, the Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and other relevant entities play in investigating reprisal allegations.
- Assists the Inspector General in promoting the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures and allegations of reprisal.
- Assists the Inspector General in facilitating communication and coordination with the Office of Special Counsel, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), the Department, Congress, and other entities regarding the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures.

This reporting cycle, the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator continued to present information about whistleblower rights and protections to DHS staff and contractors. For questions, please contact the DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@oig.dhs.gov or visit <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/whistleblower-protection>.

Whistleblower Protection Alternative Dispute Resolution Program

The DHS OIG Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program continues to be valuable in assisting the facilitated resolution of whistleblower retaliation complaints. The program is designed to resolve whistleblower retaliation complaints filed by the following: 1) DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantee, subgrantees, and personal services contractors; 2) uniformed USCG members; 3) individuals alleging retaliatory security clearance actions; and 4) other qualified complainants. Modeled after successful ADR programs in the federal government, the DHS OIG ADR program provides complainants with an alternative to the formal investigative process. As an informal and confidential process, parties can customize both the ADR process and the resolution of the complaint, instead of relying on an outside decision maker.

During this reporting period, because of the success of our pilot ADR program - as demonstrated by a significant increase in requests to resolve whistleblower retaliation complaints through ADR - we established a permanent ADR program.



**Highlights of
Significant OIG Activity**

Highlights of Significant OIG Activity

During this SAR period, we issued 45 new audit and inspection reports and 140 recommendations to the Department, and we closed 108 recommendations issued in this and prior periods.

In this report, we highlight our pandemic response oversight activities and specific audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations. Our work is risk-based and aligns with the Department's strategic mission areas outlined in the [DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2024](#).

- Strengthen U.S. Borders and Approaches
- Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats
- Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure
- Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience
- Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security
- Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Pandemic Response Accountability

DHS OIG is one of nine statutorily mandated IGs participating in the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), which was established as a committee of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). PRAC's mission is to promote transparency and ensure coordinated, comprehensive oversight of the Government's spending and COVID-19 pandemic response to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. PRAC is tracking more than \$5 trillion in payments to individual citizens, loans for businesses, and support for hospitals and other medical providers, as well as economic relief for impacted businesses; industries; and state, local, and tribal governments. As a participating PRAC member, we conducted a review to determine the sources and intended purpose of Federal pandemic response funding initiatives provided to six geographic areas between January 1, 2020 and September 30, 2021. We also completed an analysis of one geographic area's compliance with FEMA's Public Assistance Emergency Protective

Measures that was included in PRAC’s report, *A Review of Pandemic Relief Funding and How It Was Used in Six U.S. Communities Springfield, Massachusetts* (May 2024).

Since January 2020, DHS OIG has received over 8,700 COVID-19 related complaints resulting in 601 high impact investigations. At the close of this SAR period, our COVID-19 related investigations have resulted in approximately 187 indictments, 47 criminal informations, 129 convictions, and more than \$32.5 million in recoveries, restitutions, and fines. We also released the following audit report related to COVID-19.

[FEMA’s Emergency Non-Congregate Sheltering Interim Policy Provided Greater Flexibility for Emergency Sheltering During the COVID-19 Pandemic, OIG-24-38](#)

The objective of this audit was to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of FEMA’s Non-Congregate Sheltering (NCS) Interim Policy 104-009-18 in providing shelter to displaced disaster survivors in response to federally declared disasters during the COVID-19 pandemic. FEMA’s Interim Policy provided an adequate and effective framework for NCS implementation. The Interim Policy included program details and requirements for determining eligible work and costs for NCS in response to federally declared disasters during the COVID-19 pandemic. We did not identify any issues with the Interim Policy, as it adequately and effectively provided the flexibilities to shelter displaced disaster survivors in response to federally declared disasters during the COVID-19 pandemic, as intended. As such, this report contains no recommendations.

[Strengthen U.S. Borders and Approaches](#)

“DHS helps maintain national security by managing the flow of people and goods into the United States. DHS’ border security approach focuses on four goals: (1) securing and managing air, land, and maritime borders; (2) preventing and intercepting foreign threats so they do not reach U.S. soil; (3) enforcing immigration laws; and (4) properly administering immigration benefits.” -- *DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan*

We continue to evaluate the Department’s operations to secure our borders, safeguard and facilitate trade and travel, enforce immigration laws, and properly administer immigration benefits. We issued 16 audit and inspection reports during this reporting period related to border security. Seven of these reports described the results of unannounced inspections at CBP and ICE facilities.

DHS Needs to Improve Its Screening and Vetting of Asylum Seekers and Noncitizens Applying for Admission into the United States (REDACTED), OIG-24-27

The objective of this audit was to determine the effectiveness of DHS' technology, procedures, and coordination to screen and vet asylum seekers and noncitizens seeking admission to the United States. We found that DHS' technology, procedures, and coordination were not fully effective to screen and vet noncitizens applying for admission into the United States or asylum seekers whose applications were pending for an extended period. We made five recommendations to improve the Department's screening and vetting of asylum seekers and noncitizens. The Department concurred with all five recommendations.

Management Alert – CBP Has Limited Information to Assess Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant Visa Holders (REDACTED), OIG-24-33

We issued this management alert as part of an ongoing audit of CBP's ability to identify Department of State (DOS) visa holders who were granted interview or fingerprint waivers. The objective of our ongoing audit is to determine (1) the extent to which CBP was aware of DOS' policy changes to grant certain categories of visas without in-person interviews and biometrics; and (2) the extent to which CBP can identify and fully screen visa holders with waivers upon arrival at U.S. POEs. In this management alert, we found that prior to March 2024, CBP did not have the system capability to gather information on individuals who were granted visa interview and fingerprint waivers to make more informed admissibility decisions. As a result, more than 4 years after the waiver expansion began, CBP has no assurance that individuals with waivers who arrived at U.S. POEs from 2020 through 2023 were identified for further screening. We made 2 recommendations to CBP that, when implemented, should address, and mitigate potential risks. CBP concurred with both recommendations.

Management Alert – ICE Cannot Monitor All Unaccompanied Migrant Children Released from DHS and U.S. Department of Health and Human Service's Custody, OIG-24-46

During our ongoing audit to assess ICE's ability to monitor the location and status of UCs who were released or transferred from the custody of the DHS and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), we learned ICE transferred more than 448,000 UCs to HHS from FYs 2019 to 2023. However, ICE was not able to account for the location of all UCs who were released by HHS and did not appear as scheduled in immigration court. We made 2 recommendations that will increase information sharing internally within ICE and with external stakeholders, like HHS, for UCs. ICE concurred with both recommendations.

USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims, OIG-24-36

The objective of this audit was to determine to what extent USCIS timely adjudicates asylum claims to reduce the backlog. USCIS did not adjudicate affirmative asylum applications in a timely manner to meet statutory timelines and to reduce its existing backlog. At the end of fiscal

year (FY) 2023, USCIS had more than 786,000 asylum cases pending determination for over 180 days. This occurred because USCIS did not have sufficient funding, staffing, and planning to complete its affirmative asylum caseload. We made 2 recommendations to improve planning and reporting relating to USCIS' Asylum Division. USCIS concurred with both recommendations.

Results of October 2023 Unannounced Inspections of CBP Holding Facilities in the El Paso Area, [OIG-24-39](#)

We conducted onsite, unannounced inspections of 5 CBP facilities in the El Paso area, specifically 3 U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) facilities and 2 Office of Field Operations POEs. At the time of our on-site inspections, CBP held 1,426 detainees in custody in the 5 facilities. We found that Border Patrol held some detainees in both the El Paso Hardened Facility and Santa Teresa station longer than specified in the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search, which generally limits detention to 72 hours. Additionally, Border Patrol experienced challenges staffing El Paso sector centralized processing centers during migrant surges. We referred to 1 open recommendation from a previous report and made 3 new recommendations to improve management of and conditions in CBP short-term holding facilities in the El Paso area. CBP concurred with all 3 recommendations.

Results of Unannounced Inspections of ICE's Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, [OIG-24-29](#)

We conducted an unannounced inspection of the Denver Contract Detention Facility (Denver) in Aurora, Colorado to assess ICE field offices' management of this facility and compliance with applicable standards. We found that Denver's staff complied with Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011, revised December 2016, for recreation, use of force, library, and the voluntary work program. However, facility and ICE staff did not comply with all standards related to staff-detainee communication and grievance practices. In addition, ICE did not maintain proper documentation of detainee grievances and a current log of paper requests and grievances, nor did they provide timely and appropriate responses to all requests. We made 14 recommendations for ICE's Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations to ensure the Denver Field Office overseeing the Denver facility addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all 14 recommendations.

Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats

We continue to evaluate the Department's operations to collect, analyze, and share actionable intelligence; detect and disrupt threats; protect designated leadership, events, and soft targets; and counter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats. We issued 7 audit and inspection reports during this report period related to counter terrorism and homeland security threats.

The Secret Service's Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 (REDACTED), [OIG-24-42](#)

The objective was to evaluate the Secret Service's preparation for and response to the events of January 6, 2021. We determined that on January 6, the Secret Service planned and conducted protective operations for several sites affected by the day's events, including the rally at the Ellipse, the U.S. Capitol, and the Democratic National Committee building. We found that leading up to January 6, Secret Service intelligence assessments did not convey a high potential for violence to impact protective operations. As the Capitol was breached, the Secret Service secured the Vice President, but narrowly avoided encounters with rioters. The Secret Service also sent officers to the Capitol after violence erupted, who provided security for Members of Congress and staffers sheltering in the Dirksen Senate Office building. Meanwhile, at the Democratic National Committee building, the Secret Service evacuated the Vice President-elect after discovery of a pipe bomb. The pipe bomb had been placed near the building the night before, but Secret Service personnel did not identify it during their security sweep on the morning of January 6. The Secret Service did not report the evacuation as an unusual protective event, as required by its policies. We made 6 recommendations to improve the Secret Service's policies and processes for planning and responding to similar events in the future. The Secret Service concurred with 4 recommendations and did not concur with 2 recommendations.

CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks Associated with Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into the United States and Allowing Them to Travel on Domestic Flights, [OIG-24-65](#)

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which CBP and ICE have policies and procedures to confirm an individual's identity for the documents TSA accepts for domestic travel and whether TSA ensures noncitizens traveling on domestic flights provide proof of identification consistent with all other domestic travelers. Although CBP and ICE have policies and procedures to check the identity of noncitizens seeking entry into the United States, they cannot always verify the noncitizens' identities. TSA's vetting and screening procedures do not eliminate the risk that noncitizens who may pose a threat to fellow passengers could board domestic flights. Under current processes, CBP and ICE cannot ensure they are keeping high-risk noncitizens without identification from entering the country. Additionally, TSA cannot ensure its vetting and screening procedures prevent high-risk noncitizens who may pose a threat to the flying public from boarding domestic flights. We made 3 recommendations to assess risks to public safety for noncitizens without identification released into the United States. The Department did not concur with our 3 recommendations.

I&A Needs to Improve Its Security Inspection Program to Reduce the Risk of Unauthorized Access to Classified Information, [OIG-24-55](#)

The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which I&A ensures protection of classified information and equipment from unauthorized access. We determined that I&A has a security inspection program to ensure the organization safeguards classified information and equipment. However, aspects of its security inspection program, such as scheduling inspections and ensuring that offices took corrective actions

for deficiencies, had weaknesses. We made 2 recommendations to improve I&A's oversight of its security inspection program. I&A concurred with both recommendations.

Partners Did Not Always Use DHS Technology to Obtain Emerging Threat Information, [OIG-24-62](#)

We conducted this audit to determine whether DHS has technology to identify and share actionable information on emerging threats with its external partners. DHS has technology that enables identification and sharing of emerging threat information, but DHS partners did not always use this technology to obtain threat information. Partners did not always fully leverage DHS technologies because a lack of Homeland Security Information Network functionality hindered its use; DHS did not conduct outreach to support partners' Homeland Security Information Network mission needs; and DHS did not always share information with partners in a timely manner. We made 4 recommendations to increase DHS partners' awareness of emerging threats and use of information sharing technologies. DHS concurred with 2 recommendations and did not concur with 2 recommendations.

Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure

We continue to evaluate the Department's operations to secure Federal civilian networks, strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, assess and counter evolving cybersecurity risks, and combat cybercrime. During this reporting period we issued 10 audit and inspection reports related to cyberspace and critical infrastructure.

Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2023, [OIG-24-26](#)

Our objective for this evaluation was to determine whether DHS' information security program and practices were adequate and effective to protect the information and information systems that support DHS' operations and assets for FY 2023. DHS' information security program for FY 2023 was rated "effective," according to this year's reporting instructions. We based this rating on our evaluation of DHS' compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) requirements on unclassified and National Security Systems, in which DHS earned a maturity rating of "Managed and Measurable" (Level 4) in all five functions. We made 2 recommendations to the DHS Chief Information Officer in our report. The Department concurred with both recommendations.

DHS Improved Election Infrastructure Security, but Its Role in Countering Disinformation Has Been Reduced, [OIG-24-52](#)

The objective of this review was to assess DHS' actions since 2020 to secure the election infrastructure and counter disinformation campaigns. We determined that, since 2020, DHS has taken certain actions to address cyber and physical security threats to the election infrastructure but has adjusted its efforts to combat disinformation. Additionally, I&A's election intelligence products were not always actionable. We made 1 recommendation to better secure the election infrastructure. Specifically, we recommended that the Director of CISA develop and implement a

risk-based national strategic plan to strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s election infrastructure. CISA concurred with our recommendation.

ICE Did Not Fully Implement Effective Security Controls on Selected High Value Asset Systems, [OIG-24-53](#)

The objective of this review was to determine whether ICE has implemented security controls that protect sensitive information stored and processed on its selected High Value Assets (HVA). ICE did not fully implement the necessary security controls to protect sensitive information processed by selected HVA systems. Potential consequences of the deficiencies we identified may include unauthorized access to confidential information, data manipulation or deletion. By not effectively monitoring its HVAs, ICE cannot be assured that the sensitive information stored and processed on these systems is protected and secure. We made 6 recommendations to improve the security controls that protect sensitive information stored and processed on the selected ICE HVAs. ICE concurred with all 6 recommendations.

Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience

We continue to evaluate the Department’s operations to build a national culture of preparedness, respond during incidents, support outcome-driven community recovery, and train and exercise first responders. We issued 3 audit and inspection reports under this mission area during this reporting period.

FEMA’s Inadequate Oversight Led to Delays in Closing Out Declared Disasters, [OIG-24-45](#)

The objective of this audit was to determine to what extent FEMA manages the closeout of declared disasters in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA program requirements. We determined that FEMA did not ensure that it closed out disaster declarations in a timely manner. We identified 26 programs with nearly \$9.4 million in unliquidated funds that remained open beyond their approved periods of performance that could be put to better use. We made 2 recommendations to improve FEMA’s closeout of declared disasters. FEMA concurred with both of our recommendations.

FEMA Did Not Fully Implement the State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Program (REDACTED), [OIG-24-41](#)

The objective of this audit was to determine to what extent FEMA has implemented the State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Program authorized by Section 1211 of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018. We found that FEMA did not fully implement the State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Program required by Section 1211(a) of the Act. As of March 2024, FEMA had not issued final regulations to fully implement the program. Additionally, FEMA did not implement an effective pilot program. FEMA also did not communicate timely information to Congress about incentives to encourage state, territorial, and tribal participation in the program or about the status of the component’s Disaster Recovery

Reform Act implementation efforts. We made 4 recommendations aimed at improving FEMA’s implementation of the State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Program. FEMA concurred with all 4 recommendations.

Preserve and Uphold the Nation’s Prosperity and Economic Security

We continue to evaluate the Department’s operations to enforce trade laws and facilitate lawful international trade and travel, safeguard the transportation system, maintain waterways and maritime resources, and safeguard financial systems. We issued 2 audit reports under this mission area during this reporting period.

CBP Needs to Improve its Oversight and Monitoring of Penalty Cases, [OIG-24-49](#)

The objective of this audit was to determine to what extent CBP lost revenue due to expired statute of limitations under Title 19 of the United States Code, section 1621, Limitation of actions. From our limited testing, we did not identify a systemic issue in which CBP lost revenue due to expired statute of limitations. Despite not identifying lost revenue due to expired statute of limitations, we found CBP did not maintain effective oversight of penalty cases, which may hinder CBP’s ability to collect revenue in these instances. We made 2 recommendations that will improve CBP’s oversight and monitoring of penalty cases. CBP concurred with both recommendations.

Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

We continue to evaluate the Department’s operations to strengthen Departmental governance and management, develop and maintain a high performing workforce, and optimize support to mission operations. During this reporting period, we issued 6 audit and inspection reports under this mission area.

ICE Did Not Always Manage and Secure Mobile Devices to Prevent Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Information, [OIG-24-61](#)

The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which ICE manages and secures its mobile devices. We determined that ICE did not effectively manage and secure its mobile devices or the infrastructure supporting the devices. These management and security concerns occurred primarily because ICE did not establish or implement sufficient security policies and processes. ICE personnel were unaware of some security requirements and relied on unclear or contradictory guidance. As a result, ICE mobile devices and the sensitive information they contain may be at a higher risk of unauthorized access and more susceptible to cyberattacks. We recommended ICE develop and implement policies and procedures related to mobile device security settings, application and vulnerability management, and device security and monitoring. We made 8 recommendations that will help improve ICE’s mobile device security. ICE concurred with all 8 recommendations.

Management Alert – CISA and FLETC Did Not Take Action to Protect Personally Identifiable Information and Sensitive Law Enforcement Training Curricula, OIG-24-40

During our ongoing audit of DHS’ learning management system, we identified a significant risk to the operations, assets, and individuals at CISA and FLETC. We issued this management alert to advise CISA and FLETC to take immediate action to mitigate risks associated with using a high-risk contractor to supply their learning management systems. A DHS internal investigation identified this contractor as having poor cybersecurity practices. By not taking action to mitigate the control deficiencies, CISA and FLETC may be putting sensitive personally identifiable information and sensitive law enforcement training information stored and processed by CISA and FLETC’s learning management systems at risk of compromise. We made 2 recommendations to CISA and FLETC to immediately mitigate the control deficiencies or cease operation of their learning management systems. CISA and FLETC concurred with both recommendations.

Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information

Section 405(b) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires OIG to report “incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information, including the justification of the establishment for such action.”

During this reporting period and as described in the table below, DHS OIG requests for direct, “read-only” access to databases and data extracts were both denied and delayed. DHS OIG made these requests in support of its oversight mission and in alignment with the authorities granted within the IG Act. The Department components involved in these reportable issues are CBP, DHS Management, FEMA, TSA, and USCG. Department representatives did not cite any legal authority consistent with section 406(a)(1)(B) of the IG Act to justify withholding or delaying DHS OIG’s access to information. Instead, DHS cited an inability to partition data within a system, audit scope, and data protection concerns as reasons for denying the OIG’s requests.

Project: Audit of FEMA Expenditures (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access (or full database copy) IFMIS	Denied
Full scope extract Expenditure and Vendor Data	Received

Impact: In April 2024, the OIG requested direct, read-only access to FEMA’s Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) or a complete copy of all IFMIS payment tables. After 54 calendar days and multiple follow-ups by OIG on the status of this request, FEMA denied the OIG’s request for direct access and insisted on providing only full scope data extracts. FEMA denied access due to the complexity of the IFMIS data, stating that they “would like to provide data via logical, organized report formats with additional context to eliminate erroneous assumptions, which will result in more accurate information to support the audit.” The OIG agreed to receiving extracts of all payment and vendor data for the audit scope period. After a collective 60 calendar day delay, FEMA provided the OIG with initial extracts of IFMIS payment and vendor data; however, the vendor extracts were incomplete, forcing the OIG to make multiple subsequent requests for new extracts. This delay impacts OIG’s timelines for the ongoing audit.

Project: Audit of FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Full scope extract Obligation, Transfer, and Expenditure Data	Delay

Impact: In February 2024, the OIG requested extracts of all obligation, transfer, and expenditure data for FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund for the audit scope period. FEMA provided data extracts; however, the extracts were incomplete, forcing the OIG to make multiple subsequent requests for new extracts. After a 104-calendar day delay, the OIG received usable, complete data to perform OIG oversight. The delay significantly impacted the audit team’s ability to complete this work in a timely manner and adhere to the established audit timelines.

Project: CBP’s Detection of Fraudulent Travel Documents (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Documentation: Investigative/Legal Proceeding Records	Delay
Documentation Covert Testing Reports	Delay

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access BorderStat	Denied
Limited extract Seized fraudulent travel document data	Received
Read-only access ACADIS	Denied
Read-only access ACADIS Administrative Website	Denied
Limited extract ACADIS training reports	Received

Impact: In February 2024, the OIG requested records of investigative and legal proceedings related to fraudulent travel documents as well as results of covert testing and checkpoint assessments. After a 46-calendar day delay, the OIG received the requested investigative records. After a 60-calendar-day delay, the OIG received the requested covert testing and checkpoint assessment results. Both requests required multiple follow-ups by the OIG and led to delays in audit milestones.

In April 2024, the OIG requested read-only access to BorderStat. After 28 calendar days, CBP denied OIG’s request for access, stating that the BorderStat universe is outside that scope of the audit, and that the system does not allow for the “partitioning” of data. The OIG was forced to request an extract of fraudulent travel document data which CBP provided. The denial of access to BorderStat prevented the OIG from conducting a comprehensive analytic review of the travel document data.

In May 2024, the OIG requested read-only access to the ACADIS training database. After 49 calendar days, CBP provided a formal denial of OIG’s request for access. The OIG subsequently requested direct access to the ACAIDS Administrative Website, which CBP also formally denied after an additional 16 calendar days. While awaiting CBP’s response to the access requests, the OIG requested and received an extract of training report data from ACADIS. The denial of access to the full training database prevented the OIG from conducting a comprehensive risk analysis in support of this audit.

Project: Cybersecurity System Review of a Selected HVA System at DHS HQ (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Signed Agreement Neptune	Delay

Impact: On April 22, 2024, the OIG requested a signed Rules of Engagement to Conduct Cybersecurity Testing from DHS. Fifty-five days after DHS first received the ROE, the OIG was notified that the Department Audit Liaison had requested that all ROEs be sent through OGC before they are signed. After an 83-calendar day delay, DHS provided the requested documentation.

Project: FEMA’s Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Claims Office Process (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access CLIP	Delay

Impact: In March 2024, the OIG requested read-only access to FEMA’s Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Claims and Loss Information Portal (CLIP). FEMA agreed to provide access but stated that OIG users would need to travel to the HPCC Claims Office in Santa Fe, NM to receive FEMA credentials, laptops, and system access. In June 2024, after multiple inquiries by the OIG, FEMA provided travel instructions for the OIG visit to Santa Fe. During the site visit, FEMA was unable to complete the required processes. In July 2024, after a subsequent credentialing appointment and training session, FEMA granted the OIG access to CLIP. After a collective 131-calendar day delay, the OIG received access to the data required to perform its oversight work. This delay significantly impacted the audit team’s ability to complete this work in a timely manner and adhere to the established audit timelines.

Project: Evaluation of the Merchant Mariner Credentials Suspension and Revocation Process (Evaluation)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access MMLD	Denied
Limited extract Merchant Mariner Credential Issuance Data	Delay
Read-only access MISLE Adjudication Database	Denied
Limited extract Merchant Mariner Credential Complaint, Suspension, and Revocation Data	Delay

Impact: In April 2024, the OIG requested read-only access to both the Merchant Mariner Licensing and Documentation (MMLD) system and the Maritime Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) Adjudication Database. After 37 calendar days, USCG responded with a formal letter denying the OIG access to both systems. USCG stated that this was not a “formal denial,” but rather a “modification of the OIG’s request” due to sensitivity concerns. USCG also offered to provide limited scope extracts from both systems.

The OIG subsequently requested data extracts from both MMLD and the MISLE Adjudication Database. After 23 calendar days, USCG provided the MMLD data extract. After 51 calendar days and multiple extension requests, USCG provided the MISLE Adjudication data extract. After a collective 88 calendar days, the OIG received complete, usable data to perform OIG oversight. The delay significantly impacted the evaluation team’s ability to complete this work in a timely manner and adhere to the established project timelines.

Project: Audit of I&A Mobile Device Management and Security (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access ServiceNow Ticketing System	Denied
Limited extract I&A Mobile Device Ticket Data	Received

Impact: In July 2024, the OIG requested read-only access to DHS OCIO’s instance of the ServiceNow Ticketing System. DHS OCIO promptly denied the OIG’s request for access and offered to make a one-time pull of the data that falls within the audit scope. The OIG subsequently requested and received a limited scope extract of I&A mobile device ticket data from the ServiceNow Ticketing System. The denial of access prevented the OIG from conducting a comprehensive risk assessment of Mobile Device ticketing data.

Project: Evaluation of TSA’s Process for Investigating and Referring Misconduct (Evaluation)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access ECMS ITS	Denied
Limited extract FAMS Case Data	Received

Impact: In July 2024, the OIG requested read-only access to the Electronic Case Management System Insider Threat Section (ECMS ITS). TSA promptly denied the OIG’s request for access and offered to provide specific data extracts relevant to the project objective. The OIG subsequently requested and received a limited scope extract of TSA FAMS case data from ECMS ITS. The denial of direct access to this data prevented the OIG from conducting a comprehensive analytic risk assessment.

Project: FEMA’s Oversight of the Shelter and Services Program for Noncitizens (Audit)

Description of OIG Request	DHS Response
Read-only access FEMA GO	Denied
Limited extracts SSP and EFSP-H Grant Data	Pending

Impact: FEMA pre-emptively denied the OIG direct, read-only access to the FEMA GO back-end database during a system walkthrough stating direct access could not be granted due to the inability to “partition” the data to only those data relevant to the audit.

In August 2024, the OIG requested full-scope extracts of all Shelter and Service Program (SSP) and Emergency Food and Shelter Program – Humanitarian Awards (EFSP-H) grant data contained in FEMA GO. A month later, and after multiple follow-ups by the OIG, FEMA requested a meeting during which they stated that it would be too difficult to extract all data related to SSP grants due to the complexity of the database. The OIG was asked to review samples of data and further limit the scope of the data requested.

A month after initially stating that there were EFSP-H grant data in FEMA GO, FEMA reversed course stating that was, in fact, not the case. The OIG was directed to FEMA’s Individual Assistance division for those data instead. The OIG has subsequently submitted limited extract requests for both SSP and EFSP-H grant data. 73 calendar days after being told that direct database access was not possible, and 56 calendar days after submitting the initial full-scope extract requests, the OIG still has not received complete, usable data to perform its oversight work. These delays have significantly impacted the OIG’s ability to meet project milestones.

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Investigations

Investigations

Overview and Select Narratives

The Office of Investigations investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and personnel actions.

During this reporting period, we initiated 160 investigations and closed 163. Our investigations resulted in 64 arrests, 59 indictments, 41 convictions, and 4 personnel actions. In accordance with the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, we have included information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

The narratives below are a select sample of our completed investigations.



Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits

Jointly with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) OIG and the Virginia Employment Commission, we investigated 3 civilians for fraudulent Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit claims related to the CARES Act. The civilians, one of whom was an inmate, used the personally identifiable information (PII) of several inmates at state detention centers to obtain UI and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia accepted guilty pleas from the 3 civilians for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. §1349 (Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud). The civilians were sentenced to 120 months, 72 months, and 45 months incarceration respectively, followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount totaling \$802,656.

Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits

Jointly with the DOL OIG and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice OIG, we investigated 5 civilians for fraudulent UI benefit claims related to the CARES Act. The civilians, 3 of whom were inmates, used the PII of several inmates at state detention centers to obtain UI and PUA benefits. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas accepted guilty pleas from the 5 civilians for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. §371 (Conspiracy to Commit Theft of Government Funds). The civilians were sentenced to 60 months, 42 months, 37 months, 30 months incarceration, and 60 months of probation respectively, followed by 3 years of supervised release for the incarcerated civilians and ordered to pay restitution in the amount totaling \$205,697.

Federal Officer Interfering with a Flight Crew

Jointly with the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility, we investigated an ICE ERO Deportation Officer (DO) who, while in the course of his official duties transporting a detainee on a commercial flight from Dallas, Texas, to Miami, Florida, filmed underneath a flight attendant's skirt as she passed by him. The incident was recorded by another flight attendant. A federal jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida found the former DO guilty of violations of Title 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (Interfering with a Flight Crew). The former DO was sentenced to 24 months of probation.

Attempted Online Enticement of a Minor by a Federal Officer

Jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Othello, Washington, Police Department, we investigated an ICE ERO Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer (SDDO) for attempted online enticement of a minor. The SDDO was arrested in a law enforcement operation meant to identify individuals interested and willing to meet with minors for sex. The SDDO conversed with what he believed to be a 13-year-old girl on Craigslist via text conversation from his government issued cellphone, discussed wanting to take the girl to Montana for a trip, negotiated prices for various sexual acts, and eventually agreed to meet and pay the girl for sex at a local

hotel. The SDDO traveled to the agreed upon hotel in his government issued vehicle, with his ICE issued credentials and firearm, 2 bottles of prescription medication (which included directions to take prior to sexual activity), and \$4,075 in U.S. currency. A federal jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington found the former SDDO guilty of violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Attempted Online Enticement of a Minor). The former SDDO was sentenced to 135 months incarceration, 15 years of supervised release, issued a \$5,000 fine per the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and was required to forfeit the \$4,075 in U.S. currency that was seized from him during his arrest.

Smuggling and Bribery

Jointly with the FBI Border Corruption Task Force (BCTF) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), we investigated a U.S. Border Patrol Agent (BPA) who accepted bribes and conspired with co-conspirators to use his position as a BPA to smuggle narcotics and undocumented non-citizens (UNC) into the United States for financial remuneration in violation of federal law. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona accepted a guilty plea from the former BPA for violations of Title 18 U.S.C § 201 (Bribery of Public Officials), Title 21 U.S.C. § 846, Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), and Title 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A)(i) (Conspiracy to possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, Fentanyl, and Heroin). The BPA was sentenced to 216 months incarceration followed by 5 years of supervised release. The two co-conspirators also accepted guilty pleas and were subsequently sentenced to incarceration.

False Claims Act

We investigated a FEMA contractor and four FEMA public assistance applicants based on a qui tam lawsuit alleging violations of Title 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (False Claims Act). FEMA received multiple false/misleading claims for public assistance and disbursed funds for the replacement, instead of repair, of numerous damaged facilities in New Orleans. In collaboration with DOJ's Civil Litigation Division, the investigation resulted in individual civil settlement agreements in the amount totaling \$26,112,614.

Settlement Agreement in Connection with a Civil False Claims Act Investigation Related to Air Travel

Jointly with the U.S. Department of Agriculture OIG and the U.S. Department of Transportation OIG, we investigated a foreign based air travel company, who agreed to pay \$26,817,646 to settle allegations that they knowingly and improperly avoided or decreased its obligation to remit fees collected from air travelers. The fees were related to Customs and Immigration User Fees owed to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection User Fees owed to the U.S. Department of Agriculture; and the Passenger Civil Aviation Service Fee owed to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration. The Settlement Agreement was a result of a qui tam investigation.

Investigations of Senior Government Employees

Per requirements described in the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, OIG conducted the following investigations involving senior government employees where allegations of misconduct were either substantiated, or unsubstantiated and not disclosed to the public.

Substantiated

Nothing to report.

Unsubstantiated and Not Disclosed to the public

We investigated a senior official (GS-15) for alleged violations of 5 CFR 2635 (Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch), Title 18 USC § 201(c)(1)(b) (Illegal Gratuities), and Title 18 USC § 201 (Bribery of Public Officials). The senior official was alleged to have violated ethics and contract guidelines. The senior official retired from DHS during this investigation. Our investigation did not reveal the senior official benefited personally while employed by DHS or in retirement. The investigative findings were presented to the United States Attorney's Office, District of Columbia, who declined prosecution. We found the allegation was unsubstantiated.

We investigated a senior official (SES) for alleged violations pertaining to ethics and contract guidelines. The SES was alleged to have used his current position to offer and award a contract to a company in which he was formerly employed. Our investigation determined the allegation was unsubstantiated as the SES provided all information related to his former position/company to the contracting officer and Office of Counsel. Additionally, the contract was not awarded to the company the SES was formerly employed.

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Other OIG Activities

Other OIG Activities

Congressional Briefings

The OIG did not provide testimony before Congress during this reporting period. We held more than 60 meetings and briefings with Members of Congress, committees, and their staffs during this reporting period. The Inspector General personally briefed numerous Members who sit on committees with jurisdiction over DHS regarding DHS OIG's complete portfolio of work.

Legislative and Regulatory Reviews

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to programs and operations of the establishment and to make recommendations in the semiannual reports required by section 405(b) of this title concerning the impact of the legislation and regulations on the economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations administered or financed by the establishment, or the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in the programs and operations.

During this SAR period, we engaged with 2 Congressional committees and provided technical drafting assistance on 2 legislative proposals concerning the impact of the proposals on the economy and efficiency in the administration of the Department's programs and operations. Specifically, at the request of Members of the House Appropriations Committee, we provided technical drafting assistance on DHS OIG's FY25 Appropriation levels as well as a provision stating that no funds made available under the Act shall be used to delay or deny DHS OIG access to any records, documents, or other information DHS OIG is entitled to consistent with the law. We also twice provided technical drafting assistance to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, regarding accountability and transparency related to senior leader misconduct within the U.S. Coast Guard Reauthorization Act.

Oversight of Single Audits

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires that Inspectors General take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with *generally accepted government auditing standards* (GAGAS). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a fiscal year to obtain an audit, referred to as a "Single Audit" (per the *Single Audit Act*, as amended by Public Law 104-

156.)³ Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their Single Audit work in compliance with GAGAS, and to determine that the audit results are properly reported.

During this reporting period, we completed 130 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by the non-Federal auditing firms (independent public accountant organizations.) These 130 desk reviews encompass \$1,663,957,516 in Federal grant spending, of which \$1,453,921,684 was for direct DHS grants. We did not complete any quality control reviews.

Forty-seven percent of our desk reviews did not disclose any quality issues, or disclosed only minor issues that did not require corrective actions. The remaining 53 percent contained errors needing correction in future filings, as identified below.⁴

Problems with:	Number
Corrective Action Plan	32
Current Report	25
Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards	23
Single Audit Report Submitted Late	14
Standard Form Accompanying Report	7
Findings	7
Risk Assessment	7
Prior Report	6
Other	3

Two single audits reviewed failed our review. We await the non-Federal auditors to revise these submissions. We will review these two submissions when available and will report the review results in a later submission.

³ In April 2024, OMB increased the single audit threshold from \$750,000 to \$1,000,000, effective for audits beginning on or after October 1, 2024.

⁴ Some of the single audit submissions had several errors, so arithmetically there were more errors noted than 53 percent of 130 letters would indicate.

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Appendices

[Appendix 1: Reports](#)

Reports with Monetary Findings

Resolution of Reports and Recommendations

Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months

Reports with Open Resolved Recommendations Older than 6 Months

Audit and Inspection Reports Issued this SAR Period

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

The [National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008](#) requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.



Reports with Monetary Findings

Reports and Recommendations with Questioned or Unsupported Costs

Category	# Reports	# Recommendations	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs
Carryover	7	7	\$6,942,594,379	\$0
Issued	0	0	\$0	\$0

Reports and Recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

Category	# Reports	# Recommendations	Funds Put to Better Use
Carryover	5	5	\$654,311,248
Issued	1	1	\$7,051,860,362

Resolution of Reports and Recommendations⁵

Reports and Recommendations with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months

Period Ending	# Reports with Unresolved Recommendations > 6 Months	# Recommendations Unresolved > 6 Months
4/1/2024	17	30
9/30/2024	11	19

⁵ Since 2003, OIG has issued 11,756 recommendations. DHS has taken action to address all but 518 of them. This appendix excludes investigative reports.

Current Report Inventory

Report Category	# Reports
Reports with open recommendations at the beginning of the period	173
Reports issued to DHS this period	45
Reports with recommendations closed this period	8
Reports with open recommendations at the end of the period	152

Active Recommendations

Recommendation Status	# of Recommendations
Open recommendations at the beginning of the period	534
Recommendations issued this period	140
Recommendations closed this period	108
Open recommendations at the end of the period	518

Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec No.	DHS Comp.	Questioned Cost	FPTBU	Reason Code*	Functional Area
10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	3	TSA	-	-	A	LET
9/19/2018	OIG-19-17	<i>FAMS Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable</i>	1, 2	TSA	-	\$394,000,000	C	LET
9/30/2019	OIG-19-66	<i>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds</i>	1, 3	FEMA	-	-	A	DMIP
4/6/2020	OIG-20-23	<i>FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003</i>	1, 2	FEMA	\$3,035,279,851	-	A	FACET
7/5/2022	OIG-22-49	<i>DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism</i>	1, 6	DHS	-	-	B	LET
8/10/2022	OIG-22-56	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program</i>	1, 10	FEMA	-	\$45,200,000	C	DMIP
9/6/2022	OIG-22-64	<i>DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis</i>	2	SEC, DSEC, COS	-	-	A	LET
9/16/2022	OIG-22-69	<i>FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program</i>	3, 4, 5, 6	FEMA	-	-	A	FACET

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec No.	DHS Comp.	Questioned Cost	FPTBU	Reason Code*	Functional Area
9/27/2022	OIG-22-73	<i>More than \$2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees Identities</i>	6	FEMA	-	-	A	FACET
8/22/2023	OIG-23-42	<i>Ineffective Controls Over COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Leave the Program Susceptible to Waste and Abuse</i>	1	FEMA	\$24,438,662	-	A	DMIP
9/25/2023	OIG-23-56	<i>CBP Did Not Effectively Conduct International Mail Screening or Implement the STOP Act</i>	3	CBP	-	-	C	LET
Totals	11 Reports		19 Recs		\$3,059,718,513	\$439,200,000		

*Reason Code Key

A = DHS did not concur and has not changed its original position

B = DHS did not provide timely/sufficient corrective action plan and/or expected completion date

C = Disagreement on evidence and/or proposed corrective actions

Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “MA” is a management alert. These reports identify conditions or issues that may pose a serious, imminent threat to safety, health, property, or continuity of operations, or a risk of fraud, waste, or abuse. A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight, which OIG dissolved in April 2021.

Reports with Open Resolved Recommendations Older than 6 Months

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	20	\$0	\$0	DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	\$0	\$0	OGC, TSA
OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	CBP, CFO, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS
OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	3	\$0	\$0	I&A
OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the US USCG Investigative Service</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCG
OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
OIG-18-16	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	40	\$0	\$0	CBP, DHS, FEMA, USCG, USSS
OIG-18-70	<i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-18-78	<i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
OIG-18-83	<i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-18-88	<i>Review of USCG's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
OIG-19-04	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	CBP, DHS, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS
OIG-19-15	<i>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively</i>	1	\$1,768,768	\$0	NPPD
OIG-19-23	<i>USBP Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-19-42	<i>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program</i>	3	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-20-03	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	4	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-20-13	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-20-15	<i>FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-20-28	<i>TSA's Challenges with Passenger Screening Canine Teams - Sensitive Security Information</i>	1	\$0	\$77,000,000	TSA
OIG-20-37	<i>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CISA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-20-59	<i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE, PLCY, TSA
OIG-20-62	<i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
OIG-20-73	<i>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018</i>	2	\$0	\$0	DHS, MGMT
OIG-20-76	<i>FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-20-77	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
OIG-21-01	<i>DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CISA
OIG-21-06	<i>DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PRIV
OIG-21-08	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	12	\$0	\$0	CFO, DHS
OIG-21-09	<i>DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PLCY, ICE
OIG-21-15	<i>ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-21-26	<i>FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$25,594,524	\$0	FEMA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-21-27	<i>CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - For Official Use Only</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-21-31	<i>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC/DSEC/COS
OIG-21-35	<i>DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE, TSA, DHS, FPS
OIG-21-43	<i>FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-21-59	<i>CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CISA
OIG-21-62	<i>CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-21-64	<i>Lessons Learned from FEMA's Initial Response to COVID-19</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-21-65	<i>USCG Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand its Public Notifications During Outages</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCG
OIG-22-01	<i>ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-22-03	<i>Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-22-04	<i>DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CFO
OIG-22-08	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	4	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-22-10	<i>USCIS' U Visa Program Is Not Managed Effectively and Is Susceptible to Fraud</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCIS
OIG-22-25	<i>FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-22-33	<i>The Office for Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CISA
OIG-22-34	<i>CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-22-42	<i>Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
OIG-22-44	<i>ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-22-46	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions</i>	4	\$0	\$134,911,248	FEMA
OIG-22-49	<i>DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism</i>	3	\$0	\$0	DHS, S&T

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-22-51	<i>Assessment of FEMA's Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Program</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-22-52	<i>DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP, PLCY
OIG-22-54	<i>DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-22-56	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program</i>	7	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-22-60	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021</i>	1	\$0	\$0	I&A
OIG-22-61	<i>Vulnerabilities Continue to Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
OIG-22-63	<i>CISA and FEMA Can Improve Coordination Efforts to Ensure Energy Sector Resilience</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CISA, FEMA
OIG-22-65	<i>USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information</i>	7	\$0	\$0	USCIS
OIG-22-66	<i>DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE, MGMT
OIG-22-69	<i>FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program</i>	3	\$3,744,943,964	\$0	FEMA
OIG-22-76	<i>FEMA's Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement</i>	3	\$103,140,036	\$0	FEMA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-22-77	<i>FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage Disaster Case Management Program Funds in Support of Hurricane Maria Recovery Services</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-22-79	<i>The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-23-02	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on the Department of Homeland Security's Consolidated Financial Statements for FYs 2022 and 2021 and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	3	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-23-04	<i>DHS Did Not Always Promptly Revoke PIV Card Access and Withdraw Security Clearances for Separated Individuals</i>	6	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-23-05	<i>DHS Did Not Consistently Comply with National Instant Criminal Background Check System Requirements</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC/DSEC/COS, USCG
OIG-23-06	<i>Management Alert - CBP Needs to Provide Adequate Emergency Back-Up Power to its Video Surveillance Systems at the Blaine Area Ports to Ensure Secure and Safe Operations (REDACTED)</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-07	<i>DHS Has Made Progress in Fulfilling Geospatial Data Act Responsibilities, But Additional Work is Needed</i>	3	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-23-14	<i>FEMA Did Not Provide Sufficient Oversight of Project Airbridge</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-23-16	<i>FEMA Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-23-17	<i>Secret Service and ICE Did Not Always Adhere to Statute and Policies Governing Use of Cell-Site Simulators</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE, USSS
OIG-23-19	<i>CISA Made Progress but Resources, Staffing, and Technology Challenges Hinder Cyber Threat Detection and Mitigation</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CISA
OIG-23-20	<i>FEMA Should Increase Oversight to Prevent Misuse of Humanitarian Relief Funds</i>	1	\$7,428,574	\$0	FEMA
OIG-23-21	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2022</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-23-23	<i>The United States USCG Needs to Improve Its Accounting for Non-Capitalized Personal Property Assets</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCG
OIG-23-24	<i>Intensifying Conditions at the Southwest Border Are Negatively Impacting CBP and ICE Employees' Health and Morale</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE
OIG-23-25	<i>DHS' Fiscal Year 2022 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA, DHS
OIG-23-29	<i>Results of Unannounced Inspections of CBP Holding Facilities in the Yuma-Tucson Areas</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-30	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2022</i>	2	\$0	\$0	I&A
OIG-23-33	<i>ICE Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information</i>	7	\$0	\$0	ICE

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-23-34	<i>FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage the Distribution of COVID-19 Medical Supplies and Equipment</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-23-35	<i>DHS Components Did Not Always Adhere to Internal Control Policies and Procedures for Ensuring That Bankcard Program Spending Limits Are Established Based on Procurement Needs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-23-36	<i>United States USCG Instituted Controls for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Extraordinary Relief Request, But Guidance Could Be Improved</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
OIG-23-39	<i>CBP Outbound Inspections Disrupt Transnational Criminal Organization Illicit Operations</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-42	<i>Ineffective Controls Over COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Leave the Program Susceptible to Waste and Abuse</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
OIG-23-44	<i>Cybersecurity System Review of the TSA's Selected HVA</i>	12	\$0	\$0	TSA
OIG-23-45	<i>CBP Could Do More to Plan for Facilities Along the Southwest Border</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-46	<i>The United States Coast Guard Needs to Determine the Impact and Effectiveness of Its Streamlined Inspection Program</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCG
OIG-23-47	<i>DHS Does Not Have Assurance That All Migrants Can be Located Once Released into the United States</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-23-48	<i>CBP's Management of International Mail Facilities Puts Officer Safety and Mission Requirements at Risk</i>	2	\$0	\$3,200,000	CBP

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-23-52	<i>ICE Did Not Accurately Measure and Report Its Progress in Disrupting or Dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-23-53	<i>Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System Compliance with 28 C.F.R. Part 23</i>	3	\$0	\$0	PLCY, PRIV
OIG-23-54	<i>CBP Needs to Improve Its Video and Audio Coverage at Land Ports of Entry</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-55	<i>DHS Needs to Improve Annual Monitoring of Major Acquisition Programs to Ensure They Continue to Meet Department Needs</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT, USCG
OIG-23-56	<i>CBP Did Not Effectively Conduct International Mail Screening or Implement the STOP Act</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-57	<i>Better TSA Tracking and Follow-up for the 2021 Security Directives Implementation Should Strengthen Pipeline Cybersecurity - Sensitive Security Information</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
OIG-23-58	<i>DHS Needs to Update Its Strategy to Better Manage Its Biometric Capability Needs</i>	4	\$0	\$0	DHS, MGMT, PLCY
OIG-23-59	<i>ICE Should Improve Controls Over Its Transportation Services Contracts</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-23-60	<i>CBP Accounted for Its Firearms but Did Not Always Account for Ammunition or Monitor Storage Facilities</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
OIG-23-61	<i>CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy Policies or Develop Sufficient Policies Before Procuring and Using Commercial Telemetry Data (LES)</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE, MGMT

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-24-02	<i>ICE Management and Oversight of Mobile Applications</i>	6	\$0	\$0	DHS, ICE
OIG-24-06	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on the Department of Homeland Security's Consolidated Financial Statements for FYs 2023 and 2022 and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	9	\$0	\$0	DHS
OIG-24-08	<i>Coast Guard National Maritime Center's Oversight of Merchant Mariner Training and Examinations</i>	7	\$0	\$0	USCG
OIG-24-09	<i>CISA Needs to Improve Collaboration to Enhance Cyber Resiliency in the Water and Wastewater Sector</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CISA
OIG-24-16	<i>ICE Major Surgeries Were Not Always Properly Reviewed and Approved for Medical Necessity</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
OIG-24-20	<i>Results of July 2023 Unannounced Inspections of CBP Holding Facilities in the Rio Grande Valley Area</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
109	Total	387	\$3,882,875,866	\$215,111,248	

Audit and Inspection Reports Issued this SAR Period

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
4/16/2024	OIG-24-21	Results of an Unannounced Inspection of ICE's Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami, Florida	\$0	\$0	\$0
4/18/2024	OIG-24-22	CISA's Use of Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Funds	\$0	\$0	\$0
4/18/2024	OIG-24-23	Results of an Unannounced Inspection of ICE's Golden State Annex in McFarland, California	\$0	\$0	\$0
5/6/2024	OIG-24-24	DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees	\$0	\$0	\$0
5/28/2004	OIG-24-25	DHS' Fiscal Year 2023 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/4/2024	OIG-24-26	Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2023	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/7/2024	OIG-24-27	DHS Needs to Improve Its Screening and Vetting of Asylum Seekers and Noncitizens Applying for Admission into the United States (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/7/2024	OIG-24-28	Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2023 (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/12/2024	OIG-24-29	Results of an Unannounced Inspection of ICE's Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado	\$0	\$0	\$0

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
6/12/2024	OIG-24-30	CBP and ICE Did Not Have an Effective Process for Detaining and Removing Inadmissible Travelers at an International Airport (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/12/2024	OIG-24-31	ICE's Risk-Classification Assessment Process Was Not Consistently Used to Prevent the Release of High-Risk Individuals	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/17/2024	OIG-24-32	Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Funding: CBP Must Improve Processes for Addressing Critical Repairs at CBP-owned Land Ports of Entry	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/25/2024	OIG-24-33	Management Alert - CBP Has Limited Information to Assess Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant Visa Holders (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
6/25/2024	OIG-24-34	FEMA Region IV Has a Process to Identify Single Sites Damaged by Multiple Events	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/2/2024	OIG-24-35	TSA Could Not Assess Impact of Federal Air Marshal Service Personnel Deployed to Support Southwest Border Security (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/3/2024	OIG-24-36	USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/9/2024	OIG-24-37	Coast Guard Should Take Additional Steps to Secure the Marine Transportation System Against Cyberattacks	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/9/2024	OIG-24-38	FEMA's Emergency Non-Congregate Sheltering Interim Policy Provided Greater Flexibility for Emergency Sheltering During the COVID-19 Pandemic	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/16/2024	OIG-24-39	Results of October 2023 Unannounced Inspections of CBP Holding Facilities in the El Paso Area	\$0	\$0	\$0

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
7/17/2024	OIG-24-40	Management Alert - CISA and FLETC Did Not Take Action to Protect Personally Identifiable Information and Sensitive Law Enforcement Training Curricula	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/25/2024	OIG-24-41	FEMA Did Not Fully Implement the State-Administered Direct Housing Grant Program (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
7/31/2024	OIG-24-42	The Secret Service's Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 at the U.S. Capitol (Redacted)	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/8/2024	OIG-24-43	DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing an Enhanced Personnel Vetting Program	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/8/2024	OIG-24-44	Results of January 2024 Unannounced Inspections of CBP Holding Facilities in the Del Rio Area	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/14/2024	OIG-24-45	FEMA's Inadequate Oversight Led to Delays in Closing Out Declared Disasters	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/19/2024	OIG-24-46	ICE Cannot Monitor All Unaccompanied Migrant Children Released from DHS and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Custody	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/19/2024	OIG-24-47	S&T Inconsistently Managed Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Research and Development Activities”	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/19/2024	OIG-24-48	CBP Did Not Thoroughly Plan for CBP One™ Risks, and Opportunities to Implement Improvements Exist	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/3/2024	OIG-24-49	CBP Needs to Improve Its Oversight and Monitoring of Penalty Cases	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/3/2024	OIG-24-50	TSA Made Progress Implementing Requirements of the 9/11 and TSA Modernization Acts but Additional Work Remains	\$0	\$0	\$0

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
9/13/2024	OIG-24-51	CBP Conducts Individualized Assessments but Does Not Comprehensively Assess Land Port of Entry Operations	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/17/2024	OIG-24-52	DHS Improved Election Infrastructure Security, but Its Role in Countering Disinformation Has Been Reduced	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/17/2024	OIG-24-53	ICE Did Not Fully Implement Effective Security Controls on Selected High Value Asset Systems	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/17/2024	OIG-24-54	CBP's Office of Field Operations Used Overtime in Accordance with Policies and Procedures	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/17/2024	OIG-24-55	I&A Needs to Improve Its Security Inspection Program to Reduce the Risk of Unauthorized Access to Classified Information	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/17/2024	OIG-24-56	Coast Guard Needs to Implement Effective Planning for Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Projects	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/17/2024	OIG-24-57	Audit of Office of Intelligence and Analysis's Contract and Funding Management Process	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/24/2024	OIG-24-58	CBP Needs to Improve Its Management of the Facility Condition Assessment Program	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/24/2024	OIG-24-59	Summary of Unannounced Inspections of ICE Facilities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2020-2023	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/25/2024	OIG-24-60	CISA Faces Challenges Sharing Cyber Threat Information as Required by the Cybersecurity Act of 2015	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/25/2024	OIG-24-61	ICE Did Not Always Manage and Secure Mobile Devices to Prevent Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Information	\$0	\$0	\$0

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
9/27/2024	OIG-24-62	DHS Partners Did Not Always Use DHS Technology to Obtain Emerging Threat Information	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/27/2024	OIG-24-63	Results of an Unannounced Inspection of Baker County Sheriff's Office in Macclenny, Florida	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/29/2024	OIG-24-64	Oversight Reports Identify Recurring Challenges with DHS Strategic Planning	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/30/2024	OIG-24-65	CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks Associated with Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into the United States and Allowing Them to Travel on Domestic Flights - Sensitive Security Information	\$0	\$0	\$0
Totals	-	Reports 45	\$0	\$0	\$0

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
7/28/2023	OIG-23-37	<i>FEMA Continues to Make Improper Reimbursements through the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant Program</i>	\$19,120,558	\$19,120,558	-	\$19,120,558
9/25/2023	OIG-23-59	<i>ICE Should Improve Controls Over Its Transportation Services Contracts</i>	\$408,875	\$272,262	\$136,613	\$272,262
Total	2 Reports	3 Recommendations	\$19,529,433	\$19,392,820	\$136,613	\$19,392,820

[Appendix 2: Other OIG Activities](#)

Contract Audit Results

Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG

Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

[Contract Audit Results](#)

During this SAR period there were no contract audit reports issued containing costs.

[Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG](#)

Section 405(b)(8) – (10) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of, or conducted by, an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period. If no peer review was conducted within the reporting period, OIGs must include a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another OIG.

Peer Reviews of DHS OIG

During this reporting period, the DOL OIG initiated a CIGIE external peer review of DHS OIG’s investigative operations but had yet to issue a related draft report.

Peer Reviews Conducted by DHS OIG

DHS OIG did not conduct any CIGIE external peer reviews during this reporting period.

Peer Review Recommendations

There are no outstanding recommendations from previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG.

Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

During this SAR period, DHS OIG did not conduct any Audits, Inspections, or Evaluations that were closed and not publicly disclosed.

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

Requirement:

Reporting on Failure to Meet Deadlines in Remediation Plans. Section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) requires that the Inspector General's (IG) semi-annual report to Congress required under section 405 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, include instances and reasons when an agency has not met the milestones established in the remediation plan. Specifically, the report shall include: (1) the facts pertaining to noncompliance with Section 803 (a), including the nature and extent of noncompliance, the primary reason or cause for the failure to comply, and any extenuating circumstances; (2) a statement of the remedial actions needed to comply; and (3) the entity or organization responsible for the noncompliance and if different, the entity or organization responsible for correcting the noncompliance.

Facts Pertaining to Non-compliance

As of September 30, 2023, DHS' financial management systems did not comply substantially with Federal financial management system requirements, as DHS continued to have a material weakness in Information Technology (IT) Controls and Information Systems and Financial Reporting.⁶

⁶ OIG-24-06, Independent Auditors' Report on the Department of Homeland Security's Consolidated Financial Statements for FYs 2023 and 2022 and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, November 2023

Information Technology Controls and Information Systems

DHS continued to have deficiencies in its design and implementation of IT and information systems controls. Specifically, the independent auditors noted DHS did not achieve objectives and respond to risks arising from IT as required by Green Book principles. DHS did not effectively design, implement, or operate IT general controls for access to programs and data, program changes, and computer operations. Some of these deficiencies have persisted since the inception of DHS.

Financial Reporting

DHS did not design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks as required by Green Book principle 10, *Design Control Activities*, or implement the entity's information systems and related control activities through policies as required by Green Book principles. Specifically, the independent auditors noted DHS did not effectively design, implement, and/or operate controls in the financial reporting processes across DHS related to information derived from systems, journal entries, and service organizations. Additionally, DHS did not identify and analyze response to risk presented by the USCG financial system implementation, and controls were not designed or implemented to mitigate risk.

Statement of the remedial actions needed to comply

To address this non-compliance, the Department has launched a multiyear financial systems modernization program, and DHS Office of Chief Financial Officer and components continue to design, document, and implement compensating controls to reduce the severity of legacy system application functionality limitations. In its [FY 2023 Agency Financial Report](#), DHS has established a target date of FY 2028 for FFMIA correction.

Appendix 3: Abbreviations

ADR - Alternative Dispute Resolution	LWA – Lost Wages Assistance
CARES Act - Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act	OPE – Office of Partnership and Engagement
CIGIE - Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency	NPPD - National Protection and Programs Directorate
CLIP – Claims and Loss Information Portal	OPS – Office of Operations Coordination
CTI – Cyber Threat Indicators	OSINT – Open-Source Intelligence
DATA Act - Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014	PUA – Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
DOL – Department of Labor	PC&I – Procurement, Construction & Improvements
DOJ – Department of Justice	PRAC - Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
EDS – Enforcement Data System	POE – Port of Entry
EFSP - Emergency Food and Shelter Program	RDT&E - research, development, testing, and evaluation
ERO - Enforcement and Removal Operations	SBA – Small Business Administration
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation	SES – Senior Executive Service
FCA – Facility Condition Assessments	SLTT – State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
GAGAS - Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards	TEDS - National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search
GAO – U.S. Government Accountability Office	UC – Unaccompanied Children
HHS – Health and Human Services	UI – Unemployment Insurance
HVA – High Value Assets	U.S.C. – United States Code
HSI – Homeland Security Investigations	USPIS – U.S. Postal Inspection Service
IG Act – Inspector General Act of 1978	WPD – Whistleblower Protection Division
IT – Information Technology	WPU – Whistleblower Protection Unit

[Appendix 4: Index to Reporting Requirements](#)

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401-424, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010* and the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, are listed below, as well as where to find the information in this report.

IG Act Section	Requirement	Report Section
404(a)(2)	Legislative and regulatory reviews	Congressional Briefings
405(b)(1)	Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies	Throughout report
405(b)(1)	Recommendations with respect to significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies	Throughout report
405(b)(2)	Significant recommendations on which corrective action has not been completed	Appendix 1
405(b)(4)	Matters referred to prosecutorial authorities and resulting prosecutions and convictions	Investigations Overview
405(b)(5)	List of audit, inspection, and evaluation reports and where applicable total questioned costs and funds to be put to better use	Appendix 1
405(b)(3)	Summary of significant reports	Significant OIG Activity
405(b)(5)	Statistical table showing reports with questioned and unsupported costs	Appendix 1
405(b)(5)	Statistical table showing reports with recommendations that funds be put to better use	Appendix 1
405(b)(6)	Summary of prior reports with no management decisions	Appendix 1
	Summary of prior reports with no establishment comment returned within 60 days	Nothing to report
	Summary of prior reports with outstanding unimplemented recommendations	Appendix 1

IG Act Section	Requirement	Report Section
405(b)(6)	Significant revised management decisions	Nothing to report
405(b)(6)	Significant management decisions with which DHS OIG disagrees	Appendix 1
405(b)(7)	Information required by § 804(b) of the <i>Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996</i>	Appendix 2
405(b)(8)-(10)	Results of any peer review of DHS OIG by another OIG or date of last peer review, list of outstanding recommendations from any peer review of DHS OIG that have not been fully implemented, and a list of peer reviews conducted by DHS OIG including any outstanding recommendations	Appendix 2
405(b)(11)	Statistical tables showing investigative reports, referrals, and total number of indictments and criminal information resulting from any prior referrals	Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments
405(b)(12)	Metrics used for investigative statistical tables	Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments
405(b)(13)	Investigations involving a Senior Government Employee	Investigations
405(b)(14)	Instances of whistleblower retaliation	Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments
405(b)(15)	Attempts to interfere with OIG independence	Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information
405(b)(15)	Summary of reports to head of establishment when information or assistance requested was unreasonably refused or not provided	Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information
405(b)(16)	Inspections, evaluations, and audits that were closed and not disclosed to the public; and	Appendix 2
	Investigations involving a Senior Government Employee that were closed and not disclosed to the public	Investigations



Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024

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Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

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