



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY **OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

OIG-25-19

March 3, 2025

FINAL REPORT

TSA's Activities Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness, but More Can be Done





OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 | www.oig.dhs.gov

March 3, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: Melanie Harvey
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Administrator
Transportation Security Administration

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

SUBJECT: *TSA's Activities Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness, but More Can Be Done*

**JOSEPH V
CUFFARI**

Digitally signed by
JOSEPH V CUFFARI
Date: 2025.03.03
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Attached for your action is our final report, *TSA's Activities Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness, but More Can Be Done*. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.

The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving TSA's oversight of its passenger rail systems. Your office concurred with both recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider recommendations 1 and 2 open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts. Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the *Inspector General Act*, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please contact me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kristen Bernard, Deputy Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.

Attachment



DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

TSA's Activities Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness, but More Can Be Done

March 3, 2025

Why We Did This Audit

According to TSA, passenger rail systems and other modes of surface transportation in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. TSA plays a leading role in protecting the country's surface transportation systems. Among its responsibilities, TSA engages with passenger rail operators by conducting assessments to address security vulnerabilities and sharing best practices and intelligence information. We conducted this audit to determine to what extent TSA's intelligence sharing and industry engagements enhance the security and preparedness of passenger rail systems.

What We Recommend

We made two recommendations to improve TSA's oversight of passenger rail systems.

For Further Information:

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or email us at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov.

What We Found

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) shared intelligence and engaged with industry stakeholders to enhance passenger rail security and preparedness. Specifically, TSA shared threat information and intelligence products and assessed passenger rail systems to identify security vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. In addition, TSA provided workshops and training to passenger rail system owners and operators to help them better secure their operations.

However, TSA did not always document its industry engagement activities. For example, TSA did not consistently input accurate information, left comment fields blank, and in some cases, did not document its activities in its system of record. TSA's transportation security inspectors did not always document activities, and supervisors did not always review records prior to approving them, because TSA's *Surface Operations Program Manual* did not include guidance for properly recording and reviewing data. Properly documenting its program activities is important because TSA uses data to inform its year-end performance status reports.

Finally, TSA did not provide timely reporting on its progress toward implementing the *National Strategy for Transportation Security* as required by law. According to TSA, it did not submit its 2020 and 2021 reports by the required due dates because COVID-19 impacted data collection. TSA has not recovered from these delays and has not yet reported on 2023 results.

TSA Response

TSA concurred with both recommendations. We included TSA's management response in this report as Appendix B.



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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Background

There are currently 113 passenger rail systems operating in the United States. These systems include heavy rail (subway and metros), light rail, streetcars, monorails, automated guideways, and commuter and intercity passenger railroads. According to passenger rail ridership data from the Federal Transit Administration and other individual passenger rail systems, U.S. passenger rail systems reported 2.8 billion passenger trips in 2022. Passenger rail systems are operated by publicly and privately owned entities.¹

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) plays a leading role in protecting the country’s passenger rail systems and other modes of surface transportation. These other modes include mass transit, freight rail, highway and motor carrier, and pipeline. Figure 1 shows examples of different modes of surface transportation. According to TSA, passenger rail and other modes of surface transportation are vulnerable to terrorist attacks such as incidents involving small arms or edged weapons, vehicle ramming, and improvised explosive devices. For example, a man opened fire on a Brooklyn subway train in 2022, wounding 10 passengers with a handgun. Surface transportation systems are difficult to secure because their open architecture is designed to move people and goods quickly based on publicly available and observable schedules with defined patterns of movement.

Figure 1. Types of Surface Transportation



Source: TSA

Although TSA is responsible for securing all modes of transportation per the *Aviation and Transportation Security Act*,² the responsibility for carrying out safety and security measures for mass transit and passenger rail falls primarily on system owners and operators. TSA’s responsibilities include engaging with passenger rail operators by conducting assessments to address security vulnerabilities and sharing best practices and intelligence information. This framework is different from the aviation mode of transportation, where TSA provides direct security such as screening passengers and their property for prohibited items before allowing them on board commercial flights.

¹ Examples of passenger rail system owners and operators include Amtrak (a rail operator that provides service nationwide), Maryland Area Regional Commuter (a commuter rail system in the Washington–Baltimore area), and Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (or Metra, a commuter rail system serving the Chicago area).

² The *Aviation and Transportation Security Act* established the TSA in 2001. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Section 403) directed the transfer of TSA, including all security functions, from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security.



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In October 2019, TSA established the Surface Operations office within its division of Security Operations. Surface Operations implements policy and develops guidance for transportation security inspectors (officials who assess and inspect passenger rail operations to determine whether owners use established guidelines and comply with security regulations). TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis also plays a role in securing surface transportation systems; it ensures Surface Operations has timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence to inform and support the owners and operators of transportation systems. TSA's Policy, Plans, and Engagement's Surface Division develops surface transportation security policies and engages with relevant TSA offices and industry stakeholders. In fiscal year 2023, TSA received \$154.7 million to oversee the Nation's surface transportation systems, which represents about 2 percent of TSA's overall budget.

TSA's oversight activities with respect to securing passenger rail systems in the United States are governed by existing guidelines and publications. The biennial *National Strategy for Transportation Security*³ (a joint publication by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation) addresses the security of transportation assets in the United States that must be protected from attack or disruption by terrorists or other hostile forces. In addition, TSA's *Surface Operations Program Manual* (issued in April 2022)⁴ offers guidance to transportation security inspectors on assessing and inspecting surface systems' operations. The manual also outlines roles and responsibilities for these transportation security inspectors, regional security inspectors, and other regional and headquarters personnel.

We conducted this audit to determine to what extent TSA's intelligence sharing and industry engagements enhance the security and preparedness of passenger rail systems.

Results of Audit

TSA Shared Intelligence that Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness

As part of its responsibilities, TSA advises passenger rail owners and operators on matters relating to surface transportation security and shares intelligence to enhance passenger rail security and preparedness.

TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis shared intelligence with passenger rail owners and operators through its 65 field intelligence officers⁵ assigned to metropolitan areas across the

³ Title 49 U.S. Code § 114 (s)(1) (A) and (B).

⁴ The full title of the manual is the *Transportation Security Administration Security Operations Surface Operations Program Manual*, dated April 22, 2022.

⁵ This number includes three vacancies.



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country. In October 2022, TSA established the Surface Information Sharing Cell to share information about threats with key surface transportation stakeholders.⁶ As of June 2024, the sharing cell had 465 members and representatives from 42 passenger rail systems.⁷ According to TSA, during the scope of our audit, the sharing cell held virtual meetings twice a week⁸ and convened for occasional in-person meetings, referred to as industry days, at TSA headquarters in Springfield, Virginia. During these meetings, TSA shared intelligence briefings related to surface transportation with stakeholders.

We reviewed briefings, which included topics such as research, trend analysis, and summary threat analysis. For example, an Intelligence-Information Threat briefing TSA gave to surface transportation stakeholders in February 2023 covered topics that were planned for an upcoming industry day, such as physical threats to critical infrastructure.

TSA also distributed intelligence reports to passenger rail owners and operators through its field intelligence officers and the Homeland Security Information Network.⁹ According to TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, it issued 104 intelligence reports with critical threat information related to surface transportation between FYs 2019 and 2023. Of those intelligence reports, 18 directly related to passenger rail and covered a variety of topics such as a New York City subway bombing, an arrest following a train derailment, and terrorism threat assessments. These reports included information such as research findings, trend analyses, summaries of threat assessments, and yearly statistics on global terrorist attacks.

We surveyed officials from 12 passenger rail systems to determine whether they were satisfied with TSA's intelligence information. Some of the questions we asked included:

- How do you receive security- and intelligence-related information from TSA?
- Have you participated in TSA's Surface Information Sharing Cell meetings?
- Do you find the security- and intelligence-related information you receive useful? Please explain why or why not.

Officials from 9 of 12 passenger rail systems responded to our questionnaire and stated that they were generally satisfied with the information TSA shares with them.

⁶ Surface transportation stakeholders include entities such as passenger rail systems; law enforcement; and Federal, state, and local government agencies.

⁷ Although the scope of our report was FY 2019 to FY 2023, TSA informed us that as of December 2024, the sharing cell had 575 total members and representatives from 55 passenger rail systems.

⁸ According to TSA, it increased the weekly virtual meetings to 3 days a week in February 2024 and to 5 days a week in August 2024.

⁹ The Homeland Security Information Network, or HSIN, is DHS' system to access homeland security data, send requests securely between agencies, manage operations, coordinate planned event safety and security, respond to incidents, and share information.



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TSA Conducted Industry Engagements that Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness

As part of its oversight role, TSA works with industry partners to develop standards and best practices within or across the surface transportation modes. These industry standards and best practices include establishing security and emergency response plans, defining security management roles and responsibilities, and conducting background investigations on employees and contractors. TSA incorporated these standards and best practices into the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) assessment.

According to TSA, the BASE assessment is a comprehensive review of security programs to enhance threat prevention and protection and increase response preparedness. The BASE assessment is TSA's primary method of identifying vulnerabilities in the security posture of passenger rail systems. When assessing the security of a passenger rail system, TSA inspectors determine, for example, whether the system has an established written system security plan and emergency response plan; whether the system's employees are knowledgeable of and well-prepared to develop, disseminate, and implement these plans; and whether the system has a process to conduct background investigations on its employees and contractors. TSA details BASE assessment findings in a report with recommendations and shares these results with passenger rail system owners and operators to improve their security posture.

Passenger rail system owners and operators are not required to participate in a BASE assessment. Therefore, TSA cannot compel them to participate. However, of the 113 passenger rail systems currently in operation, 105 have had at least one BASE assessment since 2006. The remaining 8 passenger rail systems have not been assessed.¹⁰ From FYs 2019 to 2023, TSA completed 67 BASE assessments on 56 passenger rail systems.

In addition to the BASE assessments, TSA conducted other assessments and activities to help strengthen passenger rail system security postures. From FYs 2020 to 2023,¹¹ TSA conducted:

- **577 Security Enhancements Through Assessment.** These covert operations involve placing unattended or suspicious bags on transit vehicles before required pre-trip, mid-trip, or post-trip inspections. Additional options include using suspicious individuals, suspicious bags, or unattended bags within stations, yards, and depots to assess front-

¹⁰ These eight passenger rail systems accounted for 1,980,733 passenger trips (or about .07 percent) of the 2.8 billion passenger trips made in 2022.

¹¹ We gathered information from TSA's year-end reports, which recorded activities for all surface transportation modes. The FY 2019 year-end reported information is not included because TSA presented activities as percentages, which were not comparable with the numerical data reported for FYs 2020 through 2023.



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line employees' security awareness, reporting procedures, and challenge procedures.

- 352 Exercise Information System Workshops. These workshops are designed to prepare passenger rail owners and operators to effectively respond to security incidents as well as to examine a system's implementation of security measures. These workshops involve discussion-based tabletop exercises focused on multi-agency coordination to respond to a security incident. They provide opportunities for participants to better understand the roles of their respective agencies, their employees, and their security partners.
- 3,645 Risk Mitigation Activities for Surface Transportation. This program incorporates awareness trainings and intelligence briefings to engage with passenger rail owners and operators on topics related to risk mitigation. These trainings and briefings are tailored to the interests of the owners and operators, who request such presentations from TSA. One example of these trainings is First Observer Plus, which contains elements to help passenger rail systems and their employees recognize suspicious activity that may be related to terrorism, assess what they see, and report their observations.

TSA Did Not Always Document Industry Engagement Activities

TSA did not always properly document its program activities in accordance with its requirements. According to the 2022 *Surface Operations Program Manual*, transportation security inspectors must thoroughly document any incidents, inspections, and engagements with passenger rail owners and operators in the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS), TSA's primary system of record. These records must include the actions completed, results, and total time spent conducting these activities.

We analyzed PARIS records and identified missing records, contradictory information, and blank comment fields. A comparison of PARIS and the Surface Data Management System (SDMS)¹² showed that 29 of the 67 (43 percent) BASE assessments conducted from FYs 2019 to 2023 were not recorded in PARIS. In addition, some PARIS records listed two different entities or locations in the same record. For example, a single PARIS record cited the Greater Richmond Transit Company in Richmond, Virginia, and the Long Island Railroad in New York City, New York. This record documented an activity conducted for a transit system in Virginia and is not affiliated with the system in New York. Finally, some records had no information in the comment fields describing TSA's actions. Specifically, 2,757 of 11,831 (23 percent) engagement records contained no information in the comment fields. Per the *Surface Operations Program Manual*, inspector notes should include relevant information and details to aid in completing PARIS records.

¹² TSA uses SDMS to record the detailed results of BASE assessments.



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The *Surface Operations Program Manual* also describes roles and responsibilities of both inspectors and supervisors, including that:

- inspectors must thoroughly document their activities;
- supervisors review and approve records in PARIS; and
- regional security inspectors and other headquarters personnel perform random quality control reviews of PARIS records for accuracy; adherence to guidance, standards, and procedures; and attention to detail and thoroughness.

However, the manual does not provide instructions on how to properly input and review these records. We determined that TSA supervisors did not adequately review the records they approved in PARIS, even though the manual requires them to review these records.

Incomplete and inaccurate PARIS data affects the accuracy of year-end performance status reports, which inform future annual workplans. Further, data quality issues limit TSA's ability to identify trends and analyze the results of its surface operations, which may negatively impact TSA's decision making. Ultimately, TSA's data quality issues could impact its planned activities to assist owners and operators with enhancing passenger rail security.

TSA Did Not Report Its Transportation Security Performance to Congress in a Timely Manner

The United States Code (U.S.C.)¹³ requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees¹⁴ on DHS' progress made toward implementing the *National Strategy for Transportation Security*. The reports are due in February of each year. To comply with the reporting requirements, TSA develops and submits its *Annual Report on Transportation Security* to Congress. Since 2019, TSA has submitted three reports covering 4 years to Congress; all three submissions were late. Table 1 shows TSA's timeline regarding the annual reports.

¹³ See 49 U.S.C. § 114(s)(4)(B), 49 U.S.C. § 44938(a), 49 U.S.C. § 114 note, 115 Stat 613-614, 6 U.S.C. § 1141, and 6 U.S.C. § 1161. 49 U.S.C. § 114(s)(4)(B) relates to the National Strategy for Transportation Security and requires annual reporting in conjunction with the submission of the budget (Title 39, section 1105(a)).

¹⁴ The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.



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Table 1. Timeline for the *Annual Report on Transportation Security*

Report Year	Required Issue Date	Issue Date and Status
2019	2020	February 23, 2021
2020	2021	N/A (Combined with 2021 due to COVID-19)
2021	2022	April 10, 2023
2022	2023	October 10, 2024
2023	2024	Not Started ¹⁵

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General analysis of TSA’s *Annual Report on Transportation Security*

According to TSA, it fell behind in submitting these reports because COVID-19 impacted the data collection and reporting process for the 2020 and 2021 annual performance reports. TSA also stated that it had other documents to prepare in addition to the *Annual Report on Transportation Security*. Further, TSA stated that gathering data for agencies outside of TSA also contributed to the delay. As a result, TSA combined both years into one report, which was issued to Congress in April 2023, over 1 year past the reporting deadline.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic affected operations in 2020 and 2021, it was not a cause for TSA’s delayed reporting for later years. As Table 1 shows, TSA appears to be delayed in reporting its progress made in 2023. Without these annual reports, Congress may be unaware of program activities, key accomplishments, and issues impacting surface transportation. Without timely reporting, Congress is also unable to monitor progress of the surface transportation security programs and may be receiving outdated information.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: We recommend that TSA evaluate and revise, as appropriate, its *Surface Operations Program Manual* and ensure accurate data collection and detailed supervisory reviews.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that TSA complete the 2023 *Annual Report on Transportation Security* and submit the report to Congress.

¹⁵ TSA began working on the next report (covering FY 2023 and FY 2024) on November 5, 2024, and anticipates publishing it by the end of June 2025.



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Management Comments and OIG Analysis

TSA provided management comments on a draft of this report. We included the comments in their entirety in Appendix B. We also received technical comments from TSA on the draft report and revised the report as appropriate. TSA concurred with both recommendations. A summary of TSA's response and our analysis follows.

TSA Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. TSA Surface Operations is revising the *Surface Operations Program Manual* to include guidance for field personnel regarding data collection and guidance to regional staff reviewing and approving data entries in PARIS. Before finalizing the revised manual, TSA Surface Operations will provide a Surface Information Notice and associated training to personnel performing the quality control reviews. Estimated Completion Date: June 30, 2025.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. Based on TSA's response, we consider this recommendation open and resolved. This recommendation will remain open until we receive a copy of the manual, the Surface Information Notice, and outlines of related training.

TSA Response to Recommendation 2: Concur. TSA is drafting the next Annual Report on Transportation Security and will consolidate reporting for FYs 2023 and 2024 into one report. TSA anticipates publishing this report by the end of June 2025, which will bring TSA up to date in its required annual reporting. Estimated Completion Date: June 30, 2025.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. Based on TSA's response, we consider this recommendation open and resolved. This recommendation will remain open until we received a copy of the published report.



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Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Pub. L. No. 107-296) by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*.

Our objective was to determine to what extent TSA's intelligence sharing and industry engagements enhance the security and preparedness of passenger rail systems. We reviewed TSA's activities between FY 2019 and FY 2023.

To answer our audit objective, we interviewed TSA officials from various offices including:

- Surface Operations;
- Intelligence and Analysis;
- Policy, Plans, and Engagement; and
- Requirements and Capabilities Analysis.

We obtained data extracts from PARIS and SDMS. PARIS is the primary system of record in which TSA documents incidents, inspections, and engagement activities. TSA records BASE assessment results in SDMS. We assessed the reliability of the PARIS and SDMS data extracts. To assess the completeness of the data, we discussed the methodology TSA officials used to obtain the data we requested. In addition, we compared the extracts we received early in our fieldwork against the extracts we received later in our fieldwork to verify their accuracy. Although we identified deficiencies with one of the datasets, which we noted in the body of this report, they did not adversely affect our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Accordingly, we determined the data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our audit.

We reviewed applicable Federal laws and regulations, TSA policies and procedures including annual Surface Operations Work Plans, DHS OIG and U.S. Government Accountability Office audit reports, media articles, and congressional testimonies related to our audit objective. We assessed internal controls significant within the context of our audit objective and analyzed TSA's activities such as inspections, incidents, and engagements within the scope of our audit.

We visited several Surface Operations field offices in Florida, Georgia, Maryland, New York, Texas, and Virginia. Table 2 shows the field offices we visited.



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Table 2. TSA Surface Operations Field Offices Visited

Location	City, State
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International	Atlanta, GA
Miami International	Miami, FL
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall	Baltimore, MD
John F. Kennedy International	New York City, NY
Albany International	Albany, NY
George Bush Intercontinental	Houston, TX
Ronald Reagan Washington National	Arlington, VA

Source: DHS OIG

During the site visits, we interviewed intelligence officers and inspectors to obtain a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities related to passenger rail. In addition, we interviewed officials from five passenger rail systems and obtained their views on the level and adequacy of TSA’s intelligence sharing and engagement. To obtain additional input on TSA’s intelligence sharing and industry engagement, we surveyed officials from 12 passenger rail systems.

We conducted this audit from October 2023 through October 2024 pursuant to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401–424, and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information

During this audit, TSA provided timely responses to our requests for information and did not delay or deny access to information we requested.



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Appendix B: TSA Comments on the Draft Report




U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration
6595 Springfield Center Drive
Springfield, Virginia 20588

BY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

February 6, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

FROM: Melanie Harvey 
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Administrator
Transportation Security Administration

SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report: "TSA's Activities
Enhanced Passenger Rail Security and Preparedness, but
More Can Be Done" (Project No. 23-049-AUD-TSA)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

TSA leadership is pleased to note OIG's positive recognition that TSA shared intelligence information and engaged with industry stakeholders to enhance passenger rail security and preparedness. OIG also acknowledged that TSA shared threat information and intelligence products and assessed passenger rail systems to identify security vulnerabilities and mitigate risks, and that TSA provided workshops and training to passenger rail systems owners and operators to help them better secure their operations. TSA remains committed to working collaboratively with surface transportation operators, local, state and federal security partners to ensure appropriate security and preparedness postures are employed.

The draft report contained 2 recommendations with which TSA concurs. Attached find our detailed response to each recommendation. TSA previously submitted technical comments addressing several accuracy, contextual, and other issues under a separate cover for OIG's consideration, as appropriate.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you again in the future.

Attachment



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Attachment: Management Response to Recommendations Contained in OIG 23-049-AUD-TSA

OIG recommended that TSA:

Recommendation 1: Evaluate and Revise, as appropriate, its Surface Operations Program Manual and ensure accurate data collection and detailed supervisory reviews.

Response: Concur. TSA Security Operations/Surface Operations is currently revising the "Surface Operations Program Manual," (SPM)¹ to include guidance for field personnel regarding data collection. Once complete, the updated SPM will require data collected to be reported in TSA's primary system of record, the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) system. This updated SPM will also provide guidance to regional staff reviewing and approving data entries in PARIS. Program managers and regional supervisors will provide quality control to approved and/or submitted PARIS entries completed by Transportation Security Inspectors. Prior to finalization of the revised SPM, TSA Security Operations/Surface Operations will provide a Surface Information Notice, and associated training, to personnel performing the quality control reviews which will outline the process in its entirety. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): June 30, 2025.

Recommendation 2: Complete the 2023 Annual Report on Transportation Security and submit the report to Congress.

Response: Concur. TSA is in the process of drafting the next Annual Report on Transportation Security and will consolidate reporting for fiscal years 2023 and 2024 into one report. The report is anticipated to be published by the end of June 2025 and will bring TSA current in its required annual reporting. This effort will be led by the TSA Office of Strategy, Policy Coordination, and Innovation, which leads the development of the next annual report in coordination with interagency and Co-Sector Risk Management Agency partners, as appropriate, including but not limited to the Department of Transportation and the US Coast Guard. ECD: June 30, 2025.

¹ "Surface Operations Program Manual," dated April 22, 2022.

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Appendix C: Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
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Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees

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